10: Lessons for the Future

“The lessons and recommendations from the Lancet enquiry appear relevant here.”
IPCC Review Panel

Chapter Summary

This chapter deals with four of the ‘high profile’ cases the Inquiry considered:

Superintendent Ali Dizaei
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick
Chief Inspector Julia Pendry
Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi
Lessons to be learnt

10.1 In this chapter, we will consider four cases in detail in order to identify lessons the MPS can learn from the way these cases were handled.

10.2 Paragraph 4 of our terms of reference asks us “to identify lessons to be learnt from the outcome of recent high profile cases (including recommendations made by the Gurpal Virdi Inquiry, and the outcome of the case involving Supt. Dizaei).”

10.3 However, our terms of reference did not include a definition of the phrase ‘high profile case’ or a list of such cases, although they did mention Superintendent Dizaei and Detective Sergeant Virdi. One of our first tasks as an Inquiry, therefore, was to seek the assistance of stakeholders in identifying those cases generally regarded as being ‘high profile’. This led to the Secretary to the Inquiry writing to the MPA, the Police Federation, the MET-TUS and the staff support associations operating in the MPS, asking them to nominate appropriate cases.

10.4 We then compiled a list of 11 cases from those nominated to us. Two of the individuals did not wish to participate in the exercise which left us with nine cases.

10.5 We invited submissions from all nine individuals involved in the cases asking them to address a series of questions and issues. We are most grateful to these individuals for taking the time and trouble to set out their experiences in order to contribute to our work.

10.6 Having considered these submissions, we commissioned independent reviews in relation to seven of the cases, where we wished to clarify some of the facts. We felt we had sufficient information in the other two cases. Two of the reviews were carried out by an experienced HR professional and the other five by two former senior police officers from police services outside London.

10.7 The three professionals who carried out the reviews were given a brief by the Inquiry and reviewed original documentation held by the MPS and the MPA. We relied on their experience and professional judgement to look at relevant material and we are satisfied that they fulfilled their remit. We invited the individuals involved and the MPS to comment on our investigators’ reports.

10.8 Having considered the reports we had commissioned, we invited four of the seven individuals to give evidence and took their cases up with the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, when he came to give evidence on the second occasion. It is these four cases we are using to identify the ‘lessons to be learnt’. They are all cases which have attracted a significant amount of interest from the media and the public.

10.9 Our decision not to deal with the other five cases in detail should not be taken to mean that we do not think that the MPS has anything to learn from the way these cases were handled. Quite the reverse, we believe that there is merit in examining all cases once they are concluded and attempting to identify lessons for the future. We dealt with this specifically when we referred to Employment Tribunal cases earlier in our report.

10.10 Indeed, the details of the experiences of the individuals involved in all nine cases and the recommendations they made, together with those of the other 66 individuals who made submissions to us, have proved invaluable in assisting us in reaching our conclusions and in drafting this report.

10.11 Turning to the four cases we deal with in this chapter, we received evidence in relation to the high profile cases from the individuals involved, staff organisations and other commentators.

10.12 We have carefully reviewed all the evidence we have received, including the submissions of the individuals involved, other documents available to us and the reports of the independent investigators we engaged. We are mindful of the fact that we are necessarily considering the cases with the benefit of hindsight and have tempered our conclusions accordingly.

10.13 Our comments on each of the four cases begin with a summary of the facts surrounding the investigation. This is drawn from the work of our independent investigators and other evidence. We then outline criticisms of the way each case was handled. We do not outline all the criticisms we have heard but only those we consider are justified. Finally, we set out the lessons which we consider can be learnt as a result of the way each case was handled.

Superintendent Jamshid Ali Dizaei

10.14 Superintendent Dizaei was born in Iran. He was educated in the United Kingdom from the age of 12. He joined Thames Valley Police Service in 1985 and was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1990.

10.15 He was promoted to the rank of Inspector in 1993 and in 1997 became a Chief Inspector. He transferred to the MPS on promotion to the rank of Superintendent on 29th March 1999.

10.16 The following is a summary of the details of the investigation, drawn from our independent investigators’ report:

Chronology

29 March 1999
Superintendent Dizaei moved to the MPS on promotion to the rank of Superintendent.
June 1999
MPS received information that Superintendent Dizaei was friendly with a known drug dealer in Camden.
July 1999
Operation Bittern commenced. As part of this Operation, approval was given by a Commander, for Superintendent Dizaei’s office telephone at Kensington Police Station to be the subject of a Private Side Intercept (PSI), for an initial period of 4 weeks. This authority was subsequently renewed every 4 weeks until October 1999. Conventional surveillance and lifestyle checks were also authorised.
8 September 1999
Intelligence obtained from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have obtained a discount whilst purchasing a Cartier watch. Further intelligence suggested that he was associating with a solicitor who was connected to two former MPS officers who themselves were considered serious integrity risks.
22 September 1999
Further PSI intelligence suggested Superintendent Dizaei may be trying to resolve a dispute between a personal friend and some local builders and spoke to police officers at Epsom who were dealing with this problem.
24 September 1999
Further PSI intelligence suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may be associating with a nurse who was supplying him with needles.
15 October 1999
The Commander who was authorising the PSI decided that there were no grounds for the intercept to continue, based on the fact that there was no intelligence to show any criminal conduct.
12 November 1999
Conventional surveillance cancelled.
19 November 1999
Authority was given for an integrity test on Superintendent Dizaei.
16 December 1999
Superintendent Dizaei was successful at the extended interview for the Strategic Command Course, but his selection was deferred for 12 months to allow him to gain further experience / development.
28 January 2000
Letter of complaint about Superintendent Dizaei was received by his Borough Commander alleging criminal conduct and harassment in May 1999. The complainant, who was the mother of the victim of these incidents, was interviewed later that night but no witness statement was obtained. Operation Helios commenced.
29 January 2000
Authority was granted for the PSI to be redeployed on Superintendent Dizaei’s office telephone.
31 January 2000
The victim of these incidents was interviewed but no witness statement obtained. During the course of this interview the victim informed the police that Superintendent Dizaei was also assisting Iranian nationals with visas and that he was charging for this service.
3 February 2000
Information was obtained which suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have charged an associate £400 for assisting with a speeding ticket offence.
7 February 2000
Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have received a reward from the organisers of a forthcoming concert for assisting with policing arrangements.
9 February 2000
Witness statement was obtained from the complainant who sent a letter to the police on 28 January 2000.
18 February 2000
Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have associated with a cocaine user.
29 February 2000
Application for renewal of the continued deployment of the PSI was submitted to a Commander. Authority was granted despite the fact that the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) stated that “a number of lines of enquiry, that existed a month ago, into his alleged criminal conduct have been completed with a negative result”. The authority was granted on the basis that “it would gain evidence to prevent further abduction attempts and threats to the safety of the complainant and her daughter. Also in the interest of national security in identifying possible links between Superintendent Dizaei and foreign nationals who are of interest to other agencies.” During the course of this next renewal period (four weeks) Superintendent Dizaei was on annual leave for a period of two weeks.
3 March 2000
The SIO made an entry in his decision log to arrange an interview / conference with at least two key opinion formers from the ethnic community about this operation with the aim of ensuring that it was not biased or unfair.
3 April 2000
MPS officers met representatives of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Los Angeles Police Department and Beverly Hills Police to request assistance in the integrity testing of Superintendent Dizaei.
14 April 2000
Information was received which suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have paid a cheque for £10,000 on 10 April 2000 to an associate who was suspected of money laundering in relation to fraud and drugs.
12 May 2000
MPS officers visited USA and Canada to discuss using an undercover officer for an integrity test.
25 May 2000
Intelligence from PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may be continuing to associate with individuals suspected of fraud and drug offences.
15 June 2000
CPS wrote to MPS outlining their serious concerns about a proposed integrity test and stating that there was little or no evidence to substantiate the MPS’ suspicions about Superintendent Dizaei.
5 July 2000
Operation review conference held.
24 July 2000
CPS wrote to the MPS again setting out concerns about any integrity test.
31 July 2000
Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have added his girlfriend’s name to his car insurance and advised her what to do if she were involved in an accident on her way to work, as this insurance did not cover travelling to work.
22 August 2000
Intelligence from PSI indicated that Superintendent Dizaei was giving advice to an associate about an incident involving a motor vehicle. He also gave advice to the officer who was investigating this matter.
25 August 2000
Strategic Review meeting held.
4 September 2000
Meeting between Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and Commander to discuss the proportionality of the operation after the strategic review conducted on 25 August.
4 September 2000
SIO made a decision log entry regarding the formation of an Independent Advisory Group.
5 September 2000
An undercover officer was deployed to commence the integrity test in Superintendent Dizaei’s gym in the UK.
6 September 2000
Superintendent Dizaei made a report of criminal damage to his motor vehicle, claiming it was damaged close to his place of work. At the relevant time he was subject to surveillance, which suggested that his vehicle may have been at a different location.
14 September 2000
Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have been involved in the revocation of a licence at the restaurant of an associate.
15 September 2000
An associate of Superintendent Dizaei was arrested for drink driving and sought advice from him. A cheque for £800 was subsequently passed to Superintendent Dizaei.
19 September 2000
Paper was produced by the MPS (origin unknown) about the proportionality of the Operation.
16 October 2000
Superintendent Dizaei attended a British-Iranian business conference in Los Angeles and gave a speech whilst in full uniform, without authority.
26 October 2000
CPS wrote to the MPS concerning the incident on 22 August 2000 and advised that no criminal offences were disclosed against Superintendent Dizaei.
October 2000
Superintendent Dizaei was introduced to the organiser of an Iranian Concert who raised concerns that he had received a threatening letter.
6 November 2000
Gold strategy meeting was convened to review the progress of the Operation.
23 November 2000
Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have received complimentary tickets for a concert.
5 December 2000
MPS decided to stage a tabletop exercise to review the operational strategy, media strategy and investigation plan for an open, conventional investigation.
20/21 December 2000
Tabletop exercise held in a hotel.
5 January 2001
Strategic meeting followed by a Detective Chief Superintendent making a Policy file entry regarding the conduct of this Operation.
18 January 2001
Superintendent Dizaei was suspended from duty. Regulation 9 Notices served on him and his home, office, car, and gym locker were searched.
2 February 2001
Additional Regulation 9 Notices served.
23 February 2001
Additional Regulation 9 Notice served.
26 March 2001
Second tabletop exercise.
26 March 2001
Strategic Briefing to Independent Advisory Group.
2 April 2004
Superintendent Dizaei issued proceedings against the MPS, alleging race discrimination.
9 April 2001
Gold Review of the Operation.
11 April 2001
Additional Regulation 9 Notice served.
1/2 May 2001
Victim of incidents in May/June 1999 made witness statements.
3 May 2001
Additional Regulation 9 Notices served.
11 May 2001
Superintendent Dizaei was arrested, kept in custody and interviewed for alleged deception.
13/14 June 2001
Third tabletop exercise.
9 July 2001
Gold Strategic Review of Operation.
10/11 July 2001
Superintendent Dizaei re-arrested by appointment and interviewed.
18 September 2001
Superintendent Dizaei re-arrested by appointment and interviewed.
31 May 2002
Superintendent Dizaei issued defamation proceedings against named officers in the MPS.
17 March 2003
Superintendent Dizaei stood trial at the Central Criminal Court.
11 April 2003
Superintendent Dizaei acquitted.
September 2003
CPS decided that no further charges should be preferred against Superintendent Dizaei.
16 September 2003
The NBPA boycotted the MPS recruitment drives and announced a ‘march of solidarity’ on Scotland Yard to be held in November 2003.
24 October 2003
Settlement agreement, which provided for the return to duty of Superintendent Dizaei with him receiving words of advice for the two counts of misconduct which he admitted, his secondment to the NBPA with promotion to Chief Superintendent in due course, his attendance on the Strategic Command Course, an agreement that he would amend his Employment Tribunal claim to omit reference to Operation Helios, that he would not pursue his defamation claim or any private prosecutions or personal complaints, payment of a sum of money to him, a withdrawal by the NBPA of complaints against named senior officers and a public acknowledgment that it was no longer discouraging recruits from ethnic minority backgrounds from applying to the MPS and that it would re-route its march to avoid New Scotland Yard.
March 2004
PCA directed that the MPS should take disciplinary action against Superintendent Dizaei.
1 April 2004
MPS requested that the IPCC review the PCA’s direction to prefer disciplinary charges.
16 June 2004
IPCC decided to reverse the PCA’s decision.

How the case was handled

10.17 A variety of witnesses have been critical of the way in which Operation Helios was handled. We also received evidence from the MPS and have considered all the evidence carefully in reaching our conclusions. We do not repeat here all of the criticisms of the investigation which we received but only outline those criticisms with which we agree.

10.18 As with the other high profile cases, many of the issues which in our view merit criticism are generic and apply to other cases we have examined.

The investigation process

10.19 We have previously identified what we consider to be weaknesses in the way DPS conducts investigations. We think these weaknesses are evident in relation to Operation Helios, where we consider there to have been a fundamental lack of strategic grasp of the investigation and a failure to step back from it, during its course, and objectively assess the evidence that had been gathered.

10.20 Superintendent Dizaei comments on a failure of leadership in relation to the Operation in his submission: “What was clearly taking place was a steam train on its way with no one able to stop the SIO placing more coal in the furnace. There was no U turn and Helios had to continue with more surveillance and more resources. There was no leadership capable of intervention.”

10.21 The decision of the IPCC makes this point clearly:

“The delay has been caused largely by the extent to which in this case it seems to us the criminal inquiries came to dominate the handling of the case inappropriately, with no clear overall strategic grasp of the case at senior level in the MPS evident.

“The disproportionate resources given to the covert surveillance of Supt Dizaei and the many lines of investigation that were pursued to no avail have in our view been a contributory factor in the excessive delays that compromise this case as an example of justice throughout its history. The lessons and recommendations from the Lancet enquiry appear relevant here.

“We consider that several of the misconduct allegations could and should have been investigated as such and prosecuted as such a good time ago, instead of which some of them were put inappropriately into a criminal case that was then abandoned late in the day, and others apparently left in the sidings until all of the criminal matters had been pursued. We consider this to be a typical weakness of the police complaints and misconduct system, reflecting the manner in which too many complaints and misconduct allegations against police officers fail to progress timeously.”

10.22 In response to the criticism of a lack of strategic grasp of the investigation, the MPS strongly disputes that this was the case. It contends that “the evidence shows that the Helios investigation was in fact subject to an unprecedented level of strategic management and external supervision.” It points to the involvement of the Surveillance Commissioner, the Lay Advisors Group (LAG), the MPA, the CPS, the PCA and the trial judge, the Recorder of London. (The Recorder refused Superintendent Dizaei’s application to have the prosecution stayed on the grounds that it was an ‘abuse of process’.)

10.23 We accept that all of these individuals and bodies had an involvement in the case but we do not accept that their involvement constituted strategic management of the investigation, nor do we accept that it was their role to exercise this function. Ultimate responsibility for decision-making in an investigation lies with the MPS. This cannot be abdicated in favour of outside bodies.

10.24 The independent investigators considered that DPS pursued allegations that were difficult to prove in a way that resulted in allegations that were capable of proof being sidelined:

“More important was the fact that the SIO had good evidence to either arrest or at the very least discipline Superintendent Dizaei in respect of the telephone calls to his former girlfriend and her family. Throughout the remainder of 2000 up until the point when Superintendent Dizaei was suspended from duty the PSI continued to be authorised. The review has examined various documents covering this period of time and in summary the quality of the evidence obtained could best be described as limited and as such the continued justification for this facility is questionable.”

10.25 We refer below to our concerns about the way in which the MPS used the LAG in this investigation. It is worth noting here, however, that the MBPA attributes failings in this respect to the lack of strategic grasp of the investigation which we have identified more generally:

“We believe that many of the decisions that were made and actioned during this investigation can only be explained by reference to the fact that no one of sufficient seniority or independence was carrying out the necessary checks and balances required in order to prevent what we consider to have been a serious manipulation of the original IAG concept.”
(Submission from the MBPA.)

10.26 The MPS has pointed out that, in addition to the surveillance reviews, management reviews were conducted by a number of very senior officers and that the evidence does not support that those senior officers abdicated responsibility for intervening in the case.

10.27 Notwithstanding this, our overall impression of the investigation from the evidence we have seen has led us to concur with the views of the IPCC in this respect.

10.28 This lack of co-ordination of the investigation is, we consider, exemplified by the sequential way in which formal notices of alleged misconduct (Regulation 9 Notices) were served on Superintendent Dizaei:

“On the 18 January 2001 when Superintendent Dizaei was suspended he was served with a Regulation 9 Notice, which gave general details of eleven allegations, which were under investigation. Over the following months there were a further five occasions when regulation 9 notices were served although it was not until the 10 and 11 July 2001 that Superintendent Dizaei was interviewed about any of the allegations.”
(Independent Investigator’s report.)

10.29 The MPS has commented that Regulation 9 Notices were served on Superintendent Dizaei at times and locations convenient to him to minimise potential distress. It also contends that one delay in serving some Regulation 9 Notices in 2001 was “due to intelligence being turned into evidence once the investigation became overt … It needed that 6 months to develop the intelligence. The investigation wanted to avoid unnecessary service of Regulation 9 notices until the picture was clearer.”

10.30 Our investigators’ conclusions are somewhat different:

“What this staged service has left the MPS open to is the allegation that it was designed to inflict the most stress and anxiety on Superintendent Dizaei. Similarly that the service of the notices was a reaction to legal advice that there was insufficient evidence to proceed on criminal matters and that consequently the MPS were resorting to discipline matters. The situation was far from ideal.”
(Independent investigators’ report.)

10.31 In addition, Superintendent Dizaei told us in his submission that: “My lawyers who have represented superintendents for many years were astonished in the way the investigation was unfolding. It seemed to them and others that there was no coordination, no aim but a series of seat of the pants decisions based on no rational [sic] or logic.”

10.32 We think this lack of co-ordination led to an unfocused and disproportionate investigation, where the MPS concentrated on minutiae that were unlikely to take the matter much further and seemingly put evidence of greater strength on a back burner.

10.33 In response to this criticism, the MPS cites problems with the legislative framework for police discipline, in particular section 75 (3) Police Act 1996. This section has now been replaced but it is still the case that, if a criminal offence may have been committed, no misconduct process can take place until the Director of Public Prosecutions has considered the criminal aspects.

10.34 We accept that this represents the legal position but consider that the lack of co-ordination led to efforts being directed at attempting to find evidence to support a criminal case, as opposed to simply moving ahead with conduct proceedings. We are not alone in our view and cite again the views of the IPCC Review Panel:

“We consider that several of the misconduct allegations could and should have been investigated as such and prosecuted as such a good time ago, instead of which some of them were put inappropriately into a criminal case that was then abandoned late in the day, and others apparently left in the sidings until all of the criminal matters had been pursued.”

10.35 The MPS has told us that what emerges from consideration of Operation Helios is that: “those who have had the widest extent of exposure to the case, with the obvious exception of Superintendent Dizaei, appear to be most satisfied as to proportionality and those who have not had such access, appear less satisfied. In the end the MPS accepts, and has always accepted, that mistakes will have been made but would rely on the fact that the most detailed scrutiny of this case occurred during the trial … after four weeks of voir dire presented by one of the finest defence advocates of the criminal bar, the Recorder of London specifically and wholly rejected defence submissions that the investigation had been characterised by bad faith and disproportionality.”

10.36 We have considered the text of the Recorder’s judgment in which he concludes: “I do not find that there was any element at all of bad faith. Nor do I find despite some minor errors that there was anything approaching serious fault amounting to gross negligence in the course of the operation.”

10.37 We accept, of course, that, in reaching this conclusion, the Recorder considered the conduct of the investigation. However, his task was very different from ours. He was asked to consider whether the prosecution of Superintendent Dizaei constituted an abuse of process. We accept his finding that it did not.

10.38 Notwithstanding this, we remain concerned about a number of features of the investigation which we consider to be disproportionate. The IPCC also expressed concerns about disproportionality: “The disproportionate resources given to the covert surveillance of Supt Dizaei and the many lines of investigation that were pursued to no avail have in our view been a contributory factor in the excessive delays that compromise this case as an example of justice throughout its history.” (Decision of the IPCC Review Panel.)

10.39 It is certainly difficult to understand, given the allegations made against Superintendent Dizaei of which we are aware, how, for example, the following situation could have been justified:

“My eating habits were of particular interest to my accusers. I think in the region of ten statements were taken in the local restaurants I ate at to see whether I ate halal meat. A four page statement was taken from the canteen manager as to whether I eat curry on a Thursday. I say no more.”
(Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.)

10.40 In short, from the evidence we have seen, we consider that there was a lack of strategic direction resulting in a failure to apply a robust objective analysis which we think DPS should apply to all investigations.

“I think it is only proper and appropriate that a complaint against a police officer should be investigated, but that is said with the proviso that it is equally incumbent on the investigator to use rational judgment, fairness and unbiased criteria in investigating that complaint.”
(Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.)

Gold Group

10.41 We are concerned about the way in which the MPS used a Gold Group in relation to Operation Helios. As we understand it, in the MPS, Gold Groups are formed when there is a ‘critical incident’. The definition in the MPS’ Investigation of Critical Incidents Manual (2002) is “any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and / or the community.”

10.42 In passing, we note that there has been no general agreement to this definition being extended to apply to cases such as Operation Helios.

10.43 In essence the MPS has argued that a Gold Group was formed in this case because “the investigation of a senior police officer, regardless of race or gender, has the potential for a significant impact on a community”. We do not agree that the seniority of the officer concerned, in itself, would necessarily lead to a significant impact on a community, although we can see that Superintendent Dizaei’s race may well have been an issue.

10.44 From the evidence we have considered, we can see that there was a point in the investigation into Superintendent Dizaei when a Gold Group could have been established appropriately, to advise on the possible impact on the community of the arrest of such a senior and high profile minority ethnic officer.

10.45 However, our concern is the involvement of the Gold Group in the strategic management of the investigation, which is the role of senior officers in DPS.

10.46 Under the current disciplinary system as operated by the MPS, investigations into the alleged misconduct of an officer below ACPO rank are the responsibility of DPS. The MPS argues that a Gold Group is formed to strengthen decision-making and accountability. In our view, the use of a Gold Group in this case only served to blur the lines of decision-making and accountability.

Policy File / Decision Log

10.47 We have already noted our concern about the failure of DPS always to maintain a proper written record of decisions made during the course of an investigation. For Operation Helios, a policy file was maintained but, as our investigators highlighted, it failed to document key decisions:

“The decision not to inform [Superintendent Dizaei] is outlined in decision log 1 on 29 January 2000 and reviewed at decision log 18 on 14 February 2000 and again at log 20 on 28 February 2000. In each case the reason not to do so relates to there being an ongoing criminal investigation, which was likely to be jeopardised should Superintendent Dizaei have become aware of its existence. The policy log fails to go into any detail as to how it is thought he would place the investigation in jeopardy. …

“With regard to the arrest of Superintendent Dizaei in May 2001 the review has had sight of an MPS document headed ‘Operational Strategy’. This document is undated, but it has clearly been prepared around the time that the operation was moving from the covert to overt stage. Contained within this document is a paragraph, which reads, ‘Mozart [code name for Superintendent Dizaei] will not be arrested at this stage, the evidence to justify doing so is weak’. No further record or Decision Log entry has been made by the SIO to justify a change of stance when in fact the evidence against him was no stronger.”
(Independent investigators’ report.)

10.48 Failure to record the reasoning behind key decisions during any investigation puts the MPS at risk. It means that the organisation does not have an adequate audit trail of decisions made. Inevitably, this makes it difficult for the organisation both to justify actions if they later become subject to scrutiny, and to rebut allegations that it has discriminated against the officer concerned or infringed his or her human rights.

Lay Advisors

10.49 We welcome the use of the IAG in appropriate cases and have made recommendations in a previous chapter about how the IAG might be put on a stronger and more transparent footing. We have also commented about the way in which the LAG was used during Operation Helios. We have expressed our concern that they were not given all the relevant information nor informed of the decision to settle the case:

“There is no indication in the researched paperwork that suggests that these concerns as to the validity of some of the proposed methods of investigation and their proportionality were ever brought to the attention of those providing independent advice or peer review. The tone of the letters from [redacted] is at odds with the tone of documents being provided to those advising the investigation. It is open to speculation as to whether their conclusions would have been different if they have been made aware of the shortcomings outlined by the CPS.”
(Independent investigators’ report.)

10.50 If external advisors are to be used by the MPS, the benefit the organisation may gain from this process is greatly reduced if they are not brought in at an early stage of the investigation or if they do not have full access to all relevant documentation. A number of people told us about their perception that the valuable asset of the LAG was used selectively, evidenced in relation to Operation Helios by the failure of the MPS to inform them of the settlement agreement with Superintendent Dizaei.

10.51 This could give rise to the perception that the organisation does not really value the Lay Advisors’ input with regard to decisions that really count, and that it is only concerned to use them to ‘race-proof’ decisions it is sure it can already justify. When asked, however, how he could be sure that there was no ‘race-proofing’ involved in the process in which he took part, Lord Dholakia, a member of the LAG involved in Operation Helios, refuted that allegation:

“I was given every documentation that was available and I spent two days studying those documents in the privacy of my own room, without any help from anybody else, and I was able to come to a judgment at that particular stage, and I made it very clear that if at any stage I felt there was any racial, cultural or religious bias I would jump like a ton of bricks, and it never happened.”
(Evidence of Lord Dholakia.)

10.52 Representatives of the LAG have commented that: “The Helios LAG was composed of individuals drawn from different professional backgrounds, faith, ethnic and cultural groups, all of whom gave their time voluntarily and exercised their views independently … Individual members shared a common view throughout our work on Helios.”

10.53 We do not seek to criticise either the individual Lay Advisors themselves or the work of the LAG. Our concern, as set out above, is how the MPS treated the Lay Advisors by not providing them with all the relevant information and documents.

10.54 Similar considerations apply to the use of other external advisors, who need to be given a full account of all relevant information and have their advice considered constructively.

“ACU (the Anti Corruption Unit) also sought the advice of [redacted], a Deputy Chief Constable, and yet failed to inform [redacted] that others members of the NBPA were being investigated. More importantly the DCC (from whom advice had been sought) specifically recommended that the mileage allegations should not be subject of discipline (due the triviality and age of the claims) let alone a criminal trial. Yet that advice was wholly ignored. Cherry picking of bits and pieces of advice from ‘advisors’ to fit a prescribed agenda is contrary to common sense, disingenuous and abuse of the role of advisors. However, the MPA were quick to argue that because a DCC had quality assured the investigation and conduct of the officers, they as a police authority did not need to address our complaint.”
(Submission of the NBPA.)

Settlement Agreement

10.55 The IPCC strongly criticised the MPS’ decision to enter into a settlement agreement with Superintendent Dizaei in the way that it did:

“We have also considered the agreement between the MPS and others dated 24 October 2004 [sic – should be 2003] and referred to above. The agreement sets out the terms to facilitate the reinstatement of Supt Dizaei within the MPS. As noted, this agreement is ultra vires and does not bind the PCA or the IPCC insofar as parts of the agreement relate to the termination of misconduct proceedings against Supt Dizaei, a point conceded by the MPS. Whilst we note that the MPS has withdrawn the undertaking rashly given to Mr Dizaei’s solicitors to offer no evidence at any misconduct tribunal, we are of the view that it can now be argued to be unfair to Supt Dizaei to proceed with a hearing. Mr Dizaei entered into the agreement with the benefit of legal advice, and he can, not unreasonably, seek to rely on the undertaking he was given by the MPS. In any other employment context such an agreement would stand. We have to weigh the public interest in upholding the special powers accorded the PCA/IPCC under the police disciplinary system with the application of the principles of justice applicable in any such individual case. As noted above, we consider subordinating the latter to the former risks frustrating the very objective sought.

“The MPS has relied in its arguments for not proceeding with a disciplinary hearing primarily on broader public interest arguments concerned with the needs of the police service to recruit and retain more people from black and minority ethnic groups, and specifically its assessment that in this case to set aside the agreement reached with the Black Police Association would be to jeopardise its own strategy and plans for such recruitment. We have given careful consideration to these arguments but dismiss them as matters that do not have sufficient pertinence to either the case in hand or to the specific public interest in upholding the police disciplinary system. They are essentially extraneous management concerns, legitimate and important in their own right but never sensible grounds for manipulating a disciplinary system. Indeed the failure of the MPS to keep the two separate has led to the confusion and poor judgements characterising this case.”
(Decision of the IPCC Review Panel.)

10.56 We asked the Deputy Commissioner about the IPCC’s criticism and he made clear that, in the MPS’ view, there were over-riding strategic management concerns which justified the approach taken. Superintendent Dizaei referred to these when he gave evidence:

“… once you look at where this case started, the cost to the taxpayer, the cost to the confidence of policing, the trauma it caused to my family, to my colleagues, to my community, and the potential damage this would have had as this matter went to discipline – which, from my understanding, a further eminent QC was appointed to represent the Metropolitan Police – and for it to then go to an employment tribunal listed for four months, I think it was perfectly sensible for all those involved, the Metropolitan Police Authority, the Commissioner and my legal team, to try to resolve this problem and I am delighted that they did.”
(Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.)

10.57 To an extent, we understand the MPS’ concerns at the time, in particular its desire to resolve intractable management issues facing the organisation. However, we consider that it is never appropriate for a public body such as the MPS to enter into an agreement that is ultra vires, and which is likely to bring the organisation into disrepute with its own staff and officers, as well as the wider public.

10.58 Failing to consult the PCA, which had a statutory role in the case at the time the settlement agreement was drafted, was a fundamental error, as the Commissioner himself pointed out when he gave evidence: “I do not know whether Ian Blair actually contacted the PCA. If it had been me as Deputy Commissioner I would have contacted the PCA and they would have been involved in negotiations, because remember, of course, they had the job of supervising that inquiry from start to finish.”

Media issues

10.59 A number of criticisms have been made of the way in which the MPS handled media issues during Operation Helios. Superintendent Dizaei contends that the organisation had a proactive media strategy that apparently was devised with little regard to the welfare of a serving police officer who had not been found guilty of any misconduct:

“On 18th January 2001 I was asked to attend [redacted]’s office … and I was suspended. It was only then I was told of operation Helios and informed that my house, my car and premises belonging to my friends and family were being searched. My phone and warrant card was taken off me and I was told to get out. Rather than providing any support or welfare for me as a human being let alone a fellow colleague after a clear shock and trauma my colleagues decided to place me under further surveillance and tap the surrounding phone boxes … I called home to be told by my terrified children that they could not go to school because there were 30 reporters standing outside my house since 7 am (I was suspended at 0900) … The initial allegations and the way they were given to the press before they were even served on me was a carefully prepared strategy.”
(Submission of Superintendent Dizaei.)

10.60 The MPS emphatically denies that this was the case or that there was any strategy designed to inform the media of the existence of the investigation before Superintendent Dizaei was himself aware of it.

10.61 The NBPA commented on the MPS’ press strategy during Superintendent Dizaei’s trial: “One member of the DPA sat in court throughout the entire trial talking to and reassuring members of the press. Even before the jury had reached a verdict [redacted], who had booked a golfing holiday in Alacanti [sic], could not wait and with the assistance and support of the DPA held a press conference at the Yard expressing their distaste for Mr Dizaei. Selected journalist [sic] were invited and asked to sign confidentially clauses, after which they were given a detailed briefing during a ‘live’ trial”.

10.62 The MPS confirmed that the briefing took place but commented that this was in line with MPS and ACPO guidelines and that those who attended were not specially selected by the MPS.

10.63 We understand the vital role of the media in relation to the MPS’ work and do not seek to criticise the organisation for needing to take a proactive stance in relation to its dealings with the media in appropriate cases. However, we would question any strategy where statements are made to the media before the individual concerned is aware of what is being said and particularly when the officer concerned has not yet been made aware that an investigation is even taking place.

10.64 In this case, it seems likely that the media were alerted to the investigation into Superintendent Dizaei before he was aware of the investigation himself. The likely source for such information is someone in the MPS.

10.65 Whether official or unofficial, such contact with the media can only serve to cause unnecessary distress to those involved, including family and friends. If unofficial, the MPS needs to find ways of preventing similar leaks in the future.

“Learning from my own experience, what caused the most trauma to my family, and in particular my children, is the clandestine briefing to the press.”
(Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.)

10.66 In addition, in our view, while the public interest may require the MPS to announce to the media the fact of an investigation taking place, it is not appropriate for it to make subjective comments about the ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ of any officer or member of staff who is subject to disciplinary proceedings, until decisions about misconduct or criminal activity have been made by the appropriate body. We believe that any process which permits this kind of briefing should be changed.

Unfairness

10.67 The failings which we have identified above present a picture of an organisation acting unfairly towards one of its own officers who happens to be under investigation. There are numerous examples, such as the scale of the investigation and the disproportionate use of resources. No regard seems to have been had to the welfare of Superintendent Dizaei, a senior officer who, although under investigation, had not been found guilty of any relevant criminal or conduct offence.

“Within weeks of being served regulation 9 notices which were the most damaging namely sexual relationships with prostitutes and unauthorised visits to the Iranian embassy they were withdrawn without me even being questioned. By that time [redacted] had inflicted the personal damage to my reputation as he had intended … The vagueness of the discipline notices was deliberate and intended to keep me guessing. Eg Assault: no date, no name, no circumstance. Just ‘Assault’. And then the allegations were dropped without a question put to me. However the allegation appeared in every newspaper on the day of my suspension.”
(Submission of Superintendent Dizaei.)

10.68 It is undeniable that race played a considerable part in aspects of Operation Helios. It seems that Superintendent Dizaei’s Iranian descent, and his links with the Black Police Associations, were part of the MPS’ thinking in a number of unusual decisions they took in the course of the case, as outlined by the independent investigators:

“As the investigation progressed, and moved from being covert to overt several issues around fairness based on race, arose that now need to be considered. In particular the formation of a Gold group and the decision to arrest Superintendent Dizaei rather than to arrange a voluntary attendance at a police station for interview cause concern.

“… The review cannot establish the justification for the formation of such groups but the issue of Superintendent Dizaei’s race and the community cannot be ignored. The review considers that on the balance of probability, issues around race and the community were the key drivers for such a group being formed.”
(Independent investigators’ report.)

10.69 We see this as part of the pattern of the MPS’ difficulty in managing difference which we have identified more generally.

10.70 We have received evidence in relation to race discrimination from Superintendent Dizaei, the NBPA and others. In the absence of a full case review, we are not satisfied, on the evidence we have received, that race discrimination occurred.

10.71 However, we particularly note the following observations from our independent investigators:

“Soon after transferring to the force Superintendent Dizaei was posted to the Borough of Kensington.

“This Borough has a large Farsi/Iranian community and as such this could have be seen as a good move for the force, the officer and the community. Unfortunately little to no regard for the pressure such a transfer would put on the officer, from the Iranian Moslem community, appears to have been considered and as such his personal/professional roles became merged. As he had no formal briefing with regard to how much involvement he could have with this community he found himself in a position where he was able to get involved in the community, but was not functioning in an official capacity. This position would result in members of the community having expectations of him in his professional role that were beyond that which a police officer was able to deliver. This situation could be interpreted as unfair treatment based on race. However, the review considers it was more of a strategic and operational failing in respect of supporting officers from specific communities to manage professional and social pressures that result from a posting such as this.

“Consideration has also been given to failings by senior officers to curb Superintendent Dizaei’s activities in respect of his community contacts and although this probably occurred as a result of the intelligence gathering operation that commenced in the summer of 1999, it clearly put the force in a difficult and vulnerable position. This situation could be considered as being unfair, but is not based on race.

“The review has examined an official MPS record touching on this subject of intervention (dated 05.01.01 by a Detective Chief Superintendent). The document has tried to defend the MPS position but unfortunately it is dated in excess of eighteen months after the officer has been posted to the Kensington community and some twelve months after the second part of the operation commenced. There is no decision log entry or other record, which addresses the issues surrounding management intervention in August 1999 …

“With regard to the arrest of Superintendent Dizaei in May 2001 the review has had sight of an MPS document headed ‘Operational Strategy’. This document is undated, but it has clearly been prepared around the time that the operation was moving from the covert to overt stage.

“Contained within this document is a paragraph, which reads, ‘Mozart will not be arrested at this stage, the evidence to justify doing so is weak’. No further record or Decision Log entry has been made by the SIO to justify a change of stance when in fact the evidence against him was no stronger. Superintendent Dizaei makes reference to his arrest in his submission to the Inquiry … and the review considers that with regard to the manner in which he was treated, it appears that in the circumstances it was unfair and the element of race cannot be excluded.”
(Extracts from independent investigators’ report.)

10.72 It is clear to us that an investigation such as this, which lacks strategic direction in the manner we have identified and does not have a full paper audit trail for the rationale behind decisions, lays itself open to such allegations being made.

10.73 The review conducted by our independent investigators was, however, not a full case review. In relation to the issue of discrimination on the grounds of Superintendent Dizaei’s race, although the evidence is inconclusive, the issue clearly remains live and it should be looked at in the full case review we are recommending.

10.74 The MPS has commented that it is concerned that the “relatively brief nature of the independent investigators’ review of Operation Helios provides insufficient basis for the very severe criticisms made of it.” The two investigators, who carried out this review, are both experienced former senior police officers and looked at sufficient original material to focus on key issues. We are satisfied that their work was both professional and objective. But, in our view, the comment of the MPS only serves to strengthen the argument for a full case review. Nothing less can do justice to everyone concerned.

We therefore recommend a full case review of Operation Helios which is independent of the MPS. The review should include examining the issue of race discrimination.

Lessons to be learnt

10.75 We consider that the MPS needs to learn lessons from our analysis of Superintendent Dizaei’s case in relation to the following areas:

case management;
settlement agreements;
the use of Gold Groups;
the use of policy files;
the use of lay advisors; and
the issuing of press statements.

10.76 We hope that the recommendations that follow will enable it to do so.

We advocate urgent adoption by DPS of our earlier recommendation that investigations by DPS should be run in accordance with the recommendations of the Review of Operation Lancet and the normal investigative process for criminal cases. Arrangements should be made to put the necessary systems in place, as a matter of urgency, which should prevent investigations such as this becoming a ‘runaway train’. We also think that our recommended model of case management, if adopted, will help to ensure that the right checks and balances are in place to ensure that the investigation is subject to the appropriate strategic direction and scrutiny.
We recommend that the MPS avoids entering into agreements in relation to professional standards and conduct matters that are ultra vires.
We repeat our earlier recommendation that all DPS investigators should keep a full policy file documenting the reasons for key decisions made.
In respect of the use of lay advisors in such investigations, we repeat our earlier recommendations in chapter 6 on the appointment of IAG members and the resourcing of the IAG. In particular, we emphasise our earlier recommendation on disclosure.

We recommend that the Independent Advisory Group and the MPS agree a protocol in relation to disclosure of documentation and the rationale for decisions to Independent Advisory Group members. This must be based on the presumption that Independent Advisory Group members see everything that is available to the investigating officers. Where possible, this should be before decisions are taken.

We recommend that where Gold Groups are established in relation to disciplinary matters, their purpose and powers are set out in writing so that all involved are clear about their role and lines of accountability.
We repeat our earlier recommendations on issuing of press statements and dealing with the media.

We also recommend that no comment is made about an officer’s guilt or innocence by the MPS until it has been established by the appropriate decision-making body, and no embargoed interviews should be given.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick

10.77 DAC Paddick was born and educated in south London. He joined the MPS after university and was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1981. He rose rapidly through the ranks and was the Chief Superintendent in charge of Merton borough in 1998. He was promoted to Commander in 2000 and took over command of Lambeth borough. He was promoted to Deputy Assistant Commissioner in 2004.

10.78 As DAC Paddick was (and of course still is) and ACPO rank officer, the allegations relating to his conduct were dealt with by the MPA and not the MPS.

10.79 A summary of the details of the investigation, drawn from our independent investigator’s report and other evidence, is set out below:

Chronology

October 1995
Whilst serving as a Detective Chief Inspector in the MPS, Mr Paddick met and formed a relationship with Mr A.
November 1995
Mr Paddick accompanied Mr A to a London police station where Mr A had to answer to bail. Commander Paddick waited in the public area. Within a period of several months, Commander Paddick and Mr A decided to live together.
November 1998
Mr Paddick and Mr A moved into a flat together. After a period of time (the duration of which is disputed by both parties), Mr A started to smoke cannabis in the property.
July 2000
The relationship was terminated, owing to Mr A having failed to honour an agreement not to smoke cannabis in the home.
March 2002
Mr A contacted Commander Paddick and informed him that the Mail on Sunday newspaper had offered Mr A £100,000 to tell his story about the relationship with Commander Paddick, including references to Commander Paddick smoking cannabis.
17 March 2002
Story printed in the Mail on Sunday newspaper.
March 2002
The Professional Standards and Performance Monitoring Committee of the MPA invited Humberside Police to carry out an investigation in to the allegations made in the Mail on Sunday newspaper article that Commander Paddick had allowed his premises to be used for smoking cannabis, he had smoked cannabis and that he had breached Police Regulations by meeting a person on bail without lawful authority. The MPA also invited the PCA to supervise the investigation.
March to July 2002
Investigation was undertaken. This included Commander Paddick being interviewed under caution on 8 July 2002.
18 July 2002
Report by the Deputy Chief Constable of Humberside Police submitted to the PCA.
16 September 2002
The Humberside report forwarded to the CPS.
9 October 2002
The CPS decided that it would not be in the public interest to prosecute Commander Paddick. The report was forwarded to the MPA to consider if any disciplinary action should be taken.
12 November 2002
Commander Paddick was advised by the MPA that no disciplinary action would be taken against him. The MPA advised the Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, of their decision. The MPA also invited the Commissioner to consider seeing Commander Paddick to discuss the matter with him.

How the case was handled

10.80 We agree with the conclusion of the independent investigator that “there is no evidence to suggest that the investigation was authorised to treat Mr Paddick unfairly or that it was directly related to his sexuality”.

10.81 There is one particular aspect of DAC Paddick’s case, however, where criticism has been made of the organisational response, namely media handling:

“At the end of the day, in order to stop a certain national newspaper, or group of newspapers … to repeat allegations that I had been acquitted of in the course of a formal investigation, I had to sue the newspaper, which, if I had lost, would have cost me £400,000.

“I had no support whatsoever from the Metropolitan Police Service or from the Metropolitan Police Authority in terms of taking that action. Yes, the Commissioner did make a statement, which was helpful in those proceedings, but in terms of – it was my responsibility to take that action; … I was liable for whatever the outcome was going to be of those proceedings, and I think that in those sort of circumstances, you are only in that position because of the position that you hold of senior rank within the Police Service. If I was a bus driver or in some other profession, this would not have arisen, therefore there is an obligation on the Metropolitan Police Service and the Metropolitan Police Authority to defend my position.

“So, for example, when I am appointed Deputy Assistant Commissioner and a national newspaper alleges that I have only been promoted because I am gay, and I go to my press office, they turn round and say, ‘It is nothing to do with us, we did not promote you, the police authority did, go and talk to them’, it is not, I think, an acceptable support from an officer who is under attack because he is a member of a minority group.” (Evidence of DAC Paddick.)

10.82 The Deputy Commissioner refuted the allegation that the MPS had been unsupportive in this respect:

“I think the key point here for this kind of media issue is that what Brian is saying is what is the Met doing to stop newspapers repeating misleading allegations, and the answer to that is that the Met will do its best to inform and cajole newspapers to say stop doing it, but unfortunately …. we do not control the newspapers and the newspapers will or will not take any notice of what we have actually said. If we turn for instance to the issue about the cannabis pilot, I know that the DPA held two briefings, including the Commissioner being at one of them, where they made absolutely clear that Brian had not started this off on his own and this had the Commissioner’s support. Most newspapers printed that. One newspaper decided they did not want to print that and went a different way. When we then come to the issue about the major legal action in which Brian is involved, I think that becomes much more difficult. Something I said last time was that we have to understand that the issue for Brian, and in fact for Ali Dizaei, about newspapers which caused them personally most grief were nothing to do with the MPS; they were to do with the allegations of an ex-partner. At that point, using public money to support Brian in that position might have been extremely difficult. It would not be normal for to us support an officer taking … privacy proceedings, because that, I think, opens us up to almost an open-ended cheque book to a number of officers.

“I do think that Brian did get more support than again he acknowledges here. There is a very senior member of the DPA with whom Brian was in regular contact, home, mobile, office numbers and so on, but Brian was being very, very bruised by what was going on.

“… I am extremely pleased with the way Brian has actually come through this. There were some very, very difficult times for him for a couple of years while all of this was going on. He and I had many discussions, and there is one particular piece of advice I was able to give him which I think he has done, which is to stop being a story and make a story about his own achievements and the achievements of the Met, and since that stage the interest in him has diminished in the newspapers. I think he is now doing a very good job …”
(Evidence of the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair.)

10.83 We consider it unfortunate that, whatever support was offered to DAC Paddick, in particular in relation to the way his case was reported in the media, he should have been left with the impression that the organisation failed to support him during this difficult time. It appears that despite the support given, communication failed in this respect with the result that a senior officer, with a great deal to offer the MPS, genuinely believes the organisation failed to support him at a time when he needed its help.

Lessons to be learnt

10.84 We consider from our analysis that the MPS needs to learn lessons in relation to the following areas:

dealings with the media; and
support for officers under investigation.

10.85 We hope that the recommendations that follow will enable it to do so.

We have already made recommendations about how the MPS should handle media issues relating to officers under investigation.

In addition we recommend that the MPS reviews its policy in relation to correcting errors in media reporting about its officers and staff.

We repeat our earlier recommendation about the role of the HR directorate in relation to welfare support.

We recommend that the MPS examines the adequacy of welfare support to officers under investigation.

The role of the HR Directorate is clearly key in this respect and the MPS should also consider involving the Directorate of Public Affairs to determine the extent to which professional support on media issues can be offered to officers under investigation.

Chief Inspector Julia Pendry

10.86 Chief Inspector Pendry joined the MPS in 1983 and was posted to Vine Street Police Station. In the next 13 years she held a variety of postings, including as a Community Liaison Officer, an instructor at the Cadet School and a response team officer.

10.87 She was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1996 and posted to Southall, where she worked until earlier this year. She was a response team Sergeant for two years and was then selected to work in the Borough Liaison Office. In 1990, she was promoted to Inspector and over the last four years has held several roles including duty officer, staff officer to the Borough Commander, Inspection and Review and Custody Manager. She was promoted to Chief Inspector in March 2004.

10.88 A summary of the details of her case, drawn from our independent investigator’s report and other evidence, is set out below:

Chronology

2 November 2003
Guru Nanak parade held in Southall, where Inspector Pendry is Bronze Command and gave a briefing to officers.
23rd November 2003
Letter of complaint about this briefing was handed to the Borough Commander.
25 November 2003
Inspector Pendry identified as the officer subject to the complaint.
30 November 2003
Email stated that the officers concerned wished to make a formal complaint and that the MPS Sikh Association would like to be associated with the complaint on behalf of the community.
11 December 2003
Borough Commander identifies the complainants.
12 December 2003
Recommendation that an Investigating Officer should be appointed.
15 December 2003
Decision to implement a Gold Group, “to manage the various issues, i.e. the welfare of the officer complained of the support of the complainants and the community impact etc”.
16 December 2003
Internal investigation commenced.
17 December 2003
Inspector Pendry discovered, unofficially, that an investigation was taking place into her alleged racist behaviour and that consideration was being given to suspending her from duty.
18 December 2003
Inspector Pendry was advised to see members of the Senior Management Team (SMT) and another senior officer the following morning.
19 December 2003
Having waited for 1 hour and 45 minutes, Inspector Pendry was informed that one member of the SMT would not be in attendance. The Borough Commander served a Regulation 9 Notice on Inspector Pendry. While on duty at Southall Police Station, Inspector Pendry saw various police officers that had been attending a Gold Group meeting in relation to the impact on the community of the investigation into her conduct.
23 December 2003
Inspector Pendry was interviewed under caution.
24 December 2003
Inspector Pendry was informed that her promotion to Chief Inspector had been delayed.
27 December 2003
Whilst acting as Duty Officer, Inspector Pendry felt unwell and was examined by the Police Surgeon, who diagnosed her as suffering from stress.
29-31 December 2003
Inspector Pendry was made Acting Chief Inspector at Southall, during the absence of other senior officers on annual leave.
4 January 2004
Inspector Pendry received various telephone calls from friends and colleagues informing her that there was an article in a national newspaper about the allegation against her. Although Inspector Pendry was not named in the article, she was identified by these people because of her role as Inspector – Operations.
9 January 2004
MPS Police Notice announced that Inspector Pendry has been promoted to Chief Inspector with effect from 2 February 2004.
25 January 2004
Inspector Pendry was appointed Bronze Commander for the Sikh procession of Guru Ravi Dass, and conducted the briefing for the procession.
26 January 2004
SIO submitted his report. Inspector Pendry sent an email to the Borough Commander setting out concerns about her welfare and the lack of concern by the MPS for deploying her the previous day to another Sikh procession.
29 January 2004
Response from Borough Commander via email stating that he was unable to see her until 3 February 2004. Inspector Pendry went off work suffering from work-related stress.
6 February 2004
Inspector Pendry was informed that her promotion was further delayed. Report submitted to DPS.
12 February 2004
Final decision on disposal of complaint made by DPS and file returned to Borough Commander.
17 (or 18) February 2004
Inspector Pendry was informed by a Personnel Manager that there was to be no formal discipline action taken against her.
23 February 2004
Inspector Pendry officially notified that no disciplinary action would be taken against her.
26 February 2004
Borough Commander met Inspector Pendry, informed her that her promotion would be delayed and administered words of advice. Inspector Pendry was unclear about whether she had been given words of advice and what the Borough Commander had said.
27 February 2004
Inspector Pendry met a senior police officer, in the presence of her Police Federation Representative. This meeting resulted in her raising a series of complaints about the way her promotion / posting was discussed in relation to issues in her personal life. Inspector Pendry raised these complaints by lodging a Fairness at Work claim.
1 March 2004
Minutes of the Metropolitan Police Sikh Association (MPSA) meeting stated: “With regards to the Southall complaint (Inspector Pendry), an outcome has been reached. It was substantiated that the officer had used inappropriate language and as a result was given words of advice. The two officers that brought the matter to our attention have been commended by the MPSA and [redacted]. MPSA sincerely thank them for the personal courage shown. We encourage and support any member of the MPS to challenge inappropriate behavior, language and attitudes. The MPSA committee have strongly expressed that any intolerance based on faith should be treated as seriously as all other bigoted behaviour within the organisation and our communities.”
7 March 2004
Senior MPS officer addressed the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Gurdwara and discussed Inspector Pendry’s case.
26 March 2004
Inspector Pendry’s case was discussed at length during an open forum at the Annual General Meeting of the MPSA.

How the case was handled: Investigation process

10.89 The independent investigator made the following comment in relation to how the complaint about Chief Inspector Pendry’s remarks was made:

“It is clearly unfortunate if not unacceptable that where serving police officers hear such a remark, or suspect that another officer, irrespective of that officer’s rank, have made a racist remark, they did not report the fact to a more senior officer at the earliest opportunity. In the circumstances surrounding the remarks subject to this review, the delay appears unacceptable.”

10.90 While we understand that junior officers may feel reluctant to criticise the actions of more senior officers, we hope that our recommendations for reform of the disciplinary and grievance procedures will facilitate earlier and swifter resolution of such problems in the future.

10.91 We do, however, consider that late reporting of an allegation, particularly where the complaint is not made directly to the officer concerned or her line manager, is a factor that should be weighed in the balance by those responsible for its investigation.

10.92 Despite the lateness of the reporting of the allegation, there remained an opportunity for early resolution of the complaint. This was missed because the MPS immediately adopted formal processes which involved the formation of a Gold Group and the involvement of senior managers:

“With regard to the issue of resolving this complaint at the earliest possible stage, mention has already been made of this matter. The reviewing officer is of the opinion that there were clear opportunities for this to be done at an early stage and ironically the officer indicated in her response to the Form l63 (regulation 9 notice) that if she had offended someone she would have liked to have the opportunity to apologise.”
(Independent investigator’s report).

10.93 For her part, Chief Inspector Pendry made it clear to the MPS and the Inquiry that she was open to an early and amicable resolution of the matter:

“Obviously, as I said in my response to my 163 (regulation 9 notice), which was obviously delayed as well, was the fact that had I said something that could be resolved at the time I would like to have sat down with the officers, discussed the issues, and, if necessary and if appropriate, apologise. I do not feel in this case I had to apologise but I would have had to have heard what they said first of all.”
(Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.)

10.94 We consider that had the opportunity been taken at any early stage, the matter might have been resolved in a way that could have satisfied the complainants and defused an issue of community relations quickly, while addressing any weaknesses in Chief Inspector Pendry’s approach in a manner that was not distressing. We think the failure to seize the opportunity to deal with the case in this way resulted from weaknesses we have already identified in the MPS’ ability to manage difference.

10.95 It seems that the organisation’s response to the complaints, to quote Lord Harris in a different context, was to react like a “rabbit frozen in the headlights”. This had serious consequences for the officer concerned.

Lack of information

10.96 The independent investigator commented on the way in which Chief Inspector Pendry discovered that a complaint had been made against her:

“An area of concern that has been identified during the review is the manner in which Inspector Pendry found out that she was the subject of a complaint (17 December 2003). Ideally the officer should be served with the Form l63 (regulation 9 notice) at the earliest opportunity and, in this case, it was not served until the 18th December 2003. This was unfortunate but in fairness to the investigating team the notice is dated the 17 December 2003. Notwithstanding this, the review has confirmed that the complaint was made on the 23rd November, and the officer deserved to at least be made aware of the allegation.”
(Independent investigator’s report.)

10.97 In response to this, the MPS has told us that it believed it was “unfortunate” that Chief Inspector Pendry was notified by a Sergeant at Southall that she was subject to a complaint, but that it was also “inevitable”.

10.98 Chief Inspector Pendry, in her submission to us, raised a number of questions about the way in which the investigation was handled and the way in which she was treated:

“52. Why did I have to be informed by a Sergeant at Southall, in the corridor that I was being investigated?

53. Why were officers interviewed before I was given notice? …

68. How did a Chief Inspector (Black Police Association member) know of the decisions affecting my promotion before me?

69. Why was the email from workforce deployments, delaying my promotion sent on Christmas Eve, thus ruining my family Christmas?

70. Who made the decision to delay my promotion and what process was involved?

71. What is the MPS process / policy to review such decisions? My belief is that it was not followed.

72. As my promotion was delayed. Why was I continually used as both Acting Chief Inspector and Acting Superintendent on the Borough?

73. Why was I offered no official organisational support and why was I not communicated with as per 'Doing the right thing'?

74. I again refer to [redacted]’s comments about the international seriousness of the investigation and that he had personally postponed my promotion. Why did he allow me to act as an Acting Chief Inspector / Superintendent. Perhaps more importantly. Why did he allow me to lead the Sikh procession of Ravi Dass, through the streets of Southall on the 25 January 04?”
(Submission of Chief Inspector Pendry.)

10.99 The MPS has told us that Chief Inspector Pendry had not been suspended, and was therefore fit for operational duties. Its view was that, since she remained innocent of any misconduct until the contrary was established, it was appropriate for her to be deployed in relation to other religious processions.

Unfairness

10.100 We are also particularly concerned by the way in which issues impacting on Chief Inspector Pendry’s posting were handled and we consider this to be unfair. In our view, the lack of sensitivity has needlessly added to the inevitable distress caused to the officer under investigation and has led to an Employment Tribunal claim being brought against the MPS.

10.101 The independent investigator reported that: “… there is clear evidence of issues surrounding her personal life and in particular a previous relationship she had, being used in the consideration of her promotion to the rank of Chief Inspector and transfer to another station.”

10.102 Chief Inspector Pendry commented: “You know, I am a female officer, I have been a police officer for 21 years. It is obvious that most of your life, when you work as police officer, you are going to socialise with police officers; that is the way that it works. If I am going to be discriminated against and treated differently because I once used to go out with somebody, then I think that is very unfair and discriminatory behaviour.” (Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.)

10.103 We do not see how such issues can be of relevance. Be that as it may, it is quite clear that the way in which these issues was raised was badly handled, with the result that the organisation now has to face grievances raised under the Fairness at Work process and an Employment Tribunal claim.

10.104 We are also concerned about the way in which Chief Inspector Pendry’s case was discussed by a senior officer in public at the Gurdwara and at the Sikh Association Annual General Meeting. The MPS has justified this action by reference to a need to “communicate with a significant sector of Southall’s community” and to be open and transparent.

10.105 We accept the requirement for openness and transparency. However, in this case, we are concerned that there was public discussion of Chief Inspector Pendry’s case without her knowledge, and following the conclusion of the disciplinary process. We are also concerned about the level of detail of the discussions.

10.106 In his evidence to us, the Deputy Commissioner referred to “the most intense pressure in [Ms Pendry’s] personal life” and seemed to imply that the obvious distress being suffered by Chief Inspector Pendry was the result of issues in her personal life, rather than the way in which her case was handled. Having seen and heard from Chief Inspector Pendry, we reject that suggestion.

10.107 The MPS provides a service to London through its people, which are its greatest resource. Inevitably, they all have other facets to their lives other than serving the MPS. Failure to appreciate this, and to manage difference in all its varieties, will inevitably mean that the MPS will fail to get the best from its people. Such comments are extremely unsupportive of an officer who is a valuable asset to the organisation and we regret that they were made.

Welfare support

10.108 The independent investigator reported that: “Throughout the duration of this investigation there was clearly a failing by the MPS in relation to the welfare of Inspector Pendry”. We agree with this conclusion which is evidenced by a number of aspects of the investigation.

10.109 Although the MPS has told us that a Superintendent was appointed to look after Chief Inspector Pendry’s welfare, we are concerned that Chief Inspector Pendry herself perceived there to be a lack of official support when she was under investigation and was clearly unaware that the Superintendent had an official responsibility for her welfare:

“I suppose the first thing I can say is what support? I was not offered any support at all. I was not offered any occupational health. I was told on the eve of the Christian festival of Christmas, for want of a better way of describing it, that my promotion was going to be withheld. Nobody gave me any support inside, I obviously had no idea what was going to happen to me. On 27th December I was duty officer and I actually asked to see the force medical officer, who came to the station because I at the time thought I was about to suffer a stroke and I had a pounding headache and he examined me and said I was suffering from stress and I was offered absolutely no support at all. But I will say, and I think this is very, very important, I was offered no official support, but there have been people who have been truly, truly loyal and kind to me … It would have been nice if the Gold group had considered my welfare needs in the first place, rather than just thinking about everybody else’s needs.”
(Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.)

Gold Group

10.110 We have already said that we consider that the MPS missed an opportunity to address the issue raised by the complaint about Chief Inspector Pendry’s conduct at an early stage. Instead, it formed a Gold Group, partly out of a desire, it was said, to secure her welfare, which we consider it signally failed to do. A Gold Group is formed where there is a critical incident. We have already referred to the definition as “any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and / or the community.”

10.111 In this case, we see the involvement of a Gold Group as an over-reaction because the complaint came from Sikh officers and an example of the MPS’ difficulty in managing difference where race is an issue.

“It was completely and utterly disproportionate and an appalling way of managing a case.”
(Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.)

10.112 Under the current disciplinary system as operated by the MPS, investigations into the alleged misconduct of an officer are the responsibility of DPS. In our view, the use of a Gold Group in this case, as in the case of Superintendent Dizaei, only served to blur the lines of decision-making and accountability.

10.113 Even if the decision to form a Gold Group were justified, it is clear that there were a number of errors in the way it was used and its composition. Chief Inspector Pendry has raised some pertinent questions in this respect:

“63. Why was the Gold Group held at Southall police station. Was this designed to intimidate me?

64. Given that Gold Groups should be independent and unbiased. Why was [redacted] allowed to sit in the meetings and be the minute taker? He was a supervisor and witness at my briefing for Guru Nanak.

65. Why was [redacted] excluded from the Gold Group?

66. Why was [redacted] [the officer who wrote the letter of complaint to [redacted] and personal friend of seven years, to [redacted – one of the complainants], allowed to sit on the Gold Group and make decisions about me? Why were the federation and the association of senior women officers excluded from the group?

88. [Redacted] informed me that he had been overseeing the investigation. Why were the Gold Group overseeing the investigation and not DPS? What is the policy?”
(Submission from Chief Inspector Pendry.)

10.114 The MPS has told us that it accepts that holding the first meeting of the Gold Group at Southall Police Station was a mistake. We agree that it is inappropriate for such a Gold Group to be held at the station where the officer concerned is working and for officers involved in making the complaint in any way to be included on such a group. The way in which this Gold Group was established and conducted itself suggests that insufficient regard was paid to the welfare of the officer under investigation. It also raises questions about the objectivity of the management of the investigation process.

10.115 The MPS has sought to persuade us that in this case “the Gold Group provided for a measured and scrupulously fair process where the interests of all parties were represented.” Chief Inspector Pendry was not represented on the Gold Group. In any event we would query whether a Gold Group should have representatives of either complainants or other interested parties, given its role in managing a ‘critical incident’.

10.116 These failings seem to have been compounded by an apparent failure to communicate with the officer even after she raised concerns at the time:

“So every time I asked and said, ‘Please, I feel I really have concerns about the make-up of the Gold group and the bias of the Gold group and people are sitting in judgment of me, some of them with their own agendas’, that I wanted somebody sitting there considering my needs and also fairness. So we asked and we were just ignored.”
(Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.)

10.117 In addition, as we noted earlier in this report when we dealt with the Fairness at Work procedure, when Chief Inspector Pendry raised various concerns under the FAW procedure, the MPS was reluctant to deal with the matter and it took three months and 12 days to have her ‘Form 1’ accepted, as it was initially said that the issues she wanted to raise related to disciplinary matters. That is over three times as long as the entire FAW process is intended to take and hardly the best way to deal with a senior officer who already feels that the organisation is being unfair to her.

Lessons to be learnt

10.118 We consider that the MPS needs to learn lessons from our analysis in relation to the following areas:

early resolution of disputes;
confidentiality of the discipline process;
support for an officer under investigation;
the use of Gold Groups;
the way in which investigatory decisions are notified to the officer concerned;
Fairness at Work; and
dealing with difference.

10.119 We hope that the recommendations that follow will enable it to do so.

Except in the most serious cases (such as allegations of criminal behaviour) where doing so is clearly inappropriate, we recommend that the MPS should always explore options for early informal resolution.
We recommend that the MPS take steps to ensure that discipline matters relating to individuals are kept confidential and not discussed with third parties in a public forum.
We repeat our earlier recommendations in relation to welfare support to officers under investigation.
Where Gold Groups are involved, we repeat our earlier recommendation about their establishment. Further, we recommend that clear guidelines are established about the make-up of a Gold Group as, for example, it is not appropriate for representatives of complainants or other parties involved to be members of such a Gold Group or to be present at any meetings.
We recommend that officers under investigation be provided with a written record of the outcome of such an investigation and a summary of the reasons for that outcome.

It is clearly inappropriate for Chief Inspector Pendry to remain unclear about the way in which her case has been concluded, and she should be provided with such a document.

We have drawn attention to a number of questions posed by Chief Inspector Pendry and we recommend that the MPS provides her with written responses to the questions she has posed in her submission.
Our earlier recommendations in relation to Fairness at Work are also of relevance as are our comments on the MPS’ ability to manage difference.

Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi

10.120 Detective Sergeant Virdi was born in Delhi, India. He came to the United Kingdom at the age of eight and was educated in West London. He joined the MPS in 1982. After a period in Battersea, he became a member of the Metropolitan District Crime Squad. In 1987, he joined the Directorate of Intelligence. He was promoted to Police Sergeant in 1992 and appointed as Detective Sergeant in 2003.

10.121 His case is the most well-known of the cases we considered. It has been the subject of two reviews: one an Inquiry established by the MPA and chaired by one of its members, Mr David Muir, and the other a case review commissioned by the PCA from a senior officer in the Professional Standards Department of the South Wales Police Service. We have already referred to the MPA Inquiry in Chapter 6 of this report.

10.122 A summary of the details of his case, drawn from our independent investigator’s report and other evidence, is set out below:

Chronology

24 December 1997
Racist documents received by 13 minority ethnic officers who work at Ealing police station (including Police Sergeant Virdi).
29 December 1997
Ealing senior management requested an investigating officer from 2 Area Complaints Unit. The Daily Mail newspaper published a story titled ‘Race Hate Campaign’.
30 December 1997
Back up computer tapes at Ealing seized.
13 January 1998
Policy file opened.
19 January 1998
Second racist document is received by minority ethnic police staff at Ealing police station. The computer systems administrator identified the MPS logo used in the second document as one he had created on the Operational Technology Information System (OTIS), investigated the system at Ealing and concluded that the second document originated on the OTIS account of Police Constable B and was printed at Hanwell police station on 18 January 1998.
20 January 1998
Forensic Science Support Unit commenced work on computer evidence.
21 January 1998
Police Constable B seen by management with the agreement of the investigating officer, and advised she was not a suspect. Meeting not recorded.
27 January 1998
At her instigation, Police Constable B is interviewed under caution on audiotape.
17 February 1998
Press strategy options paper was agreed – this was later used. It allowed the release of the officer’s ethnicity on an ‘if asked’ basis.
25 February 1998
Request was made to place covert cameras at Hanwell police station.
27 February 1998
Conversation between management and Police Sergeant Virdi was covertly taped on the advice of the Investigating officer.
24 March 1998
Police Constable B was interviewed under caution on audiotape.
15 April 1998
Police Sergeant Virdi was arrested. Operation takes 23 hours. PoLSA (Police Search Adviser) search of Police Sergeant Virdi’s home takes seven hours.
16 April 1998
Police Sergeant Virdi suspended from duty in early hours of the day. A national newspaper publishes an article relating to the arrest, search of home and suspension of an Asian officer. News items also on ITV, BBC and Asian news.
17 April 1998
Police Sergeant Virdi interviewed under caution on audiotape and denied any connection with the sending of racist mail.
28 June 1998
Police Sergeant Virdi instigates proceedings in the Employment Tribunal.
30 June 1998
External computer specialist is asked to examine the seized computer equipment from Ealing police station.
7 July 1998
Search warrant executed at Hanwell and Ealing police stations searching lockers for the remaining nine copies of the second racist document.
July 1998 – July 2000
Six Directions Hearings held, mainly awaiting the outcome of MPS internal processes.
6 October 1998
Police Sergeant Virdi interviewed under caution.
19 October 1998
File of evidence submitted to the CPS for advice on whether to charge Police Sergeant Virdi with sending racist mail.
9 February 1999
The CPS advises that no criminal charges should be brought.
22 March 1999
File of evidence on Police Sergeant Virdi sent to MPS solicitors for counsel’s advice in respect of discipline charges.
29 April 1999
Police Sergeant Virdi informed of date of hearing and supplied with a copy of the charges.
30 June 1999
Discipline papers served on Police Sergeant Virdi.
25 Augu

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	Archive note Important note: This is an archive of the website that was formerly at www.morrisinquiry.gov.uk. It is being hosted on the MPA website for archival purposes only and may contain out-of-date information. Page summary This resource is from the final Report of the Morris Inquiry. This section contains chapter 10, "Lessons for the Future". This chapter discusses the lessons to be learnt from the four 'high profile' cases the Inquiry considered: Superintendent Ali Dizaei, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick, Chief Inspector Julia Pendry and Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi. Sections available here: 10: Lessons for the Future Chapter Summary Superintendent Jamshid Ali Dizaei Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick Chief Inspector Julia Pendry Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi Lessons to be learnt Alternative versions This document is also available in the following formats: Word [0.97MB]; PDF [1.45MB] Content 10: Lessons for the Future “The lessons and recommendations from the Lancet enquiry appear relevant here.” IPCC Review Panel Chapter Summary This chapter deals with four of the ‘high profile’ cases the Inquiry considered: Superintendent Ali Dizaei Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick Chief Inspector Julia Pendry Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi Lessons to be learnt 10.1 In this chapter, we will consider four cases in detail in order to identify lessons the MPS can learn from the way these cases were handled. 10.2 Paragraph 4 of our terms of reference asks us “to identify lessons to be learnt from the outcome of recent high profile cases (including recommendations made by the Gurpal Virdi Inquiry, and the outcome of the case involving Supt. Dizaei).” 10.3 However, our terms of reference did not include a definition of the phrase ‘high profile case’ or a list of such cases, although they did mention Superintendent Dizaei and Detective Sergeant Virdi. One of our first tasks as an Inquiry, therefore, was to seek the assistance of stakeholders in identifying those cases generally regarded as being ‘high profile’. This led to the Secretary to the Inquiry writing to the MPA, the Police Federation, the MET-TUS and the staff support associations operating in the MPS, asking them to nominate appropriate cases. 10.4 We then compiled a list of 11 cases from those nominated to us. Two of the individuals did not wish to participate in the exercise which left us with nine cases. 10.5 We invited submissions from all nine individuals involved in the cases asking them to address a series of questions and issues. We are most grateful to these individuals for taking the time and trouble to set out their experiences in order to contribute to our work. 10.6 Having considered these submissions, we commissioned independent reviews in relation to seven of the cases, where we wished to clarify some of the facts. We felt we had sufficient information in the other two cases. Two of the reviews were carried out by an experienced HR professional and the other five by two former senior police officers from police services outside London. 10.7 The three professionals who carried out the reviews were given a brief by the Inquiry and reviewed original documentation held by the MPS and the MPA. We relied on their experience and professional judgement to look at relevant material and we are satisfied that they fulfilled their remit. We invited the individuals involved and the MPS to comment on our investigators’ reports. 10.8 Having considered the reports we had commissioned, we invited four of the seven individuals to give evidence and took their cases up with the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, when he came to give evidence on the second occasion. It is these four cases we are using to identify the ‘lessons to be learnt’. They are all cases which have attracted a significant amount of interest from the media and the public. 10.9 Our decision not to deal with the other five cases in detail should not be taken to mean that we do not think that the MPS has anything to learn from the way these cases were handled. Quite the reverse, we believe that there is merit in examining all cases once they are concluded and attempting to identify lessons for the future. We dealt with this specifically when we referred to Employment Tribunal cases earlier in our report. 10.10 Indeed, the details of the experiences of the individuals involved in all nine cases and the recommendations they made, together with those of the other 66 individuals who made submissions to us, have proved invaluable in assisting us in reaching our conclusions and in drafting this report. 10.11 Turning to the four cases we deal with in this chapter, we received evidence in relation to the high profile cases from the individuals involved, staff organisations and other commentators. 10.12 We have carefully reviewed all the evidence we have received, including the submissions of the individuals involved, other documents available to us and the reports of the independent investigators we engaged. We are mindful of the fact that we are necessarily considering the cases with the benefit of hindsight and have tempered our conclusions accordingly. 10.13 Our comments on each of the four cases begin with a summary of the facts surrounding the investigation. This is drawn from the work of our independent investigators and other evidence. We then outline criticisms of the way each case was handled. We do not outline all the criticisms we have heard but only those we consider are justified. Finally, we set out the lessons which we consider can be learnt as a result of the way each case was handled. Superintendent Jamshid Ali Dizaei 10.14 Superintendent Dizaei was born in Iran. He was educated in the United Kingdom from the age of 12. He joined Thames Valley Police Service in 1985 and was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1990. 10.15 He was promoted to the rank of Inspector in 1993 and in 1997 became a Chief Inspector. He transferred to the MPS on promotion to the rank of Superintendent on 29th March 1999. 10.16 The following is a summary of the details of the investigation, drawn from our independent investigators’ report: Chronology 29 March 1999 Superintendent Dizaei moved to the MPS on promotion to the rank of Superintendent. June 1999 MPS received information that Superintendent Dizaei was friendly with a known drug dealer in Camden. July 1999 Operation Bittern commenced. As part of this Operation, approval was given by a Commander, for Superintendent Dizaei’s office telephone at Kensington Police Station to be the subject of a Private Side Intercept (PSI), for an initial period of 4 weeks. This authority was subsequently renewed every 4 weeks until October 1999. Conventional surveillance and lifestyle checks were also authorised. 8 September 1999 Intelligence obtained from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have obtained a discount whilst purchasing a Cartier watch. Further intelligence suggested that he was associating with a solicitor who was connected to two former MPS officers who themselves were considered serious integrity risks. 22 September 1999 Further PSI intelligence suggested Superintendent Dizaei may be trying to resolve a dispute between a personal friend and some local builders and spoke to police officers at Epsom who were dealing with this problem. 24 September 1999 Further PSI intelligence suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may be associating with a nurse who was supplying him with needles. 15 October 1999 The Commander who was authorising the PSI decided that there were no grounds for the intercept to continue, based on the fact that there was no intelligence to show any criminal conduct. 12 November 1999 Conventional surveillance cancelled. 19 November 1999 Authority was given for an integrity test on Superintendent Dizaei. 16 December 1999 Superintendent Dizaei was successful at the extended interview for the Strategic Command Course, but his selection was deferred for 12 months to allow him to gain further experience / development. 28 January 2000 Letter of complaint about Superintendent Dizaei was received by his Borough Commander alleging criminal conduct and harassment in May 1999. The complainant, who was the mother of the victim of these incidents, was interviewed later that night but no witness statement was obtained. Operation Helios commenced. 29 January 2000 Authority was granted for the PSI to be redeployed on Superintendent Dizaei’s office telephone. 31 January 2000 The victim of these incidents was interviewed but no witness statement obtained. During the course of this interview the victim informed the police that Superintendent Dizaei was also assisting Iranian nationals with visas and that he was charging for this service. 3 February 2000 Information was obtained which suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have charged an associate £400 for assisting with a speeding ticket offence. 7 February 2000 Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have received a reward from the organisers of a forthcoming concert for assisting with policing arrangements. 9 February 2000 Witness statement was obtained from the complainant who sent a letter to the police on 28 January 2000. 18 February 2000 Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have associated with a cocaine user. 29 February 2000 Application for renewal of the continued deployment of the PSI was submitted to a Commander. Authority was granted despite the fact that the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) stated that “a number of lines of enquiry, that existed a month ago, into his alleged criminal conduct have been completed with a negative result”. The authority was granted on the basis that “it would gain evidence to prevent further abduction attempts and threats to the safety of the complainant and her daughter. Also in the interest of national security in identifying possible links between Superintendent Dizaei and foreign nationals who are of interest to other agencies.” During the course of this next renewal period (four weeks) Superintendent Dizaei was on annual leave for a period of two weeks. 3 March 2000 The SIO made an entry in his decision log to arrange an interview / conference with at least two key opinion formers from the ethnic community about this operation with the aim of ensuring that it was not biased or unfair. 3 April 2000 MPS officers met representatives of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Los Angeles Police Department and Beverly Hills Police to request assistance in the integrity testing of Superintendent Dizaei. 14 April 2000 Information was received which suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have paid a cheque for £10,000 on 10 April 2000 to an associate who was suspected of money laundering in relation to fraud and drugs. 12 May 2000 MPS officers visited USA and Canada to discuss using an undercover officer for an integrity test. 25 May 2000 Intelligence from PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may be continuing to associate with individuals suspected of fraud and drug offences. 15 June 2000 CPS wrote to MPS outlining their serious concerns about a proposed integrity test and stating that there was little or no evidence to substantiate the MPS’ suspicions about Superintendent Dizaei. 5 July 2000 Operation review conference held. 24 July 2000 CPS wrote to the MPS again setting out concerns about any integrity test. 31 July 2000 Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have added his girlfriend’s name to his car insurance and advised her what to do if she were involved in an accident on her way to work, as this insurance did not cover travelling to work. 22 August 2000 Intelligence from PSI indicated that Superintendent Dizaei was giving advice to an associate about an incident involving a motor vehicle. He also gave advice to the officer who was investigating this matter. 25 August 2000 Strategic Review meeting held. 4 September 2000 Meeting between Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and Commander to discuss the proportionality of the operation after the strategic review conducted on 25 August. 4 September 2000 SIO made a decision log entry regarding the formation of an Independent Advisory Group. 5 September 2000 An undercover officer was deployed to commence the integrity test in Superintendent Dizaei’s gym in the UK. 6 September 2000 Superintendent Dizaei made a report of criminal damage to his motor vehicle, claiming it was damaged close to his place of work. At the relevant time he was subject to surveillance, which suggested that his vehicle may have been at a different location. 14 September 2000 Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have been involved in the revocation of a licence at the restaurant of an associate. 15 September 2000 An associate of Superintendent Dizaei was arrested for drink driving and sought advice from him. A cheque for £800 was subsequently passed to Superintendent Dizaei. 19 September 2000 Paper was produced by the MPS (origin unknown) about the proportionality of the Operation. 16 October 2000 Superintendent Dizaei attended a British-Iranian business conference in Los Angeles and gave a speech whilst in full uniform, without authority. 26 October 2000 CPS wrote to the MPS concerning the incident on 22 August 2000 and advised that no criminal offences were disclosed against Superintendent Dizaei. October 2000 Superintendent Dizaei was introduced to the organiser of an Iranian Concert who raised concerns that he had received a threatening letter. 6 November 2000 Gold strategy meeting was convened to review the progress of the Operation. 23 November 2000 Intelligence from the PSI suggested that Superintendent Dizaei may have received complimentary tickets for a concert. 5 December 2000 MPS decided to stage a tabletop exercise to review the operational strategy, media strategy and investigation plan for an open, conventional investigation. 20/21 December 2000 Tabletop exercise held in a hotel. 5 January 2001 Strategic meeting followed by a Detective Chief Superintendent making a Policy file entry regarding the conduct of this Operation. 18 January 2001 Superintendent Dizaei was suspended from duty. Regulation 9 Notices served on him and his home, office, car, and gym locker were searched. 2 February 2001 Additional Regulation 9 Notices served. 23 February 2001 Additional Regulation 9 Notice served. 26 March 2001 Second tabletop exercise. 26 March 2001 Strategic Briefing to Independent Advisory Group. 2 April 2004 Superintendent Dizaei issued proceedings against the MPS, alleging race discrimination. 9 April 2001 Gold Review of the Operation. 11 April 2001 Additional Regulation 9 Notice served. 1/2 May 2001 Victim of incidents in May/June 1999 made witness statements. 3 May 2001 Additional Regulation 9 Notices served. 11 May 2001 Superintendent Dizaei was arrested, kept in custody and interviewed for alleged deception. 13/14 June 2001 Third tabletop exercise. 9 July 2001 Gold Strategic Review of Operation. 10/11 July 2001 Superintendent Dizaei re-arrested by appointment and interviewed. 18 September 2001 Superintendent Dizaei re-arrested by appointment and interviewed. 31 May 2002 Superintendent Dizaei issued defamation proceedings against named officers in the MPS. 17 March 2003 Superintendent Dizaei stood trial at the Central Criminal Court. 11 April 2003 Superintendent Dizaei acquitted. September 2003 CPS decided that no further charges should be preferred against Superintendent Dizaei. 16 September 2003 The NBPA boycotted the MPS recruitment drives and announced a ‘march of solidarity’ on Scotland Yard to be held in November 2003. 24 October 2003 Settlement agreement, which provided for the return to duty of Superintendent Dizaei with him receiving words of advice for the two counts of misconduct which he admitted, his secondment to the NBPA with promotion to Chief Superintendent in due course, his attendance on the Strategic Command Course, an agreement that he would amend his Employment Tribunal claim to omit reference to Operation Helios, that he would not pursue his defamation claim or any private prosecutions or personal complaints, payment of a sum of money to him, a withdrawal by the NBPA of complaints against named senior officers and a public acknowledgment that it was no longer discouraging recruits from ethnic minority backgrounds from applying to the MPS and that it would re-route its march to avoid New Scotland Yard. March 2004 PCA directed that the MPS should take disciplinary action against Superintendent Dizaei. 1 April 2004 MPS requested that the IPCC review the PCA’s direction to prefer disciplinary charges. 16 June 2004 IPCC decided to reverse the PCA’s decision. How the case was handled 10.17 A variety of witnesses have been critical of the way in which Operation Helios was handled. We also received evidence from the MPS and have considered all the evidence carefully in reaching our conclusions. We do not repeat here all of the criticisms of the investigation which we received but only outline those criticisms with which we agree. 10.18 As with the other high profile cases, many of the issues which in our view merit criticism are generic and apply to other cases we have examined. The investigation process 10.19 We have previously identified what we consider to be weaknesses in the way DPS conducts investigations. We think these weaknesses are evident in relation to Operation Helios, where we consider there to have been a fundamental lack of strategic grasp of the investigation and a failure to step back from it, during its course, and objectively assess the evidence that had been gathered. 10.20 Superintendent Dizaei comments on a failure of leadership in relation to the Operation in his submission: “What was clearly taking place was a steam train on its way with no one able to stop the SIO placing more coal in the furnace. There was no U turn and Helios had to continue with more surveillance and more resources. There was no leadership capable of intervention.” 10.21 The decision of the IPCC makes this point clearly: “The delay has been caused largely by the extent to which in this case it seems to us the criminal inquiries came to dominate the handling of the case inappropriately, with no clear overall strategic grasp of the case at senior level in the MPS evident. “The disproportionate resources given to the covert surveillance of Supt Dizaei and the many lines of investigation that were pursued to no avail have in our view been a contributory factor in the excessive delays that compromise this case as an example of justice throughout its history. The lessons and recommendations from the Lancet enquiry appear relevant here. “We consider that several of the misconduct allegations could and should have been investigated as such and prosecuted as such a good time ago, instead of which some of them were put inappropriately into a criminal case that was then abandoned late in the day, and others apparently left in the sidings until all of the criminal matters had been pursued. We consider this to be a typical weakness of the police complaints and misconduct system, reflecting the manner in which too many complaints and misconduct allegations against police officers fail to progress timeously.” 10.22 In response to the criticism of a lack of strategic grasp of the investigation, the MPS strongly disputes that this was the case. It contends that “the evidence shows that the Helios investigation was in fact subject to an unprecedented level of strategic management and external supervision.” It points to the involvement of the Surveillance Commissioner, the Lay Advisors Group (LAG), the MPA, the CPS, the PCA and the trial judge, the Recorder of London. (The Recorder refused Superintendent Dizaei’s application to have the prosecution stayed on the grounds that it was an ‘abuse of process’.) 10.23 We accept that all of these individuals and bodies had an involvement in the case but we do not accept that their involvement constituted strategic management of the investigation, nor do we accept that it was their role to exercise this function. Ultimate responsibility for decision-making in an investigation lies with the MPS. This cannot be abdicated in favour of outside bodies. 10.24 The independent investigators considered that DPS pursued allegations that were difficult to prove in a way that resulted in allegations that were capable of proof being sidelined: “More important was the fact that the SIO had good evidence to either arrest or at the very least discipline Superintendent Dizaei in respect of the telephone calls to his former girlfriend and her family. Throughout the remainder of 2000 up until the point when Superintendent Dizaei was suspended from duty the PSI continued to be authorised. The review has examined various documents covering this period of time and in summary the quality of the evidence obtained could best be described as limited and as such the continued justification for this facility is questionable.” 10.25 We refer below to our concerns about the way in which the MPS used the LAG in this investigation. It is worth noting here, however, that the MBPA attributes failings in this respect to the lack of strategic grasp of the investigation which we have identified more generally: “We believe that many of the decisions that were made and actioned during this investigation can only be explained by reference to the fact that no one of sufficient seniority or independence was carrying out the necessary checks and balances required in order to prevent what we consider to have been a serious manipulation of the original IAG concept.” (Submission from the MBPA.) 10.26 The MPS has pointed out that, in addition to the surveillance reviews, management reviews were conducted by a number of very senior officers and that the evidence does not support that those senior officers abdicated responsibility for intervening in the case. 10.27 Notwithstanding this, our overall impression of the investigation from the evidence we have seen has led us to concur with the views of the IPCC in this respect. 10.28 This lack of co-ordination of the investigation is, we consider, exemplified by the sequential way in which formal notices of alleged misconduct (Regulation 9 Notices) were served on Superintendent Dizaei: “On the 18 January 2001 when Superintendent Dizaei was suspended he was served with a Regulation 9 Notice, which gave general details of eleven allegations, which were under investigation. Over the following months there were a further five occasions when regulation 9 notices were served although it was not until the 10 and 11 July 2001 that Superintendent Dizaei was interviewed about any of the allegations.” (Independent Investigator’s report.) 10.29 The MPS has commented that Regulation 9 Notices were served on Superintendent Dizaei at times and locations convenient to him to minimise potential distress. It also contends that one delay in serving some Regulation 9 Notices in 2001 was “due to intelligence being turned into evidence once the investigation became overt … It needed that 6 months to develop the intelligence. The investigation wanted to avoid unnecessary service of Regulation 9 notices until the picture was clearer.” 10.30 Our investigators’ conclusions are somewhat different: “What this staged service has left the MPS open to is the allegation that it was designed to inflict the most stress and anxiety on Superintendent Dizaei. Similarly that the service of the notices was a reaction to legal advice that there was insufficient evidence to proceed on criminal matters and that consequently the MPS were resorting to discipline matters. The situation was far from ideal.” (Independent investigators’ report.) 10.31 In addition, Superintendent Dizaei told us in his submission that: “My lawyers who have represented superintendents for many years were astonished in the way the investigation was unfolding. It seemed to them and others that there was no coordination, no aim but a series of seat of the pants decisions based on no rational [sic] or logic.” 10.32 We think this lack of co-ordination led to an unfocused and disproportionate investigation, where the MPS concentrated on minutiae that were unlikely to take the matter much further and seemingly put evidence of greater strength on a back burner. 10.33 In response to this criticism, the MPS cites problems with the legislative framework for police discipline, in particular section 75 (3) Police Act 1996. This section has now been replaced but it is still the case that, if a criminal offence may have been committed, no misconduct process can take place until the Director of Public Prosecutions has considered the criminal aspects. 10.34 We accept that this represents the legal position but consider that the lack of co-ordination led to efforts being directed at attempting to find evidence to support a criminal case, as opposed to simply moving ahead with conduct proceedings. We are not alone in our view and cite again the views of the IPCC Review Panel: “We consider that several of the misconduct allegations could and should have been investigated as such and prosecuted as such a good time ago, instead of which some of them were put inappropriately into a criminal case that was then abandoned late in the day, and others apparently left in the sidings until all of the criminal matters had been pursued.” 10.35 The MPS has told us that what emerges from consideration of Operation Helios is that: “those who have had the widest extent of exposure to the case, with the obvious exception of Superintendent Dizaei, appear to be most satisfied as to proportionality and those who have not had such access, appear less satisfied. In the end the MPS accepts, and has always accepted, that mistakes will have been made but would rely on the fact that the most detailed scrutiny of this case occurred during the trial … after four weeks of voir dire presented by one of the finest defence advocates of the criminal bar, the Recorder of London specifically and wholly rejected defence submissions that the investigation had been characterised by bad faith and disproportionality.” 10.36 We have considered the text of the Recorder’s judgment in which he concludes: “I do not find that there was any element at all of bad faith. Nor do I find despite some minor errors that there was anything approaching serious fault amounting to gross negligence in the course of the operation.” 10.37 We accept, of course, that, in reaching this conclusion, the Recorder considered the conduct of the investigation. However, his task was very different from ours. He was asked to consider whether the prosecution of Superintendent Dizaei constituted an abuse of process. We accept his finding that it did not. 10.38 Notwithstanding this, we remain concerned about a number of features of the investigation which we consider to be disproportionate. The IPCC also expressed concerns about disproportionality: “The disproportionate resources given to the covert surveillance of Supt Dizaei and the many lines of investigation that were pursued to no avail have in our view been a contributory factor in the excessive delays that compromise this case as an example of justice throughout its history.” (Decision of the IPCC Review Panel.) 10.39 It is certainly difficult to understand, given the allegations made against Superintendent Dizaei of which we are aware, how, for example, the following situation could have been justified: “My eating habits were of particular interest to my accusers. I think in the region of ten statements were taken in the local restaurants I ate at to see whether I ate halal meat. A four page statement was taken from the canteen manager as to whether I eat curry on a Thursday. I say no more.” (Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.) 10.40 In short, from the evidence we have seen, we consider that there was a lack of strategic direction resulting in a failure to apply a robust objective analysis which we think DPS should apply to all investigations. “I think it is only proper and appropriate that a complaint against a police officer should be investigated, but that is said with the proviso that it is equally incumbent on the investigator to use rational judgment, fairness and unbiased criteria in investigating that complaint.” (Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.) Gold Group 10.41 We are concerned about the way in which the MPS used a Gold Group in relation to Operation Helios. As we understand it, in the MPS, Gold Groups are formed when there is a ‘critical incident’. The definition in the MPS’ Investigation of Critical Incidents Manual (2002) is “any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and / or the community.” 10.42 In passing, we note that there has been no general agreement to this definition being extended to apply to cases such as Operation Helios. 10.43 In essence the MPS has argued that a Gold Group was formed in this case because “the investigation of a senior police officer, regardless of race or gender, has the potential for a significant impact on a community”. We do not agree that the seniority of the officer concerned, in itself, would necessarily lead to a significant impact on a community, although we can see that Superintendent Dizaei’s race may well have been an issue. 10.44 From the evidence we have considered, we can see that there was a point in the investigation into Superintendent Dizaei when a Gold Group could have been established appropriately, to advise on the possible impact on the community of the arrest of such a senior and high profile minority ethnic officer. 10.45 However, our concern is the involvement of the Gold Group in the strategic management of the investigation, which is the role of senior officers in DPS. 10.46 Under the current disciplinary system as operated by the MPS, investigations into the alleged misconduct of an officer below ACPO rank are the responsibility of DPS. The MPS argues that a Gold Group is formed to strengthen decision-making and accountability. In our view, the use of a Gold Group in this case only served to blur the lines of decision-making and accountability. Policy File / Decision Log 10.47 We have already noted our concern about the failure of DPS always to maintain a proper written record of decisions made during the course of an investigation. For Operation Helios, a policy file was maintained but, as our investigators highlighted, it failed to document key decisions: “The decision not to inform [Superintendent Dizaei] is outlined in decision log 1 on 29 January 2000 and reviewed at decision log 18 on 14 February 2000 and again at log 20 on 28 February 2000. In each case the reason not to do so relates to there being an ongoing criminal investigation, which was likely to be jeopardised should Superintendent Dizaei have become aware of its existence. The policy log fails to go into any detail as to how it is thought he would place the investigation in jeopardy. … “With regard to the arrest of Superintendent Dizaei in May 2001 the review has had sight of an MPS document headed ‘Operational Strategy’. This document is undated, but it has clearly been prepared around the time that the operation was moving from the covert to overt stage. Contained within this document is a paragraph, which reads, ‘Mozart [code name for Superintendent Dizaei] will not be arrested at this stage, the evidence to justify doing so is weak’. No further record or Decision Log entry has been made by the SIO to justify a change of stance when in fact the evidence against him was no stronger.” (Independent investigators’ report.) 10.48 Failure to record the reasoning behind key decisions during any investigation puts the MPS at risk. It means that the organisation does not have an adequate audit trail of decisions made. Inevitably, this makes it difficult for the organisation both to justify actions if they later become subject to scrutiny, and to rebut allegations that it has discriminated against the officer concerned or infringed his or her human rights. Lay Advisors 10.49 We welcome the use of the IAG in appropriate cases and have made recommendations in a previous chapter about how the IAG might be put on a stronger and more transparent footing. We have also commented about the way in which the LAG was used during Operation Helios. We have expressed our concern that they were not given all the relevant information nor informed of the decision to settle the case: “There is no indication in the researched paperwork that suggests that these concerns as to the validity of some of the proposed methods of investigation and their proportionality were ever brought to the attention of those providing independent advice or peer review. The tone of the letters from [redacted] is at odds with the tone of documents being provided to those advising the investigation. It is open to speculation as to whether their conclusions would have been different if they have been made aware of the shortcomings outlined by the CPS.” (Independent investigators’ report.) 10.50 If external advisors are to be used by the MPS, the benefit the organisation may gain from this process is greatly reduced if they are not brought in at an early stage of the investigation or if they do not have full access to all relevant documentation. A number of people told us about their perception that the valuable asset of the LAG was used selectively, evidenced in relation to Operation Helios by the failure of the MPS to inform them of the settlement agreement with Superintendent Dizaei. 10.51 This could give rise to the perception that the organisation does not really value the Lay Advisors’ input with regard to decisions that really count, and that it is only concerned to use them to ‘race-proof’ decisions it is sure it can already justify. When asked, however, how he could be sure that there was no ‘race-proofing’ involved in the process in which he took part, Lord Dholakia, a member of the LAG involved in Operation Helios, refuted that allegation: “I was given every documentation that was available and I spent two days studying those documents in the privacy of my own room, without any help from anybody else, and I was able to come to a judgment at that particular stage, and I made it very clear that if at any stage I felt there was any racial, cultural or religious bias I would jump like a ton of bricks, and it never happened.” (Evidence of Lord Dholakia.) 10.52 Representatives of the LAG have commented that: “The Helios LAG was composed of individuals drawn from different professional backgrounds, faith, ethnic and cultural groups, all of whom gave their time voluntarily and exercised their views independently … Individual members shared a common view throughout our work on Helios.” 10.53 We do not seek to criticise either the individual Lay Advisors themselves or the work of the LAG. Our concern, as set out above, is how the MPS treated the Lay Advisors by not providing them with all the relevant information and documents. 10.54 Similar considerations apply to the use of other external advisors, who need to be given a full account of all relevant information and have their advice considered constructively. “ACU (the Anti Corruption Unit) also sought the advice of [redacted], a Deputy Chief Constable, and yet failed to inform [redacted] that others members of the NBPA were being investigated. More importantly the DCC (from whom advice had been sought) specifically recommended that the mileage allegations should not be subject of discipline (due the triviality and age of the claims) let alone a criminal trial. Yet that advice was wholly ignored. Cherry picking of bits and pieces of advice from ‘advisors’ to fit a prescribed agenda is contrary to common sense, disingenuous and abuse of the role of advisors. However, the MPA were quick to argue that because a DCC had quality assured the investigation and conduct of the officers, they as a police authority did not need to address our complaint.” (Submission of the NBPA.) Settlement Agreement 10.55 The IPCC strongly criticised the MPS’ decision to enter into a settlement agreement with Superintendent Dizaei in the way that it did: “We have also considered the agreement between the MPS and others dated 24 October 2004 [sic – should be 2003] and referred to above. The agreement sets out the terms to facilitate the reinstatement of Supt Dizaei within the MPS. As noted, this agreement is ultra vires and does not bind the PCA or the IPCC insofar as parts of the agreement relate to the termination of misconduct proceedings against Supt Dizaei, a point conceded by the MPS. Whilst we note that the MPS has withdrawn the undertaking rashly given to Mr Dizaei’s solicitors to offer no evidence at any misconduct tribunal, we are of the view that it can now be argued to be unfair to Supt Dizaei to proceed with a hearing. Mr Dizaei entered into the agreement with the benefit of legal advice, and he can, not unreasonably, seek to rely on the undertaking he was given by the MPS. In any other employment context such an agreement would stand. We have to weigh the public interest in upholding the special powers accorded the PCA/IPCC under the police disciplinary system with the application of the principles of justice applicable in any such individual case. As noted above, we consider subordinating the latter to the former risks frustrating the very objective sought. “The MPS has relied in its arguments for not proceeding with a disciplinary hearing primarily on broader public interest arguments concerned with the needs of the police service to recruit and retain more people from black and minority ethnic groups, and specifically its assessment that in this case to set aside the agreement reached with the Black Police Association would be to jeopardise its own strategy and plans for such recruitment. We have given careful consideration to these arguments but dismiss them as matters that do not have sufficient pertinence to either the case in hand or to the specific public interest in upholding the police disciplinary system. They are essentially extraneous management concerns, legitimate and important in their own right but never sensible grounds for manipulating a disciplinary system. Indeed the failure of the MPS to keep the two separate has led to the confusion and poor judgements characterising this case.” (Decision of the IPCC Review Panel.) 10.56 We asked the Deputy Commissioner about the IPCC’s criticism and he made clear that, in the MPS’ view, there were over-riding strategic management concerns which justified the approach taken. Superintendent Dizaei referred to these when he gave evidence: “… once you look at where this case started, the cost to the taxpayer, the cost to the confidence of policing, the trauma it caused to my family, to my colleagues, to my community, and the potential damage this would have had as this matter went to discipline – which, from my understanding, a further eminent QC was appointed to represent the Metropolitan Police – and for it to then go to an employment tribunal listed for four months, I think it was perfectly sensible for all those involved, the Metropolitan Police Authority, the Commissioner and my legal team, to try to resolve this problem and I am delighted that they did.” (Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.) 10.57 To an extent, we understand the MPS’ concerns at the time, in particular its desire to resolve intractable management issues facing the organisation. However, we consider that it is never appropriate for a public body such as the MPS to enter into an agreement that is ultra vires, and which is likely to bring the organisation into disrepute with its own staff and officers, as well as the wider public. 10.58 Failing to consult the PCA, which had a statutory role in the case at the time the settlement agreement was drafted, was a fundamental error, as the Commissioner himself pointed out when he gave evidence: “I do not know whether Ian Blair actually contacted the PCA. If it had been me as Deputy Commissioner I would have contacted the PCA and they would have been involved in negotiations, because remember, of course, they had the job of supervising that inquiry from start to finish.” Media issues 10.59 A number of criticisms have been made of the way in which the MPS handled media issues during Operation Helios. Superintendent Dizaei contends that the organisation had a proactive media strategy that apparently was devised with little regard to the welfare of a serving police officer who had not been found guilty of any misconduct: “On 18th January 2001 I was asked to attend [redacted]’s office … and I was suspended. It was only then I was told of operation Helios and informed that my house, my car and premises belonging to my friends and family were being searched. My phone and warrant card was taken off me and I was told to get out. Rather than providing any support or welfare for me as a human being let alone a fellow colleague after a clear shock and trauma my colleagues decided to place me under further surveillance and tap the surrounding phone boxes … I called home to be told by my terrified children that they could not go to school because there were 30 reporters standing outside my house since 7 am (I was suspended at 0900) … The initial allegations and the way they were given to the press before they were even served on me was a carefully prepared strategy.” (Submission of Superintendent Dizaei.) 10.60 The MPS emphatically denies that this was the case or that there was any strategy designed to inform the media of the existence of the investigation before Superintendent Dizaei was himself aware of it. 10.61 The NBPA commented on the MPS’ press strategy during Superintendent Dizaei’s trial: “One member of the DPA sat in court throughout the entire trial talking to and reassuring members of the press. Even before the jury had reached a verdict [redacted], who had booked a golfing holiday in Alacanti [sic], could not wait and with the assistance and support of the DPA held a press conference at the Yard expressing their distaste for Mr Dizaei. Selected journalist [sic] were invited and asked to sign confidentially clauses, after which they were given a detailed briefing during a ‘live’ trial”. 10.62 The MPS confirmed that the briefing took place but commented that this was in line with MPS and ACPO guidelines and that those who attended were not specially selected by the MPS. 10.63 We understand the vital role of the media in relation to the MPS’ work and do not seek to criticise the organisation for needing to take a proactive stance in relation to its dealings with the media in appropriate cases. However, we would question any strategy where statements are made to the media before the individual concerned is aware of what is being said and particularly when the officer concerned has not yet been made aware that an investigation is even taking place. 10.64 In this case, it seems likely that the media were alerted to the investigation into Superintendent Dizaei before he was aware of the investigation himself. The likely source for such information is someone in the MPS. 10.65 Whether official or unofficial, such contact with the media can only serve to cause unnecessary distress to those involved, including family and friends. If unofficial, the MPS needs to find ways of preventing similar leaks in the future. “Learning from my own experience, what caused the most trauma to my family, and in particular my children, is the clandestine briefing to the press.” (Evidence of Superintendent Dizaei.) 10.66 In addition, in our view, while the public interest may require the MPS to announce to the media the fact of an investigation taking place, it is not appropriate for it to make subjective comments about the ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ of any officer or member of staff who is subject to disciplinary proceedings, until decisions about misconduct or criminal activity have been made by the appropriate body. We believe that any process which permits this kind of briefing should be changed. Unfairness 10.67 The failings which we have identified above present a picture of an organisation acting unfairly towards one of its own officers who happens to be under investigation. There are numerous examples, such as the scale of the investigation and the disproportionate use of resources. No regard seems to have been had to the welfare of Superintendent Dizaei, a senior officer who, although under investigation, had not been found guilty of any relevant criminal or conduct offence. “Within weeks of being served regulation 9 notices which were the most damaging namely sexual relationships with prostitutes and unauthorised visits to the Iranian embassy they were withdrawn without me even being questioned. By that time [redacted] had inflicted the personal damage to my reputation as he had intended … The vagueness of the discipline notices was deliberate and intended to keep me guessing. Eg Assault: no date, no name, no circumstance. Just ‘Assault’. And then the allegations were dropped without a question put to me. However the allegation appeared in every newspaper on the day of my suspension.” (Submission of Superintendent Dizaei.) 10.68 It is undeniable that race played a considerable part in aspects of Operation Helios. It seems that Superintendent Dizaei’s Iranian descent, and his links with the Black Police Associations, were part of the MPS’ thinking in a number of unusual decisions they took in the course of the case, as outlined by the independent investigators: “As the investigation progressed, and moved from being covert to overt several issues around fairness based on race, arose that now need to be considered. In particular the formation of a Gold group and the decision to arrest Superintendent Dizaei rather than to arrange a voluntary attendance at a police station for interview cause concern. “… The review cannot establish the justification for the formation of such groups but the issue of Superintendent Dizaei’s race and the community cannot be ignored. The review considers that on the balance of probability, issues around race and the community were the key drivers for such a group being formed.” (Independent investigators’ report.) 10.69 We see this as part of the pattern of the MPS’ difficulty in managing difference which we have identified more generally. 10.70 We have received evidence in relation to race discrimination from Superintendent Dizaei, the NBPA and others. In the absence of a full case review, we are not satisfied, on the evidence we have received, that race discrimination occurred. 10.71 However, we particularly note the following observations from our independent investigators: “Soon after transferring to the force Superintendent Dizaei was posted to the Borough of Kensington. “This Borough has a large Farsi/Iranian community and as such this could have be seen as a good move for the force, the officer and the community. Unfortunately little to no regard for the pressure such a transfer would put on the officer, from the Iranian Moslem community, appears to have been considered and as such his personal/professional roles became merged. As he had no formal briefing with regard to how much involvement he could have with this community he found himself in a position where he was able to get involved in the community, but was not functioning in an official capacity. This position would result in members of the community having expectations of him in his professional role that were beyond that which a police officer was able to deliver. This situation could be interpreted as unfair treatment based on race. However, the review considers it was more of a strategic and operational failing in respect of supporting officers from specific communities to manage professional and social pressures that result from a posting such as this. “Consideration has also been given to failings by senior officers to curb Superintendent Dizaei’s activities in respect of his community contacts and although this probably occurred as a result of the intelligence gathering operation that commenced in the summer of 1999, it clearly put the force in a difficult and vulnerable position. This situation could be considered as being unfair, but is not based on race. “The review has examined an official MPS record touching on this subject of intervention (dated 05.01.01 by a Detective Chief Superintendent). The document has tried to defend the MPS position but unfortunately it is dated in excess of eighteen months after the officer has been posted to the Kensington community and some twelve months after the second part of the operation commenced. There is no decision log entry or other record, which addresses the issues surrounding management intervention in August 1999 … “With regard to the arrest of Superintendent Dizaei in May 2001 the review has had sight of an MPS document headed ‘Operational Strategy’. This document is undated, but it has clearly been prepared around the time that the operation was moving from the covert to overt stage. “Contained within this document is a paragraph, which reads, ‘Mozart will not be arrested at this stage, the evidence to justify doing so is weak’. No further record or Decision Log entry has been made by the SIO to justify a change of stance when in fact the evidence against him was no stronger. Superintendent Dizaei makes reference to his arrest in his submission to the Inquiry … and the review considers that with regard to the manner in which he was treated, it appears that in the circumstances it was unfair and the element of race cannot be excluded.” (Extracts from independent investigators’ report.) 10.72 It is clear to us that an investigation such as this, which lacks strategic direction in the manner we have identified and does not have a full paper audit trail for the rationale behind decisions, lays itself open to such allegations being made. 10.73 The review conducted by our independent investigators was, however, not a full case review. In relation to the issue of discrimination on the grounds of Superintendent Dizaei’s race, although the evidence is inconclusive, the issue clearly remains live and it should be looked at in the full case review we are recommending. 10.74 The MPS has commented that it is concerned that the “relatively brief nature of the independent investigators’ review of Operation Helios provides insufficient basis for the very severe criticisms made of it.” The two investigators, who carried out this review, are both experienced former senior police officers and looked at sufficient original material to focus on key issues. We are satisfied that their work was both professional and objective. But, in our view, the comment of the MPS only serves to strengthen the argument for a full case review. Nothing less can do justice to everyone concerned. We therefore recommend a full case review of Operation Helios which is independent of the MPS. The review should include examining the issue of race discrimination. Lessons to be learnt 10.75 We consider that the MPS needs to learn lessons from our analysis of Superintendent Dizaei’s case in relation to the following areas: case management; settlement agreements; the use of Gold Groups; the use of policy files; the use of lay advisors; and the issuing of press statements. 10.76 We hope that the recommendations that follow will enable it to do so. We advocate urgent adoption by DPS of our earlier recommendation that investigations by DPS should be run in accordance with the recommendations of the Review of Operation Lancet and the normal investigative process for criminal cases. Arrangements should be made to put the necessary systems in place, as a matter of urgency, which should prevent investigations such as this becoming a ‘runaway train’. We also think that our recommended model of case management, if adopted, will help to ensure that the right checks and balances are in place to ensure that the investigation is subject to the appropriate strategic direction and scrutiny. We recommend that the MPS avoids entering into agreements in relation to professional standards and conduct matters that are ultra vires. We repeat our earlier recommendation that all DPS investigators should keep a full policy file documenting the reasons for key decisions made. In respect of the use of lay advisors in such investigations, we repeat our earlier recommendations in chapter 6 on the appointment of IAG members and the resourcing of the IAG. In particular, we emphasise our earlier recommendation on disclosure. We recommend that the Independent Advisory Group and the MPS agree a protocol in relation to disclosure of documentation and the rationale for decisions to Independent Advisory Group members. This must be based on the presumption that Independent Advisory Group members see everything that is available to the investigating officers. Where possible, this should be before decisions are taken. We recommend that where Gold Groups are established in relation to disciplinary matters, their purpose and powers are set out in writing so that all involved are clear about their role and lines of accountability. We repeat our earlier recommendations on issuing of press statements and dealing with the media. We also recommend that no comment is made about an officer’s guilt or innocence by the MPS until it has been established by the appropriate decision-making body, and no embargoed interviews should be given. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick 10.77 DAC Paddick was born and educated in south London. He joined the MPS after university and was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1981. He rose rapidly through the ranks and was the Chief Superintendent in charge of Merton borough in 1998. He was promoted to Commander in 2000 and took over command of Lambeth borough. He was promoted to Deputy Assistant Commissioner in 2004. 10.78 As DAC Paddick was (and of course still is) and ACPO rank officer, the allegations relating to his conduct were dealt with by the MPA and not the MPS. 10.79 A summary of the details of the investigation, drawn from our independent investigator’s report and other evidence, is set out below: Chronology October 1995 Whilst serving as a Detective Chief Inspector in the MPS, Mr Paddick met and formed a relationship with Mr A. November 1995 Mr Paddick accompanied Mr A to a London police station where Mr A had to answer to bail. Commander Paddick waited in the public area. Within a period of several months, Commander Paddick and Mr A decided to live together. November 1998 Mr Paddick and Mr A moved into a flat together. After a period of time (the duration of which is disputed by both parties), Mr A started to smoke cannabis in the property. July 2000 The relationship was terminated, owing to Mr A having failed to honour an agreement not to smoke cannabis in the home. March 2002 Mr A contacted Commander Paddick and informed him that the Mail on Sunday newspaper had offered Mr A £100,000 to tell his story about the relationship with Commander Paddick, including references to Commander Paddick smoking cannabis. 17 March 2002 Story printed in the Mail on Sunday newspaper. March 2002 The Professional Standards and Performance Monitoring Committee of the MPA invited Humberside Police to carry out an investigation in to the allegations made in the Mail on Sunday newspaper article that Commander Paddick had allowed his premises to be used for smoking cannabis, he had smoked cannabis and that he had breached Police Regulations by meeting a person on bail without lawful authority. The MPA also invited the PCA to supervise the investigation. March to July 2002 Investigation was undertaken. This included Commander Paddick being interviewed under caution on 8 July 2002. 18 July 2002 Report by the Deputy Chief Constable of Humberside Police submitted to the PCA. 16 September 2002 The Humberside report forwarded to the CPS. 9 October 2002 The CPS decided that it would not be in the public interest to prosecute Commander Paddick. The report was forwarded to the MPA to consider if any disciplinary action should be taken. 12 November 2002 Commander Paddick was advised by the MPA that no disciplinary action would be taken against him. The MPA advised the Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, of their decision. The MPA also invited the Commissioner to consider seeing Commander Paddick to discuss the matter with him. How the case was handled 10.80 We agree with the conclusion of the independent investigator that “there is no evidence to suggest that the investigation was authorised to treat Mr Paddick unfairly or that it was directly related to his sexuality”. 10.81 There is one particular aspect of DAC Paddick’s case, however, where criticism has been made of the organisational response, namely media handling: “At the end of the day, in order to stop a certain national newspaper, or group of newspapers … to repeat allegations that I had been acquitted of in the course of a formal investigation, I had to sue the newspaper, which, if I had lost, would have cost me £400,000. “I had no support whatsoever from the Metropolitan Police Service or from the Metropolitan Police Authority in terms of taking that action. Yes, the Commissioner did make a statement, which was helpful in those proceedings, but in terms of – it was my responsibility to take that action; … I was liable for whatever the outcome was going to be of those proceedings, and I think that in those sort of circumstances, you are only in that position because of the position that you hold of senior rank within the Police Service. If I was a bus driver or in some other profession, this would not have arisen, therefore there is an obligation on the Metropolitan Police Service and the Metropolitan Police Authority to defend my position. “So, for example, when I am appointed Deputy Assistant Commissioner and a national newspaper alleges that I have only been promoted because I am gay, and I go to my press office, they turn round and say, ‘It is nothing to do with us, we did not promote you, the police authority did, go and talk to them’, it is not, I think, an acceptable support from an officer who is under attack because he is a member of a minority group.” (Evidence of DAC Paddick.) 10.82 The Deputy Commissioner refuted the allegation that the MPS had been unsupportive in this respect: “I think the key point here for this kind of media issue is that what Brian is saying is what is the Met doing to stop newspapers repeating misleading allegations, and the answer to that is that the Met will do its best to inform and cajole newspapers to say stop doing it, but unfortunately …. we do not control the newspapers and the newspapers will or will not take any notice of what we have actually said. If we turn for instance to the issue about the cannabis pilot, I know that the DPA held two briefings, including the Commissioner being at one of them, where they made absolutely clear that Brian had not started this off on his own and this had the Commissioner’s support. Most newspapers printed that. One newspaper decided they did not want to print that and went a different way. When we then come to the issue about the major legal action in which Brian is involved, I think that becomes much more difficult. Something I said last time was that we have to understand that the issue for Brian, and in fact for Ali Dizaei, about newspapers which caused them personally most grief were nothing to do with the MPS; they were to do with the allegations of an ex-partner. At that point, using public money to support Brian in that position might have been extremely difficult. It would not be normal for to us support an officer taking … privacy proceedings, because that, I think, opens us up to almost an open-ended cheque book to a number of officers. “I do think that Brian did get more support than again he acknowledges here. There is a very senior member of the DPA with whom Brian was in regular contact, home, mobile, office numbers and so on, but Brian was being very, very bruised by what was going on. “… I am extremely pleased with the way Brian has actually come through this. There were some very, very difficult times for him for a couple of years while all of this was going on. He and I had many discussions, and there is one particular piece of advice I was able to give him which I think he has done, which is to stop being a story and make a story about his own achievements and the achievements of the Met, and since that stage the interest in him has diminished in the newspapers. I think he is now doing a very good job …” (Evidence of the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair.) 10.83 We consider it unfortunate that, whatever support was offered to DAC Paddick, in particular in relation to the way his case was reported in the media, he should have been left with the impression that the organisation failed to support him during this difficult time. It appears that despite the support given, communication failed in this respect with the result that a senior officer, with a great deal to offer the MPS, genuinely believes the organisation failed to support him at a time when he needed its help. Lessons to be learnt 10.84 We consider from our analysis that the MPS needs to learn lessons in relation to the following areas: dealings with the media; and support for officers under investigation. 10.85 We hope that the recommendations that follow will enable it to do so. We have already made recommendations about how the MPS should handle media issues relating to officers under investigation. In addition we recommend that the MPS reviews its policy in relation to correcting errors in media reporting about its officers and staff. We repeat our earlier recommendation about the role of the HR directorate in relation to welfare support. We recommend that the MPS examines the adequacy of welfare support to officers under investigation. The role of the HR Directorate is clearly key in this respect and the MPS should also consider involving the Directorate of Public Affairs to determine the extent to which professional support on media issues can be offered to officers under investigation. Chief Inspector Julia Pendry 10.86 Chief Inspector Pendry joined the MPS in 1983 and was posted to Vine Street Police Station. In the next 13 years she held a variety of postings, including as a Community Liaison Officer, an instructor at the Cadet School and a response team officer. 10.87 She was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1996 and posted to Southall, where she worked until earlier this year. She was a response team Sergeant for two years and was then selected to work in the Borough Liaison Office. In 1990, she was promoted to Inspector and over the last four years has held several roles including duty officer, staff officer to the Borough Commander, Inspection and Review and Custody Manager. She was promoted to Chief Inspector in March 2004. 10.88 A summary of the details of her case, drawn from our independent investigator’s report and other evidence, is set out below: Chronology 2 November 2003 Guru Nanak parade held in Southall, where Inspector Pendry is Bronze Command and gave a briefing to officers. 23rd November 2003 Letter of complaint about this briefing was handed to the Borough Commander. 25 November 2003 Inspector Pendry identified as the officer subject to the complaint. 30 November 2003 Email stated that the officers concerned wished to make a formal complaint and that the MPS Sikh Association would like to be associated with the complaint on behalf of the community. 11 December 2003 Borough Commander identifies the complainants. 12 December 2003 Recommendation that an Investigating Officer should be appointed. 15 December 2003 Decision to implement a Gold Group, “to manage the various issues, i.e. the welfare of the officer complained of the support of the complainants and the community impact etc”. 16 December 2003 Internal investigation commenced. 17 December 2003 Inspector Pendry discovered, unofficially, that an investigation was taking place into her alleged racist behaviour and that consideration was being given to suspending her from duty. 18 December 2003 Inspector Pendry was advised to see members of the Senior Management Team (SMT) and another senior officer the following morning. 19 December 2003 Having waited for 1 hour and 45 minutes, Inspector Pendry was informed that one member of the SMT would not be in attendance. The Borough Commander served a Regulation 9 Notice on Inspector Pendry. While on duty at Southall Police Station, Inspector Pendry saw various police officers that had been attending a Gold Group meeting in relation to the impact on the community of the investigation into her conduct. 23 December 2003 Inspector Pendry was interviewed under caution. 24 December 2003 Inspector Pendry was informed that her promotion to Chief Inspector had been delayed. 27 December 2003 Whilst acting as Duty Officer, Inspector Pendry felt unwell and was examined by the Police Surgeon, who diagnosed her as suffering from stress. 29-31 December 2003 Inspector Pendry was made Acting Chief Inspector at Southall, during the absence of other senior officers on annual leave. 4 January 2004 Inspector Pendry received various telephone calls from friends and colleagues informing her that there was an article in a national newspaper about the allegation against her. Although Inspector Pendry was not named in the article, she was identified by these people because of her role as Inspector – Operations. 9 January 2004 MPS Police Notice announced that Inspector Pendry has been promoted to Chief Inspector with effect from 2 February 2004. 25 January 2004 Inspector Pendry was appointed Bronze Commander for the Sikh procession of Guru Ravi Dass, and conducted the briefing for the procession. 26 January 2004 SIO submitted his report. Inspector Pendry sent an email to the Borough Commander setting out concerns about her welfare and the lack of concern by the MPS for deploying her the previous day to another Sikh procession. 29 January 2004 Response from Borough Commander via email stating that he was unable to see her until 3 February 2004. Inspector Pendry went off work suffering from work-related stress. 6 February 2004 Inspector Pendry was informed that her promotion was further delayed. Report submitted to DPS. 12 February 2004 Final decision on disposal of complaint made by DPS and file returned to Borough Commander. 17 (or 18) February 2004 Inspector Pendry was informed by a Personnel Manager that there was to be no formal discipline action taken against her. 23 February 2004 Inspector Pendry officially notified that no disciplinary action would be taken against her. 26 February 2004 Borough Commander met Inspector Pendry, informed her that her promotion would be delayed and administered words of advice. Inspector Pendry was unclear about whether she had been given words of advice and what the Borough Commander had said. 27 February 2004 Inspector Pendry met a senior police officer, in the presence of her Police Federation Representative. This meeting resulted in her raising a series of complaints about the way her promotion / posting was discussed in relation to issues in her personal life. Inspector Pendry raised these complaints by lodging a Fairness at Work claim. 1 March 2004 Minutes of the Metropolitan Police Sikh Association (MPSA) meeting stated: “With regards to the Southall complaint (Inspector Pendry), an outcome has been reached. It was substantiated that the officer had used inappropriate language and as a result was given words of advice. The two officers that brought the matter to our attention have been commended by the MPSA and [redacted]. MPSA sincerely thank them for the personal courage shown. We encourage and support any member of the MPS to challenge inappropriate behavior, language and attitudes. The MPSA committee have strongly expressed that any intolerance based on faith should be treated as seriously as all other bigoted behaviour within the organisation and our communities.” 7 March 2004 Senior MPS officer addressed the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Gurdwara and discussed Inspector Pendry’s case. 26 March 2004 Inspector Pendry’s case was discussed at length during an open forum at the Annual General Meeting of the MPSA. How the case was handled: Investigation process 10.89 The independent investigator made the following comment in relation to how the complaint about Chief Inspector Pendry’s remarks was made: “It is clearly unfortunate if not unacceptable that where serving police officers hear such a remark, or suspect that another officer, irrespective of that officer’s rank, have made a racist remark, they did not report the fact to a more senior officer at the earliest opportunity. In the circumstances surrounding the remarks subject to this review, the delay appears unacceptable.” 10.90 While we understand that junior officers may feel reluctant to criticise the actions of more senior officers, we hope that our recommendations for reform of the disciplinary and grievance procedures will facilitate earlier and swifter resolution of such problems in the future. 10.91 We do, however, consider that late reporting of an allegation, particularly where the complaint is not made directly to the officer concerned or her line manager, is a factor that should be weighed in the balance by those responsible for its investigation. 10.92 Despite the lateness of the reporting of the allegation, there remained an opportunity for early resolution of the complaint. This was missed because the MPS immediately adopted formal processes which involved the formation of a Gold Group and the involvement of senior managers: “With regard to the issue of resolving this complaint at the earliest possible stage, mention has already been made of this matter. The reviewing officer is of the opinion that there were clear opportunities for this to be done at an early stage and ironically the officer indicated in her response to the Form l63 (regulation 9 notice) that if she had offended someone she would have liked to have the opportunity to apologise.” (Independent investigator’s report). 10.93 For her part, Chief Inspector Pendry made it clear to the MPS and the Inquiry that she was open to an early and amicable resolution of the matter: “Obviously, as I said in my response to my 163 (regulation 9 notice), which was obviously delayed as well, was the fact that had I said something that could be resolved at the time I would like to have sat down with the officers, discussed the issues, and, if necessary and if appropriate, apologise. I do not feel in this case I had to apologise but I would have had to have heard what they said first of all.” (Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.) 10.94 We consider that had the opportunity been taken at any early stage, the matter might have been resolved in a way that could have satisfied the complainants and defused an issue of community relations quickly, while addressing any weaknesses in Chief Inspector Pendry’s approach in a manner that was not distressing. We think the failure to seize the opportunity to deal with the case in this way resulted from weaknesses we have already identified in the MPS’ ability to manage difference. 10.95 It seems that the organisation’s response to the complaints, to quote Lord Harris in a different context, was to react like a “rabbit frozen in the headlights”. This had serious consequences for the officer concerned. Lack of information 10.96 The independent investigator commented on the way in which Chief Inspector Pendry discovered that a complaint had been made against her: “An area of concern that has been identified during the review is the manner in which Inspector Pendry found out that she was the subject of a complaint (17 December 2003). Ideally the officer should be served with the Form l63 (regulation 9 notice) at the earliest opportunity and, in this case, it was not served until the 18th December 2003. This was unfortunate but in fairness to the investigating team the notice is dated the 17 December 2003. Notwithstanding this, the review has confirmed that the complaint was made on the 23rd November, and the officer deserved to at least be made aware of the allegation.” (Independent investigator’s report.) 10.97 In response to this, the MPS has told us that it believed it was “unfortunate” that Chief Inspector Pendry was notified by a Sergeant at Southall that she was subject to a complaint, but that it was also “inevitable”. 10.98 Chief Inspector Pendry, in her submission to us, raised a number of questions about the way in which the investigation was handled and the way in which she was treated: “52. Why did I have to be informed by a Sergeant at Southall, in the corridor that I was being investigated? 53. Why were officers interviewed before I was given notice? … 68. How did a Chief Inspector (Black Police Association member) know of the decisions affecting my promotion before me? 69. Why was the email from workforce deployments, delaying my promotion sent on Christmas Eve, thus ruining my family Christmas? 70. Who made the decision to delay my promotion and what process was involved? 71. What is the MPS process / policy to review such decisions? My belief is that it was not followed. 72. As my promotion was delayed. Why was I continually used as both Acting Chief Inspector and Acting Superintendent on the Borough? 73. Why was I offered no official organisational support and why was I not communicated with as per 'Doing the right thing'? 74. I again refer to [redacted]’s comments about the international seriousness of the investigation and that he had personally postponed my promotion. Why did he allow me to act as an Acting Chief Inspector / Superintendent. Perhaps more importantly. Why did he allow me to lead the Sikh procession of Ravi Dass, through the streets of Southall on the 25 January 04?” (Submission of Chief Inspector Pendry.) 10.99 The MPS has told us that Chief Inspector Pendry had not been suspended, and was therefore fit for operational duties. Its view was that, since she remained innocent of any misconduct until the contrary was established, it was appropriate for her to be deployed in relation to other religious processions. Unfairness 10.100 We are also particularly concerned by the way in which issues impacting on Chief Inspector Pendry’s posting were handled and we consider this to be unfair. In our view, the lack of sensitivity has needlessly added to the inevitable distress caused to the officer under investigation and has led to an Employment Tribunal claim being brought against the MPS. 10.101 The independent investigator reported that: “… there is clear evidence of issues surrounding her personal life and in particular a previous relationship she had, being used in the consideration of her promotion to the rank of Chief Inspector and transfer to another station.” 10.102 Chief Inspector Pendry commented: “You know, I am a female officer, I have been a police officer for 21 years. It is obvious that most of your life, when you work as police officer, you are going to socialise with police officers; that is the way that it works. If I am going to be discriminated against and treated differently because I once used to go out with somebody, then I think that is very unfair and discriminatory behaviour.” (Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.) 10.103 We do not see how such issues can be of relevance. Be that as it may, it is quite clear that the way in which these issues was raised was badly handled, with the result that the organisation now has to face grievances raised under the Fairness at Work process and an Employment Tribunal claim. 10.104 We are also concerned about the way in which Chief Inspector Pendry’s case was discussed by a senior officer in public at the Gurdwara and at the Sikh Association Annual General Meeting. The MPS has justified this action by reference to a need to “communicate with a significant sector of Southall’s community” and to be open and transparent. 10.105 We accept the requirement for openness and transparency. However, in this case, we are concerned that there was public discussion of Chief Inspector Pendry’s case without her knowledge, and following the conclusion of the disciplinary process. We are also concerned about the level of detail of the discussions. 10.106 In his evidence to us, the Deputy Commissioner referred to “the most intense pressure in [Ms Pendry’s] personal life” and seemed to imply that the obvious distress being suffered by Chief Inspector Pendry was the result of issues in her personal life, rather than the way in which her case was handled. Having seen and heard from Chief Inspector Pendry, we reject that suggestion. 10.107 The MPS provides a service to London through its people, which are its greatest resource. Inevitably, they all have other facets to their lives other than serving the MPS. Failure to appreciate this, and to manage difference in all its varieties, will inevitably mean that the MPS will fail to get the best from its people. Such comments are extremely unsupportive of an officer who is a valuable asset to the organisation and we regret that they were made. Welfare support 10.108 The independent investigator reported that: “Throughout the duration of this investigation there was clearly a failing by the MPS in relation to the welfare of Inspector Pendry”. We agree with this conclusion which is evidenced by a number of aspects of the investigation. 10.109 Although the MPS has told us that a Superintendent was appointed to look after Chief Inspector Pendry’s welfare, we are concerned that Chief Inspector Pendry herself perceived there to be a lack of official support when she was under investigation and was clearly unaware that the Superintendent had an official responsibility for her welfare: “I suppose the first thing I can say is what support? I was not offered any support at all. I was not offered any occupational health. I was told on the eve of the Christian festival of Christmas, for want of a better way of describing it, that my promotion was going to be withheld. Nobody gave me any support inside, I obviously had no idea what was going to happen to me. On 27th December I was duty officer and I actually asked to see the force medical officer, who came to the station because I at the time thought I was about to suffer a stroke and I had a pounding headache and he examined me and said I was suffering from stress and I was offered absolutely no support at all. But I will say, and I think this is very, very important, I was offered no official support, but there have been people who have been truly, truly loyal and kind to me … It would have been nice if the Gold group had considered my welfare needs in the first place, rather than just thinking about everybody else’s needs.” (Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.) Gold Group 10.110 We have already said that we consider that the MPS missed an opportunity to address the issue raised by the complaint about Chief Inspector Pendry’s conduct at an early stage. Instead, it formed a Gold Group, partly out of a desire, it was said, to secure her welfare, which we consider it signally failed to do. A Gold Group is formed where there is a critical incident. We have already referred to the definition as “any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and / or the community.” 10.111 In this case, we see the involvement of a Gold Group as an over-reaction because the complaint came from Sikh officers and an example of the MPS’ difficulty in managing difference where race is an issue. “It was completely and utterly disproportionate and an appalling way of managing a case.” (Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.) 10.112 Under the current disciplinary system as operated by the MPS, investigations into the alleged misconduct of an officer are the responsibility of DPS. In our view, the use of a Gold Group in this case, as in the case of Superintendent Dizaei, only served to blur the lines of decision-making and accountability. 10.113 Even if the decision to form a Gold Group were justified, it is clear that there were a number of errors in the way it was used and its composition. Chief Inspector Pendry has raised some pertinent questions in this respect: “63. Why was the Gold Group held at Southall police station. Was this designed to intimidate me? 64. Given that Gold Groups should be independent and unbiased. Why was [redacted] allowed to sit in the meetings and be the minute taker? He was a supervisor and witness at my briefing for Guru Nanak. 65. Why was [redacted] excluded from the Gold Group? 66. Why was [redacted] [the officer who wrote the letter of complaint to [redacted] and personal friend of seven years, to [redacted – one of the complainants], allowed to sit on the Gold Group and make decisions about me? Why were the federation and the association of senior women officers excluded from the group? 88. [Redacted] informed me that he had been overseeing the investigation. Why were the Gold Group overseeing the investigation and not DPS? What is the policy?” (Submission from Chief Inspector Pendry.) 10.114 The MPS has told us that it accepts that holding the first meeting of the Gold Group at Southall Police Station was a mistake. We agree that it is inappropriate for such a Gold Group to be held at the station where the officer concerned is working and for officers involved in making the complaint in any way to be included on such a group. The way in which this Gold Group was established and conducted itself suggests that insufficient regard was paid to the welfare of the officer under investigation. It also raises questions about the objectivity of the management of the investigation process. 10.115 The MPS has sought to persuade us that in this case “the Gold Group provided for a measured and scrupulously fair process where the interests of all parties were represented.” Chief Inspector Pendry was not represented on the Gold Group. In any event we would query whether a Gold Group should have representatives of either complainants or other interested parties, given its role in managing a ‘critical incident’. 10.116 These failings seem to have been compounded by an apparent failure to communicate with the officer even after she raised concerns at the time: “So every time I asked and said, ‘Please, I feel I really have concerns about the make-up of the Gold group and the bias of the Gold group and people are sitting in judgment of me, some of them with their own agendas’, that I wanted somebody sitting there considering my needs and also fairness. So we asked and we were just ignored.” (Evidence of Chief Inspector Pendry.) 10.117 In addition, as we noted earlier in this report when we dealt with the Fairness at Work procedure, when Chief Inspector Pendry raised various concerns under the FAW procedure, the MPS was reluctant to deal with the matter and it took three months and 12 days to have her ‘Form 1’ accepted, as it was initially said that the issues she wanted to raise related to disciplinary matters. That is over three times as long as the entire FAW process is intended to take and hardly the best way to deal with a senior officer who already feels that the organisation is being unfair to her. Lessons to be learnt 10.118 We consider that the MPS needs to learn lessons from our analysis in relation to the following areas: early resolution of disputes; confidentiality of the discipline process; support for an officer under investigation; the use of Gold Groups; the way in which investigatory decisions are notified to the officer concerned; Fairness at Work; and dealing with difference. 10.119 We hope that the recommendations that follow will enable it to do so. Except in the most serious cases (such as allegations of criminal behaviour) where doing so is clearly inappropriate, we recommend that the MPS should always explore options for early informal resolution. We recommend that the MPS take steps to ensure that discipline matters relating to individuals are kept confidential and not discussed with third parties in a public forum. We repeat our earlier recommendations in relation to welfare support to officers under investigation. Where Gold Groups are involved, we repeat our earlier recommendation about their establishment. Further, we recommend that clear guidelines are established about the make-up of a Gold Group as, for example, it is not appropriate for representatives of complainants or other parties involved to be members of such a Gold Group or to be present at any meetings. We recommend that officers under investigation be provided with a written record of the outcome of such an investigation and a summary of the reasons for that outcome. It is clearly inappropriate for Chief Inspector Pendry to remain unclear about the way in which her case has been concluded, and she should be provided with such a document. We have drawn attention to a number of questions posed by Chief Inspector Pendry and we recommend that the MPS provides her with written responses to the questions she has posed in her submission. Our earlier recommendations in relation to Fairness at Work are also of relevance as are our comments on the MPS’ ability to manage difference. Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi 10.120 Detective Sergeant Virdi was born in Delhi, India. He came to the United Kingdom at the age of eight and was educated in West London. He joined the MPS in 1982. After a period in Battersea, he became a member of the Metropolitan District Crime Squad. In 1987, he joined the Directorate of Intelligence. He was promoted to Police Sergeant in 1992 and appointed as Detective Sergeant in 2003. 10.121 His case is the most well-known of the cases we considered. It has been the subject of two reviews: one an Inquiry established by the MPA and chaired by one of its members, Mr David Muir, and the other a case review commissioned by the PCA from a senior officer in the Professional Standards Department of the South Wales Police Service. We have already referred to the MPA Inquiry in Chapter 6 of this report. 10.122 A summary of the details of his case, drawn from our independent investigator’s report and other evidence, is set out below: Chronology 24 December 1997 Racist documents received by 13 minority ethnic officers who work at Ealing police station (including Police Sergeant Virdi). 29 December 1997 Ealing senior management requested an investigating officer from 2 Area Complaints Unit. The Daily Mail newspaper published a story titled ‘Race Hate Campaign’. 30 December 1997 Back up computer tapes at Ealing seized. 13 January 1998 Policy file opened. 19 January 1998 Second racist document is received by minority ethnic police staff at Ealing police station. The computer systems administrator identified the MPS logo used in the second document as one he had created on the Operational Technology Information System (OTIS), investigated the system at Ealing and concluded that the second document originated on the OTIS account of Police Constable B and was printed at Hanwell police station on 18 January 1998. 20 January 1998 Forensic Science Support Unit commenced work on computer evidence. 21 January 1998 Police Constable B seen by management with the agreement of the investigating officer, and advised she was not a suspect. Meeting not recorded. 27 January 1998 At her instigation, Police Constable B is interviewed under caution on audiotape. 17 February 1998 Press strategy options paper was agreed – this was later used. It allowed the release of the officer’s ethnicity on an ‘if asked’ basis. 25 February 1998 Request was made to place covert cameras at Hanwell police station. 27 February 1998 Conversation between management and Police Sergeant Virdi was covertly taped on the advice of the Investigating officer. 24 March 1998 Police Constable B was interviewed under caution on audiotape. 15 April 1998 Police Sergeant Virdi was arrested. Operation takes 23 hours. PoLSA (Police Search Adviser) search of Police Sergeant Virdi’s home takes seven hours. 16 April 1998 Police Sergeant Virdi suspended from duty in early hours of the day. A national newspaper publishes an article relating to the arrest, search of home and suspension of an Asian officer. News items also on ITV, BBC and Asian news. 17 April 1998 Police Sergeant Virdi interviewed under caution on audiotape and denied any connection with the sending of racist mail. 28 June 1998 Police Sergeant Virdi instigates proceedings in the Employment Tribunal. 30 June 1998 External computer specialist is asked to examine the seized computer equipment from Ealing police station. 7 July 1998 Search warrant executed at Hanwell and Ealing police stations searching lockers for the remaining nine copies of the second racist document. July 1998 – July 2000 Six Directions Hearings held, mainly awaiting the outcome of MPS internal processes. 6 October 1998 Police Sergeant Virdi interviewed under caution. 19 October 1998 File of evidence submitted to the CPS for advice on whether to charge Police Sergeant Virdi with sending racist mail. 9 February 1999 The CPS advises that no criminal charges should be brought. 22 March 1999 File of evidence on Police Sergeant Virdi sent to MPS solicitors for counsel’s advice in respect of discipline charges. 29 April 1999 Police Sergeant Virdi informed of date of hearing and supplied with a copy of the charges. 30 June 1999 Discipline papers served on Police Sergeant Virdi. 25 Augu