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This resource is from the final Report of the Morris Inquiry. This section contains chapter 7, "Professional standards". This chapter discusses the structure and remit of the MPS Directorate of Professional Standards.

Sections available here:

• 7: Professional standards
  • Chapter Summary
  • The structure and remit of the MPS’ Directorate of Professional Standards
  • A new role for the directorate?
  • Perceptions of the directorate
  • Appointments to the directorate
  • The Review of Operation Lancet
  • A new model of case management
  • The experiences of individuals

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7: Professional standards

“Integrity is not negotiable.”
MPS Professional Standards Strategy

Chapter Summary

This chapter deals with:

• The structure and remit of the MPS’ Directorate of Professional Standards
• A new role for the directorate?
• Perceptions of the directorate
• Appointments to the directorate
• The Review of Operation Lancet
• A new model of case management
• The experiences of individuals:
  • Delay – “Lives on hold”
  • Supervision – “Nobody is actually held to account”
  • The investigation process – “Why do we treat our own people differently?”
  • Disclosure – “A smokescreen goes up in order to prevent you getting to the information”
  • Lack of sensitivity to victims and others – “You end up feeling you have to leave the organisation”
  • Treating all those involved the same way regardless of circumstances – “You are just a number”
  • Suspension – “Nobody wins out of suspension”
  • Welfare support – “Dignity and respect”
  • Media issues – “The MPS chose not to correct the press on any of the incorrect or unhelpful stories about me”
  • Lack of information – “Those concerned will just have to wait and see”
  • Disciplinary hearings
  • Guidelines on sanctions
  • Assistant Commissioner Reviews

7.1 In this chapter we examine how the MPS handles professional standards matters, including the work of the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) and the experiences of individual officers. We will make a number of observations and recommendations, including proposing a new model of case management. If our earlier recommendations on the regulatory framework are accepted, much of what we have said in this chapter will be overtaken. However, given the fact that it will take some time to move to the new framework we are advocating, we consider that it is worthwhile making recommendations on steps the MPS can take to improve its handling of matters relating to conduct and discipline in the meantime.

The structure and remit of the MPS’ Directorate of Professional Standards

7.2 The Commissioner set the context for the work of DPS in his written submission: “Integrity must be fundamental to delivering our service. Integrity must permeate our dealings with the public and each other.” The MPS puts integrity at the heart of its work.

7.3 DPS was established in October 2000. The new directorate brought the Central Discipline Office, the Complaints Investigations Bureau (CIB), the Anti-Corruption Command and the Area Complaints Units under a single command for the first time.

7.4 DPS is part of the command of the Deputy Commissioner, who is the ‘appropriate authority’ for discipline matters in the MPS as defined in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004. It comprises approximately 600 police officers and police staff, with a budget of £43 million and is led by a Deputy Assistant Commissioner.

“The Directorate of Professional Standards are in the front line of ensuring that corrupt officers and their abhorrent practices have no place in the organisation – their banner ‘Integrity is non-negotiable’ sets the touchstone for the rest of the organisation.”
(Submission from the Commissioner, Sir John Stevens.)

7.5 DPS operates under a Professional Standards Strategy, which “is our ‘route-map’ and embodies a change from the more conventional approach to professional standards work. In essence it is a move from the purely reactive model to one that includes preventative work as well.” (Submission from DAC Roberts.) The strategy defines professional standards as “behaviour which is consistent with the high ethical standards of policing and the MPS’ Mission, Values and Vision.”

7.6 We have been informed that DPS has fully implemented the National Intelligence Model, that operations are only initiated after careful analysis of intelligence by its Intelligence Development Group and that organisational risks are analysed using Strategic Intelligence Assessments.

7.7 We received evidence that there are 43 DPS policies which impact on conduct. These have been reduced over the last two years from 140. It cannot be appropriate to have such a large number of policies with which officers need to be fully familiar or risk the consequences.

We recommend that the MPS creates a policy database and reference source that is cogent and succinct, by reducing the number of policies which impact on the process of discipline and conduct.

7.8 DPS’ remit is to investigate where the behaviour of officers potentially offends the Police Code of Conduct, is criminal or makes the MPS potentially liable in civil or employment law. It does not investigate the behaviour of ACPO officers, whose conduct is the responsibility of the MPA, or police staff, although its remit does extend to members of the public who are thought to be involved in corrupting officers in the MPS.

“… our staff routinely face both temptation and provocation … DPS is an unavoidable ‘overhead cost’ of protecting our reputation and thus protecting policing by consent.”
(Submission of DAC Roberts.)

7.9 DPS believes it is making progress in the fight against corruption, and cites a fall in the number of complaints from the public as “a clear indication that the combination of preventative and educative efforts are bearing fruit.” (Submission of DAC Roberts.)

7.10 DPS’ Anti-Corruption Command has an international reputation and often lends its officers and expertise to assist similar departments in foreign police services. We have been told that the rest of the directorate is also seen as very effective.

7.11 DPS has an important role to play in maintaining public confidence in the MPS. The public has a right to expect the highest standards of professionalism from police officers and that swift and decisive action is taken to deal with officers whose conduct falls short of those standards. We recognise the importance of the work of professional standards officers in maintaining the integrity of the police service in this country.

A new role for the directorate?

7.12 If our recommendations concerning the abolition of the regulatory framework governing police conduct issues are accepted, there will be major implications for the role of DPS. The process to be followed will depend on the nature and source of the allegation against the officer.

7.13 The IPCC will play a role in public complaints but responsibility for dealing with the vast majority of conduct issues will lie with local managers supported by HR professionals. The HR directorate will be responsible for issuing guidance to ensure consistency of approach and of sanctions.

7.14 There will still be a need for a police as opposed to a management investigation in cases where there is an allegation or suspicion of criminal conduct. Such an investigation might be undertaken by the MPS or it might be given to an outside force, where the IPCC considers that public confidence requires an external element.

7.15 If the MPS itself were to conduct the investigation, this could be the responsibility of a specialist department, such as DPS. The MPS would have a choice whether to retain DPS in some form.

7.16 However, we cannot presume that the changes we are recommending will necessarily be adopted nor that change will happen quickly. Our terms of reference require us to inquire into the MPS’ conduct of ‘policies, procedures and practices for and resolution of complaints and allegations against individuals’. Therefore we need to consider the work of DPS in the area of complaints and discipline under the present system.

7.17 First, we would like to comment on what we have heard about how the directorate is perceived within the MPS.

Perceptions of the directorate

7.18 DPS is an extremely important department. It is in the frontline of preserving the MPS’ reputation for integrity. However, if it is to succeed in that role, not only must its own reputation be high but the way it handles investigations and deals with people must be beyond reproach. It cannot operate in isolation and needs to enjoy the trust and confidence of the rest of the organisation. We are concerned that some of the evidence we have received indicates that this is not the case.

7.19 It is clearly pleasing to enjoy a reputation as ‘a world leader in dealing with issues of professional standards’ (Foreword to the MPS Professional Standards Strategy) but if different perceptions are held by those who experience the process, then that is a message that the MPS and DPS itself need to hear.

7.20 We are sure that most DPS officers are conscientious and want to perform their duties to a very high standard. However, the totality of the evidence that we have received leaves an impression of a directorate operating outside the normal rules of investigations, apparently with little sense of urgency or sensitivity to others.

7.21 In our view, that is not an image about which the MPS should be complacent. One badly handled case is one too many. We have seen and heard examples of poor supervision and flawed decision-making.

7.22 As a general rule, officers in the MPS have the highest standards of integrity and are proud of the office they hold. It is only a very small minority whose conduct falls below the expected standards.

7.23 The majority of officers, therefore, accept unequivocally that action must be taken to deal with those whose integrity is in question. They are supportive of the need to investigate allegations thoroughly to maintain public confidence. They do not want to serve with officers whose conduct threatens the integrity of the Service.

7.24 Indeed, many of those who have themselves been subject to investigation are also supportive of the need to maintain public confidence by taking action to investigate allegations. We have been struck by the fact that a number of individuals have told us that they recognised the imperative of concerns about their conduct being investigated:

“It was absolutely right that I was investigated for this matter. I am not saying I should not have been investigated. If somebody makes a complaint it should be investigated, quite rightly.”
(Evidence of Chief Inspector Julia Pendry.)

“I should have been investigated properly, all of us should have been investigated, … the discipline procedure should have taken place immediately as it did, … what they should have done was investigate what happened, how did it happen, and is there anybody to blame for it? Or, how are we going to deal with them, and how are we going to set matters right and make sure it does not happen again?”
(Evidence of Ms JJ.)

7.25 However, there is less support for DPS itself. We have received a substantial amount of evidence about the culture of DPS and the way that it operates.

7.26 We appreciate that DPS carries out a vast number of investigations each year and that we have only heard from a relatively small number of individuals. However, we have also heard from a range of organisations that have dealt with DPS and we have a concern, based on what we have read and heard, that DPS is somewhat detached from the rest of the organisation. This image, real or perceived, cannot be good for the directorate itself and is unhealthy for the MPS as a whole.

7.27 DPS has variously been described to us as “unaccountable”, “untouchable”, “out of control” and in effect operating outside the rest of the organisation.

“I believe they have a different agenda. I mean, charter standards are for everyone, are they not? Everyone has got charter standards, and they have got their own charter standards. That is my belief now.”
(Evidence of Mr DD.)

“My personal view is they do make it up as they go along, they are given greater scope, if you like, to do what they want to get the result that they need.”
(Evidence of Mr CC.)

“The danger is that a ‘Frankenstein’ department has now been created which enjoys unprecedented support and … ‘soft love’ resulting in a culture of self fulfilling prophecy amongst its staff who believe they are untouchable and unaccountable …There is a false sense of self-belief that they are the last bastions in the over exaggerated and eminent cancer of serious corruption and poor standards which is about to engulf the organisation. The reality is that the majority of MPS employees are honest and decent individuals who do not want to be associated and frequently reminded by the highest ranks in the MPS that they work for an organisation which suffers from endemic corruption and is riddled with poor professional standards.”
(Submission from the NBPA.)

“A number of senior officers, particularly those attached to the DPS operate in a bullying, partial, class system beyond the complaint of police officers they are delegated to investigate.”
(Submission from IND 27.)

“… then who is accountable for those decisions? Because it seems that the impression it gives, that not only people who make the poor decisions which influence the lives of people, and I think the human side of this is often missed, because my family and I suffered as a result of this poor decision – not only are those people not questioned, but indeed they are promoted.”
(Evidence of Superintendent Ali Dizaei.)

“I strongly believe that DPS is not properly regulated and that they think they can do as they please without fear of an investigation into their own activities. It would seem they have a mentality that does not allow them to look at cases objectively. I would liken it to tunnel vision. They seem unable to look at the big picture and seem to focus on obtaining a prosecution, whether it by means of a criminal trial or by means of an internal hearing. It appears they will also try and obtain this end result by any means, and if that involves foul means, then as long as they get the result they want, they will use them.”
(Submission from IND 46.)

7.28 Investigations seem to be conducted without any regard for those involved.

“I think above all, that if I had to pick one thing to concentrate on, you know, that we should be presumed to be innocent, and be treated like human beings, with dignity and respect. I know how I felt and I know how my wife felt at what was happening to me, despite having done what I have done 100 per cent for the job, you know, and commitment.”
(Evidence of Mr HH.)

7.29 We have received evidence which suggests that the directorate is not accountable to the rest of the organisation. We heard from one OCU Commander who had officers who were under investigation:

“I am very rarely kept up to date. I have to go out of my way to find out the progress of it. I am regularly asked by the Federation, by the staff, for updates I cannot give them. And it is just one of a number of significant investigations that is allowed to rumble on … We could never allow a criminal investigation to carry on like that; it would be thrown out of court.”
(Evidence of Detective Chief Superintendent Peter Spindler.)

7.30 He also had concerns that the interests of the officers under investigation were not accorded any priority:

“I have officers on my command where this is hanging over them. It affects them psychologically; it increases their stress levels; it is a constant reminder that something is waiting to happen to them; some of them cannot be promoted, so they are affected careerwise and financially; it is treated by the organisation as just another investigation. So why do we treat individual officers like that, as an organisation? I find it unbelievable.”

7.31 In addition, DPS does not appear to see the need to communicate effectively with the rest of the organisation on matters of policy.

7.32 In response to a question from us on how DPS communicates its policies, we were informed that: “Policies are issued to officers and staff through Notices and Special Notices. [They] are posted on the intranet. It is a breach of the discipline code not to comply with Notices and Special Notices.” (Submission from DAC Roberts.)

7.33 We find this an unsatisfactory system for attempting to keep officers up to date in relation to matters which could lead to disciplinary proceedings. The system appears even less satisfactory in the light of the extensive evidence we have received that many officers and staff do not have the opportunity or facilities to consult the intranet regularly.

7.34 In response to this criticism, the MPS told us that DPS communicates in exactly the same way as the rest of the organisation. We comment elsewhere on communication within the MPS. Given the potential impact of DPS’ policies on individuals, we do not consider the way they are communicated to be satisfactory.

7.35 We have heard from a number of officers who have had the impression that DPS is out to get them and that this is the aim of the investigatory process:

“Well, you are made to feel on the outside by the DPS – I mean, my impression of the DPS is they are out to get us. The Metropolitan Police is a different matter, the Chief Superintendent and everyone at our home division … has been very good to us.”
(Evidence of Mr DD.)

7.36 The Deputy Commissioner thought the attitude ascribed to DPS understandable and commendable:

“One has to see the circumstances under which the DPS or the anti-corruption command was founded, which was a significant, long-lasting and strategic threat to the integrity of the whole organisation and therefore of the British policing and criminal justice, coming out of a networked group of corrupt officers, many of whom were sent to prison for long terms of imprisonment during the late 1990s. The answer, is yes, we are out to get them, and they were quite right to be out to get them.”
(Evidence of the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair.)

7.37 For his part, DAC Roberts thought this a natural extension of normal policing methods:

“Any investigating officer, if he (or she) is committed to the job that they are doing, can get too close to the case that they are dealing with. It is a process – it is a feature of police investigations, generally. There is nothing special about DPS; that is just what happened when you are committed to an investigation.”
(Evidence of DAC Roberts.)

7.38 It is generally accepted that the work of the Anti-Corruption Command is internationally recognised. There is always a risk that those who investigate corruption might become entrenched and rigid. However, it is regrettable if this attitude permeates other investigations.

7.39 We are very concerned about the following comment:

“Discipline inquiries can be quite different. You can start off at one extreme – and I have christened it ‘the Al Capone model’ – where it is very clear that you have somebody who is definitely engaged in criminal corrupt behaviour; that might well be based on intelligence that you could never use in court, but you have a very clear view: here they are; they are guilty; now the problem is finding sufficient evidence to essentially get them out of the organisation and preferably into prison: the Al Capone model. It does not matter what you get him for, you can get him for tax evasion, as long as you get him for something. That has one set of dangers and all sorts of problems inherent in it.

At the other extreme, you have an allegation which you are deeply unsure about whether or not it is true. So you have to embark on a genuine search for truth: do we know whether or not this person is guilty of the sort of things that are being alleged?

And as you go on through the inquiry, you might find that there are suggestions that he or she has been guilty of other things as well. So it is very difficult to define what success looks like when you start on that search for truth, and it is very difficult to say, ‘Well, is the misconduct system the right way to end up and get to a successful outcome?’ Whereas with your Al Capone model, you know what the successful outcome looks like; the question is whether or not you are going to get there.”
(Evidence of DAC Roberts.)

7.40 Although DAC Roberts clarified later in his evidence that he regarded neither model as a satisfactory way of conducting an investigation, we are concerned that it is accepted that this is how discipline inquiries can be conducted.

7.41 Indeed, our experience as an Inquiry gave us cause for concern about the work of DPS. Whilst recognising the legal constraints under which DPS operates, we perceived an over-anxiety about secrecy and confidentiality, a reluctance to trust us with confidential information and an impression that the directorate’s work is of such a high standard that it had nothing to learn from anywhere else.

7.42 We were particularly keen to look at best practice in all the areas we were considering. We asked at an early stage about how DPS ensures it is able to assimilate best practice from other sources. The answer revealed that it is clear that DPS considers itself to represent good practice with little to learn from elsewhere:

“I would say in matters of officer standards and integrity:
a. there is a close dialogue between the MPS and organisations such as ACPO and HMIC;
b. the MPS is seen as a leader in creating and developing best practice.”
(Submission from DAC Roberts, MPS.)

7.43 We have seen much good practice during our visits to other police services, and also in our discussions with witnesses, but it is always the case that any organisation can learn from elsewhere.

7.44 Another example of this attitude is DPS’ failure to take up the recommendations of the Review of Operation Lancet at an early stage, despite the fact that they were being adopted across the country and are cited as best practice by the IPCC.

7.45 We will reflect further on perceptions of DPS when we deal with the experiences of individuals and the criticisms of how particular investigations were handled.

We recommend that the Commissioner orders a fundamental review of the Directorate of Professional Standards, to be personally assured that the policies governing the practices and procedures of the directorate hold senior managers fully to account for the conduct and management of discipline investigations.

Appointments to the directorate

7.46 A dynamic professional standards department requires the right people. This is crucial to its effectiveness and to the confidence it inspires both internally and externally. There also needs to be a regular interchange of personnel with other parts of the service, always balancing the need to retain the correct level of experience and expertise. DPS agrees with this analysis.

7.47 The success of DPS depends upon having the strongest and best people leading the directorate to ensure that it uses best MPS practices and does not develop a culture of its own.

7.48 One of the ways of developing a vibrant organisational culture is to ensure regular injections of new individuals and ideas. There is always a danger that, if people are too long assigned to a particular role, they become complacent and too readily accepting of the organisational norms. This could result in the organisation itself becoming insular and stagnant.

7.49 We have received evidence which is critical of the way DPS recruits officers:

“The DPS needs to be overhauled. Presently most officers serving on DPS are there because of ‘who they know’ rather than ‘what they know’.”
(Submission from Detective Sergeant Gurpal Virdi.)

“Since its inception the DPS and its forerunner CIB, has been used as a networking system driven by nepotism, self interest, promotion and increased earning capacity which have bypassed the normal promotion selection protocols designed to protect the individuals.”
(Submission of IND 27.)

7.50 The Deputy Commissioner outlined the recruitment process which has become more formal in recent years. Although DPS has reserved the right not to advertise posts, in practice posts below the rank of chief superintendent are advertised. The MPS does not run a competitive process for posts at chief superintendent level and above anywhere in the Service.

7.51 We were told that, when CIB was set up, the recruitment process was much less formal and the then Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner simply picked people they thought suitable for the job. The Deputy Commissioner told us that open competition has resulted in a significant increase in the number of staff from different backgrounds. This is clearly a welcome development but can only be seen as a first step on the road to a more representative DPS.

7.52 We are not, therefore, persuaded that recruitment into DPS is the result of favours or nepotism, but rather is run as a “broadly open competition” (evidence of the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair). We do note in this area, however, that both HMIC and the MPS itself foresees changes in career progression for DPS officers and staff:

“There is a growing need for a more co-ordinated approach to training and career management across the DPS, if it is to recruit and maintain skilled staff. This is particularly so in terms of investigative skills. There is no longer an obvious pool of experienced detectives the directorate can dip into and it will need to maximise development opportunities internally and ensure appropriate exit and career planning strategies are in place if it is to continue to attract and retain such staff.”
(HMIC Inspection Report, 2002/2003.)

7.53 It is clear that, to some extent, the Deputy Commissioner shares our concerns about the need for ‘new blood’:

“… that inevitably means that that world view colours the view of DPS. If they stay too long. And one of the issues with which I charged Steve Roberts when he took over was: have a look at all this. Have some people been here too long? Are we fighting the last war? because that is what we may be.”
(Evidence of the Deputy Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair.)

7.54 We appreciate the problems that can arise when it is difficult to recruit suitable staff. It is important that DPS is able to attract new staff to avoid a culture where the ‘last war’ is being fought. We therefore welcome HMIC’s suggestion of revamping recruitment and training initiatives. Ideally officers should move on after a set period to keep the culture refreshed.

7.55 However, it is also important that the profile of officers and staff within DPS reflects the make-up of the organisation as a whole. This is likely to increase trust and confidence in the directorate.

7.56 It is generally accepted that a system of open competition represents best practice in recruitment. This entails posts being advertised widely, with the requirements of the post fully specified so that all candidates with the relevant experience and skills can apply. We see no reason why posts within the MPS should be filled any differently.

We recommend that the MPS puts in place recruitment processes which are transparent and provide for equality of opportunity. These processes must ensure that people of the right calibre are recruited to posts within the Directorate of Professional Standards and must be extended to all ranks including the most senior positions.

We recommend that the MPS puts in place processes to ensure that those recruited receive the appropriate training to undertake the roles to which they are assigned.

We recommend that the MPS takes steps to ensure that the future profile of the Directorate of Professional Standards reflects the diversity of the MPS as a whole.

We also recommend that a system of time-limited tenure of posts is considered.

The Review of Operation Lancet

7.57 The recommendations of Operation Lancet: A Case Study Review Report have been commended to us by a number of witnesses, including the MPA, the IPCC and the PSAEW. The Inquiry endorses the report’s emphasis on proportionate and timely investigations into the conduct of officers.

7.58 The report was published in July 2002. It makes recommendations for future investigations of police complaints. The recommendations are as follows:

1. that early attention be given to the issue of sharing data;
2. that a model be delivered to guide the scope and scale of a complaints investigation – similar to the framework applied in murder investigations;
3. that there should be a template to guide and record the decision whether or not to lead an investigation internally or externally;
4. that, to assist in meeting the vital requirement of clear terms of reference, a model template should be developed and issued as guidance;
5. that key stakeholders consider whether, and if yes how, a dedicated level of resilience can be introduced;
6. that, in the present regime, a formal process is established to deliver joint training and a performance monitoring mechanism between the Police Service, Crown Prosecution Service and Police Complaints Authority (now IPCC);
7. that HMIC, in conjunction with other stakeholders, should devise a mechanism for assisting with the identification of senior investigators;
8. that the mechanism of a ‘case conference’ should be established and the criteria for its use determined by the key stakeholders; and
9. that a review procedure be established for complaint investigation cases, which in appropriate cases is linked to the role of the ‘case conference’.

7.59 We support these recommendations although some doubts have been expressed to us about the propriety of the police authority being involved in case conferences. The argument is that this creates the potential for conflicts of interest were the authority later to be called upon to discipline an ACPO officer.

7.60 We are, however, concerned that the recommendations of the Lancet Review do not appear to have been adopted as quickly in the MPS as in other police services. We have been told by the MPS that “despite extensive research we have been unable to discover a model which copes with the complexity of the issues and have had to develop our own.” We are surprised that the MPS felt it necessary to conduct such “extensive research” since the Lancet recommendations are generally regarded as best practice.

We recommend that the MPS works with appropriate stakeholders to implement the recommendations of the Review of Operation Lancet.

A new model of case management

7.61 If our earlier recommendations are accepted, the current disciplinary regime will no longer exist. However, implementing this change is likely to take some time and therefore the MPS, and other police services, will have to operate under the current system in the interim. We consider that there is room for greater rigour in the operation of the process and that this would flow from greater oversight.

7.62 We have devised a model of case management which we are recommending to the MPS and which we believe will provide a more effective framework for handling complaints and discipline matters. This builds on the recommendations of the Lancet Review, which we have outlined above, and is designed to ensure more rigorous internal oversight of case management.

7.63 Whilst we accept that there have been improvements in terms of delay and the use of suspension, we believe that the way DPS operates the current system has led to a loss of confidence both internally and externally. In our view, it still takes too long to resolve a case and there are delays both in the investigation and in the time it takes to convene a disciplinary hearing.

7.64 We are optimistic that, properly applied, the model will meet some of the criticisms we have heard, from individuals and others, of the way the system is currently operated in the MPS. In particular, we believe that it will address issues of delay, the use of suspension, delay in arranging discipline panels and the lack of welfare support given to officers involved in the disciplinary process.

7.65 We accept that DPS’ caseload is very high when compared to other police services. We have been told that DPS handles approximately 5,000 cases a year. We accept that DPS should retain a case management function in respect of the majority of those cases.

7.66 However, we are persuaded that there should be a target for the completion of investigations within 90 days. We believe that many investigations could be completed well within this timescale.

7.67 Where an investigation exceeds that target period, the MPA should have a monitoring role. The Commissioner should report to the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee and the Committee should hold DPS to account for the progress of the investigation and scrutinise the reasons why it has exceeded the target time. DPS will be required to justify the time taken and also the need for a continued investigation.

7.68 We appreciate that this will involve details of individual cases being provided to the MPA’s Committee. This has not been the practice to date. However, if there is to be a return of confidence in the complaints investigation process in the MPS, we strongly believe that independent oversight is essential.

7.69 We consider that Magistrate Members of the Authority, as well as other Members with experience of the legal system, would be particularly adept at scrutinising these cases as they will have experience of case management in the courts.

7.70 Scrutiny by the MPA should continue on a monthly basis until the matter is concluded.

7.71 We consider that it would be appropriate for the IPCC to examine evidence and investigative procedures in those cases at six-monthly intervals. We are uncertain as to whether the IPCC’s existing powers can be construed as including a power to monitor in this way. If they cannot, we consider that an express power should be conferred by regulations.

7.72 Where the officer is suspended, that case should be deemed to be an Accelerated Procedure Case from the time of suspension. This would mean that resources (including officer time) will automatically be allocated to the case to ensure rapid progress in the investigation and to minimise the duration of the officer’s suspension.

7.73 In cases involving suspension, the internal case management function should be undertaken outside DPS at Assistant Commissioner level on a monthly basis. The Assistant Commissioner will adopt a case conference approach, give guidance on the management of the case and agree the continuation of the officer’s suspension or alternatively restore him or her to duty.

7.74 The HR directorate will be involved in the case conference as it will have responsibility for welfare issues as well as assisting the officer’s re-entry into the workplace if that is the outcome once the matter is concluded. The Assistant Commissioner will have to justify his or her decision in writing and the decision, and the reasons for it, will also appear in the policy file.

7.75 The clock will start when the investigation actually commences, even if it begins covertly. The MPA’s consideration of the case will begin after 90 days unless the investigation is still covert.

7.76 In covert investigations, there is already provision for review of surveillance authorities. This will obviously continue but the officer conducting that review will also be responsible for considering progress and whether the investigation should continue. His or her decisions should be recorded in the decision log.

7.77 After a covert investigation has run for three months, a chief officer from another force should review the case and he or she will have the delegated authority to stop the investigation if deemed appropriate. Such reviews should continue as and when necessary.

7.78 Once a decision has been taken to prefer disciplinary charges, a disciplinary panel should be convened within 30 days. Once appointed, the chair of the panel should convene a meeting with all parties, along the lines of a pre-trial review, to ensure issues which might delay matters are identified and addressed. Cases which have not been disposed of within 90 days of the decision to prefer charges should again be subject to monitoring by the MPA.

7.79 We consider that this model, properly applied, should assist the MPS in its management of cases and address many of the problems we have been made aware of.

7.80 We also believe that it might be of assistance to other police services and would therefore commend it to the Home Office, the IPCC, the APA and the ACPO Professional Standards Committee for national guidance.

7.81 Critics may say that the MPS’ complaints caseload would make this approach too unwieldy to administer. However, if cases which are suitable for early resolution are identified at an early stage (as they should be and as is done in other police services, such as Merseyside Police Service) we consider that there is no reason why the model we are recommending should not succeed.

We recommend that the MPS and the Metropolitan Police Authority adopt our recommended model of case management.

We also recommend that the Home Office, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Professional Standards Committee consider the introduction of a national model.

 [D]

Figure 8: Recommended Model of Case Management

The experiences of individuals

7.82 Police officers enjoy significant powers and public confidence requires that, if there is a suggestion that an officer’s conduct falls below the expected standard, the matter will be investigated.

7.83 Even if the reforms we are proposing to the conduct and discipline framework are accepted, the MPS will be operating under the current regime for a while yet. We have already alluded to the mass of evidence that we have received which is critical of how DPS operates. We believe that there are changes DPS can make to its working practices which will enable the directorate to work more effectively under the current regulatory regime.

7.84 The evidence we have received from individuals and staff support associations focuses on the way DPS conducts its investigations into individuals. We have, as an Inquiry, been concerned by some of the evidence we have heard and the lack of sensitivity to the feelings and concerns of those involved. It is no exaggeration to say that we have heard from individuals whose lives have been destroyed by their involvement in the disciplinary process.

7.85 It is not surprising that some officers are unhappy about the fact of having their conduct questioned by a professional standards directorate. Nevertheless, we have found the evidence of many witnesses who have critcised the ways in which the investigation into their conduct has been carried out, and the way that they have been treated by DPS, consistent and compelling.

7.86 Whilst we have received evidence praising the way in which DPS dealt with a case, this was very much the exception rather than the rule.

7.87 We would like again to put on record our thanks to all these individuals who took time to tell us about their experiences. We know that for many of them the process of coming before the Inquiry and reliving their experiences was somewhat distressing. Without exception, all the individuals we heard from were motivated by a desire to prevent another person going through what they had experienced.

7.88 We hope that the MPS listens to what they have told us and finds the determination to learn from their experiences.

7.89 We have attempted to group our concerns under convenient headings but, as will be clear from the evidence, some cases are illustrative of more than one issue.

Delay – “Lives on hold”

7.90 We have already referred to the issue of delay as being one of the criticisms we have received in relation to the Regulations themselves. It is one of the reasons we are recommending wholesale reform.

7.91 However, we have received evidence which would indicate that the delays that occur in professional standards matters in the MPS are not solely a result of the system.

Case of Ms JJ
 
Ms JJ was one of a number of officers subject to a disciplinary investigation arising out of an incident in February 1999. The incident resulted in criminal proceedings against two members of the public and also a public inquiry. The public inquiry reported in January 2003.
 
Despite the investigation having started in 1999, it took a further 18 months after the report of the public inquiry (i.e. until July 2004) for decisions to be taken about whether any officers should face disciplinary charges.
 
Even when a decision was made that they should face charges, those involved were not told what these charges would be. They were told that the discipline team had not yet had time to decide, notwithstanding the fact that the investigation had started over 5 years earlier.

7.92 Other examples include:

Ms BB was disciplined and eventually cleared after an appeal to the Home Secretary. This took over six years. “I think it is okay having a statutory time limit, as long as, if it is not adhered to, there is some sort of redress, because what I have found throughout this whole thing is things are laid down and then when they are not adhered to, you have got no recourse to anyone, and it is almost like, ‘Well, that is the way it is, sorry, you will have to accept it’.” (Evidence of Ms BB.)

“Delay was a significant factor. There was a four and a quarter year period from the time of the incident until its resolution. It would be difficult in any arena to justify the same.”
(Submission from the individual involved in High Profile Case (HPC) 1.)

7.93 This not only impacts on the officer under investigation but also others who are caught up in the process. This is well illustrated by the case of Ms OO, who made an allegation against an officer which took two years to investigate. This is not an isolated incident.

“… you have got that just hanging over your head the whole time. Well, if it was that it took that length of time because [redacted] was sick, and they could not interview him, then I would have to sort of say, “Can something be done in relation to that?” Because there must be other cases whereby they have taken a length of time because the person has gone sick, can he not still be interviewed, even though the person is sick? In criminal law, that would be the case, would it not?”
(Evidence of Ms AA, who made an allegation against an officer.)

7.94 One of the OCU commanders who gave evidence to us was ‘appalled’ by the length of time it had taken to investigate his officers following the death of Victoria Climbie compared with what had happened in the other agencies involved.

“Certainly if you compare us to the other agencies, local authorities, for instance, have already disciplined and sacked members of staff where we have still yet to publish any results.”
(Detective Chief Superintendent Peter Spindler).

He saw the problem as a national one, rather than MPS specific, but we have had evidence to suggest that delays in the MPS are worse than elsewhere.

Figure 9: Timeliness of Investigations and Misconduct Decisions 2002/3

	Dec '02	Jan '03	Feb '03	Mar '03	Apr '03	May '03	Jun '03	Jul '03	Aug '03	Sep '03	Oct '03	Nov '03
Public complaints
No. of live public complaint cases under investigation	624	465	572	521	572	626	607	627	592	522	501	476
No. of live public complaint cases under investigation currently over 120 days	246	162	182	152	171	189	190	178	176	173	158	117
% of live public complaints cases under investigation currently over 120 days	39%	35%	32%	29%	30%	30%	31%	28%	30%	33%	32%	25%
Average days taken to complete investigations of public complaints	313	267	213	228	246	187	263	225	247	213	285	219
Internal investigations
No. of live internal complaint cases under investigation	151	150	144	108	123	123	134	147	149	134	120	120
No. of live internal complaint cases under investigation currently over 120 days	96	101	96	72	86	75	81	84	89	90	80	74
% of live internal complaint cases under investigation currently over 120 days	64%	67%	67%	67%	70%	61%	60%	57%	60%	67%	67%	62%
Average days taken to complete investigations of internal investigations	185	205	343	287	137	151	188	359	241	171	197	191
Misconduct decisions/hearings
Misconduct decisions – % of misconduct decisions made within 20 working days (target >=85%) (12 month rolling average)	95%	95%	95%	93%	93%	92%	91%	90%	90%	88%	86%	-
Misconduct decisions – % of misconduct papers served within 25 working days (target >=85%) (12 month rolling average)	78%	78%	77%	81%	79%	79%	77%	81%	82%	86%	86%	-
Misconduct hearings – Average days from decision to misconduct hearing (12 month rolling average)	228	227	233	214	214	222	213	207	213	212	214	-
Source: MPS

7.95 It is clear that DPS has made progress in reducing the time taken to investigate complaints but we consider more can and should be done. We accept that DPS carries out regular reviews of cases but this does not appear to be adequate in reducing the significant delays that still occur. To quote Chief Superintendent Alex Fish: “What our DPS would tell us is that [independent review] exists already, but we would say it is not working”.

7.96 This is bad for an officer caught up in the process whose life is ‘on hold’, bad for the organisation and bad for Londoners.

7.97 We have also received some evidence on delays in convening Discipline Panels. One reason for delay seems to be a difficulty on getting people to sit on a Panel. This was a factor in Ms BB’s case.

7.98 We therefore believe that some form of independent review needs to be imported into the process. We consider that the model of case management we are proposing with its emphasis on increased accountability and scrutiny should help to deal with delays which are due to the actions of the MPS.

Supervision – “Nobody is actually held to account”

7.99 There was a real concern that no one appeared to be supervising disciplinary processes, challenging delays and lengthy suspensions and taking action to move things on.

“I have experienced the discipline process from an inside view, from a police officer’s point of view, and it was frustrating enough for me, knowing how it works, but I just imagine that members of the public who make complaints about police officers or whatever, the system, how more frustrating it must be for them if they are constantly fobbed off with, 'Well, that is just the way – that is how long it takes'. I do think that if there was somebody actually monitoring this, and somebody who, you know, is looking at it from an objective point of view, they have not got any axe to grind, they have not got any – you know, they are totally independent, and can see it from the point of view of, 'Look, this is not acceptable. These people are being made to wait, whether they are police officers, whether they are members of the public', and evidence, people’s memories, things like that, the longer these things get left, then the less likely justice really is going to be done, I think.”
(Evidence of Ms BB.)

7.100 We have received evidence from the MPS about a number of supervision and review systems including the Investigating Officer Workload Analysis, the Investigating Officer Throughput Analysis, the Internal Investigations Command Performance Bulletin and the DPS Monthly Management Report.

7.101 In addition, DAC Roberts told us about a new model he had evolved for reviewing cases:

“It is really looking at how a review should be done on two dimensions. The vertical axis is what you might call the traditional murder review style: where are we on the route, between ‘allegation’ and ‘conviction’, whether that be in a court or on misconduct board; or an informal finding, words of advice, something short of going to a misconduct board. The second dimension that is actually new is … where are we positioned along that spectrum of a pure search for truth or a decision that he is already guilty, and all we have got to do is find the evidence …

“That might well indicate that what it is we are trying to achieve out of this … has changed over the course of the investigation. Is our definition of success now … that, actually, sending this to a misconduct board would be completely absurd and what we really need here is management intervention and a mediation process that gets us away from the formality of quasi criminal proceedings? And are we sure, if that is the right course, that only we as the investigators think that that is the right outcome, but that the victim or victims do, that the stakeholder or stakeholders do as well, because unless all those parties to it are happy, or at least acquiescent, then you are going to end up with a process that has not satisfied everybody. And that is actually what we are trying to achieve.”

7.102 His view was that additional skills would be needed “... to those that you would require for murder review: around diversity, around mediation, around restorative justice … and legal qualifications as well. I think that would provide us with a much more rounded process which could stop the steam roller in appropriate cases, but equally could divert it into something that would be a lot more productive as an outcome than either a successful or, indeed, a failed misconduct board or criminal proceedings.”

7.103 We are not persuaded that either the current systems or DAC Roberts’ new model will involve the rigorous scrutiny that we consider essential to increase confidence in the system. Nor will it provide the accountability that is urgently needed. We return to our earlier conclusion that there needs to be an independent monitoring and review function outside DPS.

7.104 We discussed the issue of independent review with many witnesses and the suggestion found great support. Initially we considered that an external resource might be needed, but we have concluded that it could be carried out internally provided the review function was independent from DPS.

“I think it needs to sit outside the DPS. It can be internal but it is almost like a listing office, it has the functions of a listing office, and it is that independent rigour that will push issues forward. I think that if that responsibility is taken away from the officers directly involved then that will speed things up.”
(Evidence of Detective Chief Superintendent Sharon Kerr.)

7.105 The model we have proposed involves more than simply monitoring progress. It also involves monitoring the decisions taken in investigations and injecting an element of independent challenge into the process. This should go some way towards dealing with the criticisms that are made about DPS’ accountability.

7.106 In addition, it should provide a formal opportunity for informal resolution or mediation to be considered. As the MBPA told us: “It is our experience that the longer a case progresses, then so much greater is the danger of positions becoming so entrenched that informal resolution becomes an impossibility.”

The investigation process – “Why do we treat our own people differently?”

7.107 We have received consistent criticisms about the investigation processes used by DPS. These relate to a failure to progress an investigation, failure to adhere to the level of professionalism that would apply to criminal investigations involving members of the public, disproportionality of resources and failure to use policy files effectively.

7.108 The case of Mr CC is illustrative of many of the issues:

“Part of the problem I have found is the officers investigating complaints do not follow the same guidelines that everybody else in the Metropolitan Police follows, in terms of criminal investigations. As a detective myself, I am involved in criminal investigations now, and all of the inquiries that we do we have to put on to a computer-based system, detailing every contact we have with the witness, what we do during that contact with the witness, and making sure that everything is there, disclosable and retrievable.

“Complaints branch officers do not investigate in this way, they make written records, and there is no test to ensure that what they are writing is correct as to what they are actually doing on a day-to-day basis, which is a problem that I encountered, insofar as some of the witnesses were interviewed and there was not any note at all made that the officers had even spoken to them.

“In my particular case, the main witness was spoken to two days after the original complaint; no record was made anywhere, the first note being made some two months later, which compromised my position, and would not be acceptable in any other criminal inquiry.

“With a complaints investigation, they do not disclose what they do, they withhold lots of information, they actually – in my case, they withheld information that was very important to my defence.”
(Evidence of Mr CC.)

7.109 Mr CC is not alone in his criticism of the investigatory process. Other criticisms include:

1. Poor investigatory practice:
   • “The threshold for proving complaints seems too high at the investigation stage and this is compounded by the lack of proper investigation of sex/race discrimination complaints by DPS investigating officers whether locally, or centrally. They choose to ignore available evidence or avoid speaking to relevant witnesses. It seems to the Federation that at times there is no real method of investigation and reporting. Reports from members indicate that where an employment tribunal claim has been presented, the management line appears not really to investigate the claim at all.”
     (Submission from the MPS Federation.)
2. Not focusing on the more serious offences:
   • “Whilst there is a need to ensure the evidence exists DPS enquiries historically have attempted to address each and every offence, regardless of the seriousness. The blanket response has resulted in some of the key issues being missed in the smog of the investigation.”
     (Submission from Detective Chief Superintendent Sharon Kerr.)
3. Not focusing on the real issues:
   • “Everything was done as if it was a murder inquiry, you know, statements were put in plastic bags, exhibits were made, you had to sign labels and computer analysis called in, and all sorts of things like that, when the nub of it was really that all this copying had been done, yes or no; and the gun was in the safe, yes or no… It was something relatively trivial… it just seemed to be nothing happening. I mean, I spoke to department of professional standards, I spoke to my own personnel manager, I spoke to various other people, they said, ‘Oh yeah, it is all being done, it is all in hand, we are going to make a statement next week,’ and then that week would come, you would make your statement, it would go on the file, another six weeks later something else comes back, and so it goes on and on, and lasts, you know, this whole length of time.”
     (Mr EE, member of police staff who was involved in a disciplinary investigation in respect of an officer in his section.)
4. Not letting officers who are under investigation know of the nature of the allegations against them:
   • “I did not get anything on paper until a long, long time after the investigation started, and when I saw how the alleged evidence was presented to them, I could see why the job had reacted as it did, but, you know, having said that, I thought once they had looked into it – if they had asked me for my involvement, they would have seen at a very early stage that suspension was not justified.”
     (Evidence of Mr HH.)
5. Not pursuing obvious lines of inquiry which would have resolved the case quickly:
   • “It could have been done within a matter of days, all they needed to do was to review my duty sheets for the previous four months to see where I was, and to know that I had had nothing at all to do with it, no input at all whatsoever. Other people were involved in monitoring that particular job, and it could quite easily have been resolved at that stage.”
     (Evidence of Mr KK.)
6. Failing to interview officers and witnesses:
   • “During this period, they had ample opportunity to interview me, and, in actual fact – I was suspended in [redacted]; almost 14 months later, [redacted], I was told to report to a police station for interview. That was the first indication I have got as to what was happening to the inquiry.”
     (Evidence of Mr KK.)
   • “I was suspended from duty … on the word of a self confessed criminal, who at the time of committing crimes was a serving Police Officer. His allegations against me were not corroborated in any way. His so called confession where I was incriminated by him was not recorded by contemporaneous notes, tapes or video. I was left in limbo without any help or support for over a year before I was arrested by appointment, interviewed and released on bail to be told that no further action would be taken.”
     (Evidence of IND 42.)

7.110 We have also received much evidence about a lack of proportionality in some investigations which are allowed to run on because the investigating officer is certain that something will be revealed. This is in contrast to an approach, which insists on concrete evidence or considers suspending the investigation. Such ‘fishing expeditions’ give rise to the perception which we heard of DPS being ‘out to get’ certain officers.

7.111 DAC Roberts denied that the DPS approach was anything other than totally evidence based: “Evidence-based allocation of resources is not just a matter of ethics, as far as I am concerned; it is also a matter of good resource management. I could not afford to spend a lot of resources, or hardly anything, on an allegation of the sort of thing that you have just been talking about.”

7.112 As part of our consideration of high profile cases, we commissioned reviews from two experienced former detectives into a number of the cases. They commented on poor practice in relation to policy files. The files they saw did not record all the important decisions on the cases.

7.113 Not only does this leave investigating officers exposed but it also means that there can be no confidence that the necessary rigour has been brought to bear on the investigation. It also makes it difficult to track the thought processes and reasons for decisions made, which is vital.

7.114 This is all part of a picture of DPS officers operating outside of the constraints imposed on ordinary investigations. We see no compelling reason for this to be tolerated and, once again, this indicates a need for proper supervision and oversight.

7.115 All of these concerns about the way DPS carries out investigations point, in our view, to a root and branch review of investigatory practices within DPS.

We recommend that investigations by the Directorate of Professional Standards should be run along the lines of the normal investigative process for criminal cases and arrangements should be made to put the necessary systems in place as a matter of urgency.

Disclosure – “A smokescreen goes up in order to prevent you getting to the information”

7.116 A number of witnesses have criticised the way in which DPS handles requests for disclosure of material. These criticisms largely revolve around the denial of material requested and what is seen as a very slow response to requests.

“On the 17th June [redacted], a pre-hearing conference was held with DPS at Tintagel House. At this hearing, my police federation representative handed over a disclosure request for a number of documents that had been prepared by my barrister. On the 25th June, my solicitor wrote to DPS to confirm the disclosure request. On the 29th September, my solicitor had received no response from DPS. He wrote to them again asking that they provide the documents we had requested. DPS eventually replied to him on the 20th October, just 3 weeks prior to the hearing. They were refusing to disclose much of what we had requested, citing that some of the documentation was subject to a Public Immunity Interest [sic] and could not be disclosed. Why did it take DPS 4 months to respond to the original disclosure request?”
(Submission from IND 46.)

“Throughout my case I was repeatedly denied access to documents and information potentially important to my defence. While some of the documents could conceivably be subject to Public Interest Immunity issues, the police simply ignored the requests.”
(Submission from Mr CC.)

“He started off saying … the CPS had finally succumbed to the formal requests for full disclosure and one part had stated, which had been signed, ‘all undisclosed material does not undermine the Prosecution’s case.’ However, as soon as one starts to go through this material, it soon becomes apparent that all undisclosed material completely undermines the Prosecution’s case.”
(Submission from IND 22.)

7.117 Regulation 12 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004 provides that disclosure may be withheld to prevent the premature or inappropriate disclosure of information that is relevant to, or may be used in, any actual or prospective criminal proceedings. Non-disclosure is also authorised if it is necessary for the purposes of national security, the prevention or detection of crime, on proportionality grounds, or in the public interest.

7.118 The MPS is, therefore, clearly entitled to refuse to provide disclosure, if the relevant tests are met. Further, the story in relation to disclosure is not all one way, and David Hamilton, the MPS’ Director of Legal Services, has told us that:

“… there is an increasing tendency on the part of lawyers representing officers to advance preliminary arguments on behalf of their clients that presentationally and in substance mirror defence submissions in criminal proceedings. I would make the same observation in relation to the very wide-ranging approach to disclosure which is now frequently adopted. These practices result in huge delay and considerable expense is incurred by police forces both in instructing lawyers to respond to disproportionate requests for disclosure and preliminary legal arguments. Also the time spent by senior officers in listening to and determining lengthy and complex legal arguments is unacceptable. Whilst accused officers must be permitted to raise legitimate arguments, there is a line to be drawn between the appropriate and proportionate defence of an officer and the use of tactics which can have the appearance of being designed to frustrate or defeat the misconduct process.”

7.119 As a result of his concerns, Mr Hamilton made the following suggestion:

“I would suggest that these matters should be addressed by detailed IPCC guidance as to the proper parameters for disclosure in misconduct proceedings and specific guidance to panel members to ensure that the misconduct process is operated in a speedy, effective and straightforward manner.”

7.120 We agree that such guidance would usefully clarify the rules as to disclosure for all concerned, which should address the concerns of the individuals from whom we have heard, as well as the MPS. As a matter of best practice we consider any guidance should apply more widely. In addition, we think it important that any such guidance should include reference to standard timescales for responding to disclosure requests so that all concerned know what framework they need to work to.

We recommend that the Independent Police Complaints Commission should consider issuing detailed guidance as to the proper parameters for disclosure in disciplinary proceedings, including an appropriate timescale for responses to disclosure requests.

Lack of sensitivity to victims and others – “You end up feeling you have to leave the organisation”

7.121 We have received much evidence of a general nature to indicate that some DPS officers have been less than sensitive to the feelings of the officers being investigated, as well as those of witnesses who may be other officers or police staff and left to work in very difficult circumstances. This is borne out by a number of the cases we have cited in this chapter.

7.122 We have already recommended that DPS investigations should be conducted along the same lines as other criminal investigations. This should include some sensitivity to those involved and their circumstances. Work with victims has developed tremendously over the past few years. This good practice should extend to ‘internal victims’ as well as those who are simply caught up in the process.

Treating all those involved the same way regardless of circumstances – “You are just a number”

7.123 Another criticism we have heard is that, if more than one officer is involved in an incident which gives rise to an investigation, all the officers are treated in the same way, rather than an initial assessment being carried out as to likely culpability. We have heard these described as regulation 9 confetti drops and have evidence of a number of cases where this has occurred:

“An example of this would be an allegation of an abuse of power by a person subject of a search warrant. The normal allegation would be that an officer had obtained the warrant by giving false or misleading information to a magistrate. It would be clear from the papers who the officer laying the information to the court was and therefore who should be the subject of the complaint. The practice of DPS would be to give all the officers involved in the search a 163 (regulation 9 notice) and interview them under caution. This has the effect of treating all the officers as accused persons and none of them as witnesses. This denies the investigating officer the chance to get a clear picture as to what happened and prolongs the whole matter. This also causes stress to officers who have not done anything and had an adverse effect on their careers.”
(Submission from IND 36.)

“ … as soon as a complaint like this is made, yes, it has got to be investigated, and it has got to be investigated properly, but, you know, to treat us all the same and tar us all with the same brush when they were out – the people that were investigating it were out to get one person. … that is what they were out to do, but they took five of us with them, because at the time, one of the officers was facing charge of assault, we were all facing charges of neglect of duty.”
(Evidence of Ms BB.)

7.124 We can see no reason to treat all the officers involved in an incident the same regardless of circumstances. We have been told that this practice no longer occurs and to a certain extent practices of this kind should be dealt with by our earlier recommendations about investigatory procedures. However, for the avoidance of doubt:

We recommend that, when more than one officer is involved in a case, regular and frequent assessments are made of the facts with a view to determining who, if anyone, is actually culpable and which officers are peripheral to the central facts.

Suspension – “Nobody wins out of suspension”

7.125 We have heard a number of disturbing accounts from individuals about the effect on them of being suspended from duty. These accounts relate particularly to the length of time that some have been suspended.

“I think they are too quick to jump and automatically suspend … Three and a half years … because as I have explained, it was something that could have been resolved within a matter of days. Why it took three and a half years.”
(Evidence of Mr KK.)

7.126 The evidence we have seen and heard suggests that suspensions lasting well over a year are not uncommon. Indeed, we have heard of a number of officers who have been suspended from duty for over three years, and two cases where the period of suspension exceeded seven years.

7.127 Even though when officers are suspended, they are suspended on full pay, suspension by the MPS has been described to us as ‘shameful’, ‘barbaric’ and ‘absolutely disgraceful’, because of the length of time which has elapsed. Whatever the reasons for the periods involved for each individual case (and we recognise that the fault does not always lie solely with the MPS), we agree with DAC Roberts’ oral evidence that “if we have somebody suspended on full pay, Londoners get no benefit” and “nobody wins out of suspension”.

Figure 10: Officers Suspended, on Restricted Duties or Subject to the Service Confidence Procedure 2002/3

Suspensions	Dec '02	Jan '03	Feb '03	Mar '03	Apr '03	May '03	Jun '03	Jul '03	Aug '03	Sep '03	Oct '03
Total no. of officers currently suspended	39	47	47	41	43	45	47	45	48	50	54
Total no. of officers currently on restricted duties as a result of an investigation	69	69	75	79	77	72	64	64	63	70	75
Officers and civil staff currently subject to Service Confidence Procedure	12	11	11	12	13	12	15	19	20	22	22
Total	120	127	133	132	133	129	126	128	131	142	151
Source: MPS

7.128 As a matter of best practice, greater use of alternatives to suspension should be considered and implemented because this is better both for the officer concerned and the taxpayer.

“If they want to suspend us, suspend us, but every month – I am only speaking for myself here, but there are four of us. Bar one, three of us are ten year plus officers. here is a lack of experienced officers on the streets. The other officer, during the suspension, has done his promotion and will be a sergeant if we go back to work, upon his return. Oh, neighbours, friends, family, other officers, nobody can understand, but then, it is taxpayers’ money. The Metropolitan Police is not spending its own money, is it? …

“Oh, there are alternatives. I could be shuffling paper in a desk, could I not? I could wash cars if they wanted. But it is not my – you very quickly realise that you are a number. I am PC [redacted], I have no influence over what is going on. I cannot make things happen any quicker.”
(Evidence of Mr DD.)

7.129 The legislative framework for suspending police officers is now set out in regulation 4(2)(b) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, which provides as follows:

“(2) The appropriate authority shall not so suspend a police officer unless it appears to it that either of the following conditions (‘the suspension conditions’) is satisfied –

(a) that the effective investigation of the matter may be prejudiced unless the officer concerned is so suspended;

(b) that the public interest, having regard to the nature of the report, complaint or allegation, and any other relevant considerations, requires that he should be so suspended.”

7.130 The way in which the MPS approaches suspensions is set out in a Special Notice, Suspension / Removal from Normal Duty Policy – Constables to Chief Superintendents which provides:

“The decision to suspend an officer will only be made after all the other options have been considered … In all cases, unless it is impossible or positively undesirable to do so, consideration should first be given to other options rather than suspension … Suspension can occur: in any case where, the ACPO officer considers the matter, on the information available, to be capable of leading to a major penalty either in criminal or disciplinary proceedings; and it is necessary and in the public interest to do so.”

 [D]

Figure 11: Suspended Officers for the Period 1999–2004: Cases Completed and Average Time Suspended
Source: Data supplied by the MPS

7.131 Commander Carter told us that suspension remains the option of last resort. In addition, Commander Hagon told us that in the last four years suspensions have reduced by 60%. This is a very welcome trend. For, while we understand that suspension of officers in some cases is vital, we agree with the submission we received from the Metropolitan Federation that:

“The suspension of an officer from duty is a power that should be used sparingly and it is often far better to place an officer in a non-operational role, which allows both the individual and the MPS to maintain some dignity as well as allowing the officer a meaningful role within the organisation.”

7.132 DAC Roberts told us that he reviews each outstanding suspension every month, and this is a practice which we have found consistent with other police services which we visited.

7.133 We can see scope for a natural tendency, if this review takes place just in DPS, for a departmental mindset to develop in relation to each case that always justifies previous decision-making despite the good intentions of those involved.

7.134 Regular reviews of this nature are clearly important and that is why the model of case management which we have proposed gives the role to an Assistant Commissioner, independent of DPS. This should assist by ensuring that there is a fresh look at the evidence and state of play in each case on a regular basis.

7.135 We understand the need for a significant degree of discretion for senior officers in relation to the use of suspension, given the varying circumstances they have to consider. However, we think it would assist DPS’ decision-making, and the individuals involved, if the organisation published clearer guidelines setting out the framework in which this discretion will be exercised.

“I personally think that there should be guidelines … when to suspend and when not to suspend. I do not know if there are or not. It seems some people get suspended and some people do not, and it seems to be on different reasons … I would think that if there was a policy – if there is not one – if there was a policy made in relation to work colleagues, and somebody has made an allegation against their colleague, that it is laid out as to what should be done to the person who has been – you know, the allegation has been made against, and also the victim, so there is no grey area.”
(Evidence of Ms AA.)

We recommend that the MPS reviews the existing criteria for suspension to provide greater clarity on when suspension should be used.

7.136 We have had a number of submissions from individuals who say they were on the periphery of an incident which led to an investigation, and yet suspension was applied in an all-encompassing way to the minor, as well as the major, players.

“I had always assumed that to be suspended, it had to involve something serious, you know, and I never ever visualised that I would ever be in that position, and my impression was it was, as you say, ‘We have suspended this one, he is involved with him, so he will get suspended as well’. It did not seem to be a consideration, that I might just be on the periphery and dragged into it by circumstance, not having done anything criminal or dishonest. It just seemed as if, ‘Well, we will do that because it is a good idea’, that is how it appeared to me.”
(Evidence of Mr HH.)

We recommend that the MPS takes steps to ensure that, in each case when suspension is considered, it accords with the recommendation of the Review of Operation Lancet that the use of suspension always needs to be proportionate to both the allegation and the risk.

7.137 We have received evidence suggesting that some officers have been suspended without knowing why:

“I could understand why they had suspended me in the first place, but I thought maybe having done so, I should have been reinstated within two or three weeks or something like that. As I say, I thought — because I eventually saw what was being alleged. I did not get anything on paper until a long, long time after the investigation started …”
(Evidence of Mr HH.)

7.138 We suspect that such cases are historic and could not happen again because written reasons for suspension must now be given to each officer but, out of fairness to the individuals concerned, the MPS needs to make sure that no officer is left in doubt about the reasons for his or her suspension from duty.

Welfare support – “Dignity and respect”

7.139 We referred to welfare support earlier when we dealt with the role of the HR directorate and we recommended an increased role for HR in this area. We have heard a number of witnesses who have told us about a lack of welfare support to officers under investigation:

“So no, no senior officer – my own inspector from the [redacted] came out initially two or three times, something like that, but gradually, there was no contact at all, and definitely not from a senior officer.”
(Evidence of Mr HH.)

This extended to support to officers on return to work:

“I think the Metropolitan Police, anyway, seem to still have this attitude, ‘You are a man, you are in a man’s job, you do not need looking after, you are whatever age you are, you are adult enough to get on with things’, and that is clearly wrong, in my opinion.”
(Evidence of Mr HH.)

We recommend that the MPS gives the Human Resources directorate responsibility for maintaining contact with officers under investigation and overseeing welfare support and re-entry into the workplace for suspended officers.

Media issues – “The MPS chose not to correct the press on any of the incorrect or unhelpful stories about me”

7.140 Another contentious issue is the MPS’ contact with the media in disciplinary cases. A number of concerns have been raised with us.

7.141 We recognise and support the critical role that the press and broadcast media play in policing. Not only do they provide invaluable assistance in the prevention and detection of crime but they also have a part to play in holding the police service to account and providing citizens with information.

“Communication has a direct impact on the effectiveness and credibility of London policing which cannot succeed without the consent and support of the community it serves.”
(Submission from Dick Fedorcio, Director of Public Affairs, MPS.)

7.142 We recognise that there is a difficult balance to be struck between the public’s right to know and the impact which releasing information may have on an individual who may then be subject to (sometimes intrusive) media interest and comment and may well be innocent of any charges.

7.143 When investigating its own officers and staff, the MPS has a difficult line to tread between openness and its duty to act fairly in respect of its workforce.

7.144 We are concerned that a number of individuals who have given evidence to the Inquiry have told us that they have felt the MPS has not done its best to support them when their cases have received media attention.

7.145 Firstly, we have been told by a number of witnesses that they believed that, unknown to them, the organisation released official press releases about their cases to the media:

“There was too much information there for it to have been leaks.”
(Evidence of Ms BB.)

“One of the most disturbing aspects of the media ‘frenzy’ that occurred following the abandonment of the criminal proceedings against Superintendent Dizaei, was the regular appearance of detailed information in specific parts of the media that could only have come from a source within the MPS who possessed a very detailed knowledge of the investigation.”
(Submission from the MBPA.)

7.146 Secondly, officers have told us that although the organisation seemed ready to communicate the ‘bad news’ about their case when they were under investigation, but they were reluctant to do so when there was ‘good news’ in the sense of charges against an officer not being proved and when inaccurate stories were run in the press:

“… myself and one of the others that was exonerated had to phone the people that published notices, which is the internal sort of publication, and badger them to put in there that we had been exonerated, and they were like, ‘Oh yes, we will do it, we will do it’, and they did not, and eventually, they did, through persistence, they published, but it was just like a one line thing, hidden in a document.”
(Evidence of Ms BB.)

“I was ordered by my senior officers not to talk to the media in my own defence and neither the Metropolitan Police Service nor the Metropolitan Police Authority did anything to counter the stream of largely false and damaging articles.”
(Submission from DAC Brian Paddick, HPC.)

7.147 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, officers have told us that they felt abandoned by the MPS and alone when dealing with press enquiries and intrusion into their lives.

“I doubt that any officer in the MPS, apart from perhaps Commissioners, have had such intrusive press coverage. I had absolutely no idea how to deal with this. The MPS did not support me around this issue except to give me two emergency telephone numbers to ring if the press were at my door or I felt I needed help. I did need help. I rang those numbers and left messages. To date no one has responded.”
(Submission from Ms JJ.)

“Following on from that I had to cope with the media who decided to follow me, do their own investigations, write untrue articles about me … I am in no position to say to every Daily Mail reader, look this is what really happened to me, people do not want to know or hear the truth only what suits them. So I am left with having to justify everything I do.”
(Submission from IND 30.).

7.148 We asked the MPS to comment on some of the issues arising out of the evidence, in particular the question of information which some officers felt had been leaked to the press. Mr Fedorcio outlined the MPS’ procedures as follows:

“In each instance the press officer dealing with the case will clear statements or lines to take in response to media enquiries with the relevant investigating officer or case worker. Each high profile internal investigation or resulting court case has a bespoke media strategy drafted by the press officer and presented for the approval of the decision makers involved in the handling of such matters …

“We do not offer to the media the name or identity of any individuals subject to internal investigation at the point of arrest or at anytime prior to charge. We treat police officers or staff who are the subject of a potentially criminal investigation in the same way as we would a member of the public in the same position.

“The public have a legitimate right to be informed of police activity, and especially incidents involving police officers who the public have placed in particular positions of trust and authority. We will always confirm, if asked, by the media that arrests have taken place, and if any officers have been suspended. The officer would be referred to by their age, place of work, rank and gender …

“Where we believe unauthorised information has been given to the media the press officer will bring this to the attention of the investigating officer dealing with a case who will decide whether the matter should be referred to DPS for further scrutiny or investigation.”

7.149 We have received evidence that suggests that unofficial press releases or comment is made about individuals. The MPS denies this.

“I think there were unofficial press releases about me; I cannot prove it, but I do feel there were some about me, and that is what caused the media frenzy. That is why everybody focused on me, because really, what the media reported was what the Met – was what I felt the Met had been saying.”
(Evidence of MS JJ.)

7.150 Commander Hagon of DPS responded to us on the issue of unauthorised press comment:

“Unauthorised public comment, that is to say, unauthorised disclosure of confidential information by a police officer, may amount to a breach of the Police Conduct Regulations. Similarly, such action by a member of police staff may amount to a breach of Civil Staff Misconduct and Discipline procedures. Any such action may also constitute a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Official Secrets Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

“All ‘leak’ allegations received at the DPS are treated seriously but, like any other allegation, they are assessed and judged on a case by case basis. Where it is apparent that a disciplinary offence may have taken place an Investigating Officer will be appointed. It would then be the task of the Investigating Officer to identify the source and to take whatever action is deemed necessary …

“Press strategy is ultimately the responsibility of the Senior Investigating Officer and as such there is an element of subjectivity in the decision-making process. It is often very difficult to make the differential between what information the public has a right to know and what constitutes an unauthorised disclosure.”

7.151 We fully appreciate the sensitivities of press handling by the MPS a