6: Governance, Accountability and Scrutiny

“You can only have accountability from a position of knowledge. You can only obtain that knowledge by scrutiny. If there is no scrutiny, there can be no accountability.”
Peter Herbert, Member of the MPA

Chapter Summary

This chapter deals with:

The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in employment matters
The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in complaints and discipline
The implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report
The role of the Independent Advisory Group

The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in people matters

6.1 Paragraph 5 of our terms of reference asks us: “To consider and make recommendations on the role of the Police Authority and its Members in relation to the consideration of high profile or sensitive cases, and the oversight of the performance of the MPS in relation to the matters covered by this Inquiry.”

6.2 We deal with professional standards cases later in this chapter. Here we deal briefly with the MPA’s role in relation to human resource issues, in particular grievances and Employment Tribunal cases.

6.3 Police authorities have a duty to secure ‘efficient and effective’ policing in their area.

“Ensuring that the force has in place an effective HR strategy, and that HR planning and management is fully integrated into the overall business process, is fundamental to this task. Each police authority must be able effectively to scrutinise its force’s activity across the HR function and assure itself that the force is maximising the potential of its most valuable assets – its police officers, support staff and members of the special constabulary – for the delivery of more effective policing.”
(PEOPLE MATTERs, A framework for police authority oversight of police human resource plans (APA).)

6.4 Police authorities are responsible for agreeing the annual costed HR plan prepared by the police service and for agreeing the annual priorities for investment in training with the Chief Constable (the Commissioner).

6.5 The APA publication, PEOPLE MATTERs, provides a framework for police authority oversight of HR planning, policies and practices. It is in the course of being updated but is an extremely valuable source of support and guidance to police authorities in discharging their responsibilities in relation to people management.

6.6 The MPA oversees human resource matters in the MPS through its Human Resources Committee. The Committee’s terms of reference give it the role of monitoring activity on all HR issues. This also includes grievances and Employment Tribunal cases.

6.7 The APA has also published guidance on effective oversight and scrutiny of grievances and Employment Tribunal cases, PEOPLE MATTERs, Tackling discrimination: police authority oversight and scrutiny of grievance procedures and employment tribunals. This states: “Grievance and ET cases provide a significant insight into the health of any organisation. Police authorities need to clearly hold forces to account for how they deal with such cases through regular strategic analysis and scrutiny.”

6.8 This scrutiny will involve regular consideration of numbers of cases and trends over time, across the organisation and in comparison with other organisations and services. It should also involve consideration of whether there is a need to review or change a relevant policy. Case files can also be dip-sampled. The APA considers that this work is best dealt with by a committee rather than the full authority.

6.9 The MPA has told us that it does not have comprehensive oversight systems in place in relation to Employment Tribunal cases and grievances. However, it proposes to introduce systems based on the APA guidance. We have received a draft protocol between the MPA and the MPS which would cover oversight of Employment Tribunal cases as well as other matters. We consider that this protocol, together with systems based on the APA guidance, should enable the MPA to hold the MPS to account in this important area.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority puts in place comprehensive oversight systems and processes to scrutinise grievances and Employment Tribunal cases as soon as possible, taking account of the Association of Police Authorities’ guidance in this area.

The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in complaints and discipline

6.10 Public confidence requires robust scrutiny of police complaints and conduct matters. This is a key part of the role of police authorities. They must ensure that they have systems and structures in place to apply the necessary rigour to oversee the way the police service handles cases.

6.11 As a starting point, it is helpful to examine the statutory framework governing police authority oversight of complaints. This is set out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform Act 2002.

6.12 Section 6(1) of the 1996 Act places a duty on police authorities to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police service in its area. The service is under the direction and control of the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) by virtue of section 10(1).

6.13 Section 77 of the 1996 Act imposed a duty on every police authority, in maintaining an efficient and effective police service, to keep itself informed as to the workings of the procedures for handling complaints about the conduct of police officers. Section 15 of the 2002 Act maintains this duty and now widens it.

6.14 Section 22(3) of the 1996 Act requires the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) to submit a report to the police authority on such matters as the authority may determine relating to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service. This is subject to an appeal to the Home Secretary on the grounds that the report would contain information which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed, or is not needed for the discharge of the functions of the police authority.

6.15 There is no express statutory provision which imposes a duty on the police authority to hold its Chief Constable (the Commissioner) to account, although “everybody understands that is the convention.” (Evidence of David Riddle, Deputy Clerk, MPA.)

6.16 The MPA has suggested that an express provision to this effect would be helpful. We have not received evidence from any other source which would justify disturbing the current relationship.

6.17 The Chief Constable (the Commissioner) is responsible for the recording, handling and investigating of complaints about the conduct of police officers of the rank up to and including Chief Superintendent.

6.18 The police authority is responsible for overseeing the procedures for handling complaints to ensure that they comply fully with the statutory provisions, and for considering issues raised by complaints as they impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the service.

6.19 Police authorities also have responsibility for the recording, handling and investigating of complaints against ACPO officers, other than complaints relating to the direction and control of a service.

6.20 Police authorities are not responsible for investigating complaints concerning the conduct of officers below ACPO rank. The APA’s view is that, in carrying out their oversight role, police authorities should not involve themselves in the detail of individual cases, other than to look at process issues and any implications for wider policy.

6.21 In their publication, Complaints against the Police – Monitoring and Oversight Arrangements, A Good Practice Guide for Police Authorities, the APA recommends that police authorities should have in place “a structured process for ongoing scrutiny and oversight of complaints which contains all of the following elements:

process and procedural audit against Home Office guidance;
dip sampling of completed complaints files;
analysis of statistics and trends;
strategic analysis;
discussion with stakeholders and partners.”

The Guide considers each of these elements in detail and offers guidance to assist police authorities.

6.22 The MPA discharges its responsibilities for complaints through its Professional Standards and Complaints Committee. This Committee:

periodically reviews the policies and procedures adopted by the MPS for complaints handling;
liaises with HMIC in order to obtain an independent assessment of service procedures and performance;
maintains contact with the IPCC to obtain feedback and guidance;
receives regular reports from the Commissioner containing complaints performance information;
undertakes dip-sampling of complaint case files; and
maintains oversight of the implementation of the MPS’ Professional Standards Strategy.

6.23 We have received evidence from both Lord Harris, former Chair of the MPA, and Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee, on how the MPA discharges its oversight role and what they perceive to be restrictions under the current statutory regime.

6.24 Mr Auladin informed us that the MPA had recently increased staffing support to Members on professional standards issues and that the new resource would be used to develop systems and processes for oversight and monitoring, particularly in relation to dip-sampling cases, OCU level analysis, analysis of data on categories of complaint, improving discussions with stakeholders and more detailed monitoring of timeliness of investigations and their outcomes.

6.25 The MPS Directorate of Professional Standards handles approximately 5,000 cases a year. The MPA told us that, given this figure and the resources at its disposal, the proportion of files the Authority is able to sample is small. Some police authorities are able to scrutinise every complaint file for their service; that level of scrutiny is beyond the resources of the MPA and scrutiny at Member level is in the region of 10 cases a month.

6.26 However, Mr Auladin went on to underline the Authority’s view that the current monitoring regime was deficient in that the police authority is unable to influence the way matters are dealt with by the Service “in particular in terms of oversight of individual cases.” The proposal in the Review of Operation Lancet that the Clerk to the Police Authority should be included in case conferences did not, in his view go far enough and he considered that “a more systematic and formal system for proper Member oversight is required ...

“The MPA considers that the current framework should be strengthened by, as a minimum, legislation or a Home Office Code of Practice to provide for a police authority

To receive, as of right, regular reports on current ‘sensitive cases’ including complaints, discipline cases, civil actions against police, grievances and employment tribunals…

To identify specific cases upon which it requires a full report from the Commissioner, and for these to include live as well as closed cases.

To give advice or views on the conduct or progress of a specific case to which the Commissioner should be required to have regard; to nominate one or more Members to give such advice or views on a continuing basis throughout the course of an individual case.

To set standards in respect of matters such as use of mediation, informal resolution of complaints, and restorative conferencing to which the Commissioner should be required to have regard.”

(Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee.)

6.27 Lord Harris proposed in his submission that the function of the investigation of complaints within a service should be at “arms length” from the service management and directly accountable to the police authority. “Redefining the relationship of the investigating unit to the Authority could boost community confidence in the complaints process, complementing the role of the MPA.”

6.28 The MPA itself acknowledged that this proposal received little support from those giving evidence to the Inquiry. The Commissioner saw it as potentially being “political interference”, although the MPA, like all police authorities, is not intended to be a political body. The MPA clarified that they were not proposing that police authorities should have any direct responsibility for discipline decisions or functions and saw the proposal as building on the “existing convention in police forces that the Deputy Chief Constable is the discipline authority and responsible for the operation of the complaints function.”

6.29 Thus, in respect of the MPS, the MPA’s proposal is that the Deputy Commissioner should have responsibility and accountability for the direction and control of the service relating to the investigation of complaints and conduct matters and should report to, and be accountable, to the Authority for the performance of those responsibilities.

6.30 This would leave the Commissioner free in the role of final adjudicator on individual cases without a conflict of responsibilities.

“The separation of functions, and the introduction of the authority as an independent player, would serve to increase public and internal confidence in the system.”
(Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee.)

6.31 We invited the Home Office to comment on the MPA’s proposal. The department’s view is that the current statutory framework enables police authorities to carry out their oversight responsibilities and that authorities play a valuable role in asking challenging questions of the service. In their submission to us, the Home Office noted the MPA’s view that there was a case for “fundamental structural reform to put the investigation of professional standards matters at arms length from the management of the force … making it directly accountable to the MPA”. They also noted that the MPA did not appear to be seeking day to day control or management but rather to act as a “critical friend”.

6.32 The Home Office is “not yet convinced that there is a compelling case for a reform of the statutory duty of police authorities in relation to professional standards.” It also considers that making such a change would risk “blurring the clear distinctions between [Chief Constables and Police Authorities] that were established in the Police Act 1996.” On this last point they differ from the MPA. The Authority’s view is that empowering police authorities will clarify responsibilities without compromising the Commissioner’s responsibility for direction and control.

6.33 Peter Herbert, a Member (and former Deputy Chair) of the MPA, considered that the existing powers should be adequate: “… we should be able to get the level of co-operation from the MPS to make scrutiny and accountability work.” Although he implied that the system had not always worked smoothly: “I am aware, certainly, that where the MPS is resistant to that level of intrusion and accountability, either selective information, as I said earlier, is given, or no information is given at all.”

6.34 ACPO too were in favour of maintaining the status quo and disagreed with Lord Harris’ suggestion of a new reporting line for professional standards:

“The present system of misconduct hearings relies on a review and an appeal process. A review by the chief constable and ultimate appeal to a third party panel convened by the authority. An independent appeal process would have to be re-engineered if the authority were to be involved in the direct management and handling of complaints investigations. It is submitted in short that the change would be an imbalance of the relationship between a force and an authority and cumbersome to boot.”
(Submission from Christopher Fox, President of ACPO.)

6.35 Indeed, both ACPO and the Home Office believe that effective oversight is possible within the current statutory framework. This is also the view of the APA. The Association believes that, if a police authority is exercising its responsibilities robustly, it is capable of monitoring effectively.

6.36 However, the APA was “attracted to the MPA’s proposal that the investigation of professional standards should be put at arms length from the force with direct reporting to the police authority.” The Association considers that this would be consistent with the police authority’s scrutiny and oversight role and would reinforce the role of the police authority as the link between the policing service provided and the local community. “It would certainly complement the thrust of the new complaints arrangements which were designed to increase public confidence by making the system more independent.” However, the APA stressed that it had not consulted its members about the proposals and would need to do so before expressing a definitive view.

6.37 Having considered the evidence that we have received, we do not believe that there is a compelling case for recommending changes to the legislation governing the role of police authorities in relation to complaints. We are persuaded that the current statutory provisions provide a framework for effective scrutiny.

6.38 We are, of course, mindful of the fact that the MPA is a relatively new police authority charged with oversight of a police service that operated without a police authority for over 170 years. It is, therefore, likely that it might take some time to find the right level of equilibrium in the relationship and also for the MPS to appreciate the benefits of increased scrutiny.

6.39 This latter point is important, since effective oversight depends, to a certain extent, on a constructive attitude on the part of those whose work is overseen. It is possible that some of the MPA’s frustration with the current system is a reflection of the attitude of the MPS to the Authority’s interest in its work.

6.40 We have already commented on the need for a police authority to apply appropriate rigour to its oversight role. We consider that the MPA could be more assertive in exercising its powers. There are examples of police authorities who are much more robust in holding professional standards departments to account.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority enters into greater dialogue with other police authorities to establish best practice in discharging the oversight role.

This could also include visits and the exchange of information.

We also recommend that the Commissioner takes steps to ensure that the Directorate of Professional Standards appreciates the importance of scrutiny to public confidence.

6.41 In the next chapter we outline a model of case management which we believe will ensure greater scrutiny of complaints and discipline matters. If this is adopted, we are confident that it will assist the MPA in discharging its oversight role effectively.

6.42 Oversight is not political interference but part of proper accountability. This needs to be accepted by DPS, and the interest of MPA Members in the directorate’s work welcomed and positively encouraged. We have received evidence of police services who have issued an open invitation to members of their police authority’s professional standards committee to inspect any professional standards file.

6.43 We have seen a draft protocol which, when finalised, will apply to, inter alia, complaints, conduct cases and Employment Tribunal claims. This should assist in clarifying the arrangements for the provision of information on cases which are significant in terms of their financial or other consequences.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority keeps under review the protocol with the MPS on the provision of information to the Authority on complaints and conduct cases, in order to ensure that it meets its responsibility for scrutiny.

We also recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority reviews the resources it is able to devote to supporting its role in overseeing complaints and conduct cases, with a view to increasing activity further, particularly in relation to dip-sampling of files.

6.44 However, we are firmly of the view that oversight needs to be a formal function conducted through formal structures, rather than through the involvement of individual Members of the Authority in specific cases, and we would encourage a partnership to that end.

The implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report

6.45 Another matter that is relevant to paragraph 5 of our terms of reference, which deals with the oversight role of the MPA, is the implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report.

6.46 Indeed, note 8 to our terms of reference asks us to consider: “What progress has been made by the MPS on the implementation of recommendations from the Gurpal Virdi Inquiry.”

6.47 The Virdi Inquiry, Chaired by David Muir, a Member of the MPA, was set up to look at the case involving Detective Sergeant Virdi (as he now is). The facts of that case are, we believe, well known and we deal with them later in this report since the case itself is one of the ‘high profile’ cases we were asked to consider.

6.48 The Virdi Inquiry published its report in January 2001. It contained 18 recommendations, of which 11 were directed at the MPS. We have been asked to comment on the progress in implementing those recommendations. We found this a very difficult task.

6.49 On the one hand, the Commissioner has periodically provided the MPA with reports setting out the progress made by the MPS in implementing the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry and, in his written submission to us, the Deputy Commissioner told us that “The MPS has therefore complied with all the recommendations of the Gurpal Virdi report.”

6.50 On the other hand, however, we have received evidence from organisations, such as the Discrimination Law Association, the MET-TUS and from individuals, including Mr Virdi himself, which suggests that this might not be the case.

6.51 In addition, in his oral evidence to us, the Deputy Commissioner conceded that “… while we have fulfilled in a bureaucratic way the findings of the Virdi Report, I have said already that I am not happy with the fact that the spirit of them has been fully understood and put in all the other contexts.”

He went on to say: “… one of the difficulties with the Virdi report is where did it land in the organisation and what was done about it … some things were done very specifically, the Fairness at Work piece, the stuff around the press, but in broad terms I think Virdi sank into that: well, we will tick the boxes, that is all done, and we are doing so much elsewhere, let us leave it at that.”

6.52 Figure 7 outlines the evidence we received in relation to each of the relevant recommendations and the Inquiry’s observations.

6.53 Given the confusion, even within the MPS, over exactly what progress has been made in implementing these recommendations, we find it impossible to do anything more than set out the evidence we have received.

6.54 The MPA has received regular reports from the Commissioner on implementation and we are somewhat surprised that assessing progress should have been part of the task we have been given.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority should convene and chair a case conference involving the Commissioner and all relevant stakeholders (including, in particular, those individuals and organisations who have given evidence to this Inquiry on this point) to establish what progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report and to determine what, if any, further action should be taken.

Figure 7: The Recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report

Recommendation 1

Regulations, particularly in regard to discipline, should be interpreted with common sense and reasonableness in an attempt to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy and unjustified cost both financially and in personal terms.

Evidence from the MPS

While the Deputy Commissioner described this recommendation as “a bit of motherhood and pie”, he conceded that “I do not think that it is possible to know [whether this recommendation is indeed being fulfilled].”

Inquiry’s Observations

We find it difficult to establish how compliance with this recommendation could be measured.

Recommendation 2

The grievance machinery should be reviewed (as the MPS has already undertaken to do) to:

ensure that the procedure includes the informal stage of normal managerial action;
provide training to managers and supervisors in the use of the process and their obligations to address issues at an early stage;
support the decisions of managers and supervisors where appropriate;
re-launch the process and give senior officer assurance that staff who use the procedure will not be punished or victimised.

Evidence from the MPS

The MPS introduced the new Fairness at Work procedure to replace the grievance procedure on 5 May 2003.

Mr McAnuff’s submission to the Inquiry explained that this was done in response to a staff survey in 2000, consultation with staff associations and as a result of the recommendations from the Virdi Inquiry Report, and that in fact the MPS used an external consultant who assisted the Virdi Inquiry.

As the Deputy Commissioner stated in his oral evidence: “it was already in process, but it has been given a significant boost by the Virdi Inquiry.”

Inquiry’s Observations

We have received evidence on the Fairness at Work procedure and have already outlined our recommendations for its replacement.

Recommendation 3

That consideration be given to a review of administration of Employment Tribunals within the MPS to encourage:

setting up a monitoring and good practice unit capable of early intervention and for alerting chief officers to highly sensitive cases;
removal of some of the responsibility for case management to suitably trained Personnel Managers who will work in close liaison with Borough Commanders;
direct contact between Borough Commanders, Personnel Managers and MPS solicitors to encourage local management responsibility and the possibility for earlier resolution of cases.

Evidence from the MPS

In his submission, the Deputy Commissioner explained that “a review of the administration of ETs within the MPS was completed on 19 October 2003.”

In oral evidence, the Deputy Commissioner explained that the MPS had not set up a dedicated unit as such, but has in place “a mechanism” whereby the Employment Tribunal Unit, the Diversity Directorate and Directorate of Legal Services meet on a regular basis to review significant Employment Tribunal cases.

Evidence from MET-TUS

In their submission, the MET-TUS stated: “There has been no fundamental review of the way Employment Tribunals are conducted.”

Inquiry’s Observations

We have recommended that the Employment Tribunal Unit should be moved to the HR directorate.

We believe that more work needs to be done on contact with borough commanders.

Recommendation 4

Notwithstanding the constraints of the existing Regulations, the MPS should address the perceived blame culture, recognising that an early apology may be the only desired outcome and should support staff who admit to honest mistakes.

Evidence from the MPS

In his oral evidence, the Deputy Commissioner acknowledged the existence of a blame culture: “Well, it is a serious dilemma here, I have to say. It is the absolute centrepiece of the Commissioner's leadership programme … Any blame culture that exists runs through the organisation.

“I have no doubt that there has been, in the last four to five years, such an emphasis on performance, such an emphasis on getting the Met's figures right, that there has been very little room – it is this bit about, where are the soft skills in all of this? … And there is clearly a sense of a blame culture. That is what, I think, this inquiry will help, but it is my fourth pillar; you have actually got to make the organisation mature.

“But I am positive we will move on, and I am quite clear that, as always, you are going to kind of drag behind the truth.

“I am sure that when your survey is completed it can then be compared in some way with the staff survey that we did just before the Commissioner took up office and with the response to some of the other smaller staff surveys that we have done, and I think you will see an upward curve in a feeling that the people are supported and looked after. But there is a long way to go.”

Evidence from MET-TUS

In their submission, the MET-TUS stated that: “We have seen no change in the way managers behave when things go wrong.”

Inquiry’s Observations

We have received evidence that there is still an established blame culture within the MPS.

Recommendation 5

That appropriate actions arising from these recommendations should be included in the requisite action plan to comply with requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and that the MPS should produce a strategy to reassure the community of its commitment to comply with the legislation.

Evidence from the MPS

In his oral evidence, the Deputy Commissioner said that the MPS had implemented this recommendation in full: “… we issued our Race Equality Scheme in 2002 with the full backing of the CRE, and the CRE in fact use it as a template for other forces. So my hope is that this is one area where we have got this absolutely right. There is always the danger, in saying that, that we found something that is wrong, but in general, the penetration of the Race Relations Amendment Act, the Race Equality Scheme, the impact assessment is very strong, and this is one part of it … I am quite comfortable that this is a major recommendation that we have complied with.”

Evidence from MET-TUS

In their submission, the MET-TUS stated that: “The Virdi Inquiry recommendations have not been incorporated into the RRAA Action Plan.”

Inquiry’s Observations

The Inquiry was unable to assess this.

Recommendation 6

The MPS should seek to address the perceived difficulties associated with the Directorate of Legal Services, namely:

the use of early intervention strategies to limit the number of cases going to employment tribunal;
to ensure that the structure of decision-making, where legal advice is a critical consideration but not the final arbiter, is transparent to the MPA.

Evidence from the MPS

In relation to the use of early intervention strategies, the Deputy Commissioner told us his view: “My very strong sense, talking to people, is that it is about first line supervisors listening and understanding the lesson that what this person is complaining about in this instance may not be the main issue; there may be something further back that they have got to deal with, and it is taking time.”

With regard to the transparency to the MPA of the MPS’ decision-making, we are aware that a draft model protocol is being drawn up but we were informed by the Deputy Commissioner that other efforts have been made to include the MPA more: “The transparency to the MPA, there are some difficulties here, and I have got to be clear on this. There were one or two members of the MPA who have got a very specific viewpoint on this, and I am not sure it is as widely shared as it might be ... As I say, it is just a question of getting the MPA to be more involved in David Hamilton’s department. We have made many offers; some have been taken up, some have not been taken up. This is a perception that is quite deep-rooted about a number of cases, but it seems to be only deep-rooted with two or three members of the MPA rather than the whole of the MPA, but it is something we have to deal with and we have got to get right.”

David Hamilton, the MPS Director of Legal Services, drew our attention to a document MPS Decision-making in Malfeasance Litigation submitted to the MPA in 2002, which deals with the role of his directorate in decision-making in malfeasance litigation.

Evidence from MET-TUS

In their written submission, the MET-TUS stated that: “No action has been taken to implement this recommendation.”

Inquiry’s Observations

We have already commented on the use of mediation and the role of the Directorate of Legal Services.

Recommendation 7

The MPS should maintain the ongoing progress and good practice identified in the last HMIC Inspection of the Professional Standards Department, ensuring that all staff regardless of their background have confidence in the grievance procedures.

Inquiry’s Observations

The grievance procedure dealt with in the HMIC report has now been replaced by Fairness at Work on which we have commented extensively.

Recommendation 8

A press strategy should be adopted that:

explains how to deal effectively with race-specific and high-profile cases, using the learning from critical incident training;
includes the principles contained in the National Union of Journalists Guidelines on Race Reporting;
does not compromise the principles of natural justice.

Evidence from the MPS

In his submission to the Inquiry, Dick Fedoricio, the MPS Director of Public Affairs, explained that: “Following the recommendations made by the Virdi Inquiry Report in December 2001, the DPA amended the instructions issued to press officers concerning racial matters and the broader area of diversity including sexual orientation, religion, gender and transgender issues.

“These instructions were drafted in consultation with the CRE and the MPS IAG and incorporate the same guidelines laid down by the National Union of Journalists for reporting on race.

“As a result the MPS will only confirm an employee’s race if we are asked by the media and if it is strictly relevant. Such an instance would be if an internal investigation had an obvious racial component, for example, having been triggered by allegations of racist language being used. In the context of professional standards and employment matters the DPA does not offer the race of an officer in news releases or statements.

“Following recent publicised allegations that visible ethnic minority officers are being disproportionately targeted by internal investigations it has become commonplace for the DPA to be asked for the race of any officer subject to internal investigation or suspension. While such information would never be volunteered to the media it will be given as a response to a specific question. To do otherwise would be to frustrate legitimate scrutiny of the disproportionality issue, a matter clearly in the public interest.”

Evidence from MBPA

Their submission stated that: “The lessons of Virdi either have not been learned, or are simply ignored, when it comes to dealing with black and minority ethnic officers and staff in high profile cases.”

Inquiry’s Observations

This recommendation appears to have been implemented.

Recommendation 9

Senior officers should regularly monitor and review how effectively middle and junior managers implement the organisation’s policies and commitments to equality.

Evidence from the MPS

The Deputy Commissioner’s submission states that the Commissioner reported to the MPA on 10 June 2003 that: “Recommendation 9 was ‘fully adopted and ongoing’.”

Evidence from MET-TUS

The MET-TUS told us that “We are not aware of this being done in any formal, structured way.”

Inquiry’s Observations

This is a sound recommendation but monitoring cannot occur without management information and we are not aware of a structure or system which would yield that information.

Recommendation 10

On conclusion of the re-investigation into PS Virdi’s case, (to be supervised by the PCA) any officers deemed to have acted inappropriately should face disciplinary action.

Evidence from the MPS

The submission of the Deputy Commissioner states that: “ ‘a re-investigation of the PS Virdi case’, has been completed, under the supervision of the Police Complaints Authority, by the South Wales police force and is now complete. Their investigation identifies no further action which can now be taken by the MPS.”

Inquiry’s Observations

Since no action was identified by the case review, none could be taken.

Recommendation 11

The MPS should monitor the composition of Representatives of the Police Federation’s Joint Branch Board, ensuring that concrete measures are taken to address under-representation, especially from ethnic minority groups.

Evidence from the MPS

The Deputy Commissioner informed us of his view of this recommendation: “I took the view at the time, with David Muir, that this recommendation was just wrong in principle. The MPS does not have that right. We do know that the federated branch boards have a considerable difficulty in this ... I do not think it was a proper recommendation, because it should have been that the Federation did it and did something about it, but the Federation would have said, ‘Who are you to tell us this?’ so I am not sure it helps. In an ideal world, we would all be able to sort this out, but I do not know how it is sorted out through a democratic process ... I am afraid it would be better for the Federation to answer ...”

Inquiry’s Observations

The MPS can monitor representation on the branch board but is not able to take any action in relation to under-representation. This is a matter for the Police Federation and the Inquiry supports the Federation in any action it may take to address this issue.

The role of the Independent Advisory Group

6.55 The Independent Advisory Group (IAG) also discharges a scrutiny role over the MPS. The IAG was originally set up to advise the MPS’ Racial and Violent Crime Task Force on any aspect of policing that impacts on minority ethnic communities. Its area of influence has increased and it is now able to impact on the policing debate in all areas of the MPS.

6.56 This strategic IAG has been joined by a Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender Advisory Group, a Youth Advisory Group and a Disability Issues Advisory Group. There are also separate Advisory Groups for Operation Trident (gun crime) and a sub-group of the strategic IAG advises the Child Protection OCU.

6.57 In addition, 27 of the 32 Boroughs Commands now have IAG structures and those without IAGs are being encouraged to develop them.

6.58 As Commander Allen of the Diversity directorate said in his submission to us:

“Independent advice has become a key mechanism by which we improve decision-making and operational outcomes. There has been direct IAG involvement in over 370 cases, including some of the most high profile, e.g. the siege at Hackney in 2003. In addition the groups provide a constant source of advice and challenge around policy and practice across the organisation.”

6.59 Commander Allen provided us with a document, Independent Advisory Group – Protocols May 2001. This defines ‘Advisors’ as:

“Those people who are:

Able to critically appraise police policies and practices
Able to make dispassionate, measured, considered and ethical assessment of what they experience
Able to bring relevant expertise, experience and integrity
Able to reason and willing to articulate their views
Able to represent the views and commanding the respect of the communities policed
Committed to the improvement of community - police relations
Able to exercise judgement/discretion re: conflict of interest.”

6.60 Our terms of reference ask us to inquire into the policies, procedures and practices of the MPS in relation to complaints and allegations against individuals. Since members of the IAG have been used to give advice on investigations of visible ethnic minority officers, their work falls within our remit.

6.61 We were extremely impressed with the representatives of the IAG who gave evidence to us. We were also impressed with the evidence of the members of the Lay Advisors Group (LAG), which assisted the MPS in relation to Operation Helios, the investigation into Superintendent Ali Dizaei. We found members of both groups to have great integrity, mental acuity and strength of character; in short, all the qualities we regard as essential in IAG and LAG members.

6.62 We must therefore make it clear that anything we say which is critical of the IAG system and how it operates must not be read as a criticism of the individuals involved, but of the system itself.

6.63 We have heard some criticism of the IAG and particularly of IAG involvement in investigations of black officers as a ‘rubber stamp’ or a mechanism to ‘race-proof’ an inquiry. These criticisms relate to individual IAG members being ‘cherry-picked’ and formed into small ‘quasi-IAGs’ for specific cases:

“… These ‘appointments’ were often shrouded behind a cloak of secrecy that we would argue seriously undermines their terms of reference and raises further questions over the allocation of resources and the use of cash incentives.”
(Submission from the MBPA.)

6.64 The MBPA has recommended that:

“The IAG should come under the jurisdiction of the MPA, in order to maintain their independence and to prevent further suggestions of manipulation.
That no member of the IAG should be in the paid employment of the MPS or the Home Office, or be a member of a company that receives remuneration from the provision of consultancy or other services to the MPS.
New criteria should be developed in relation to the recruitment, tenure and structure of the IAG.”

6.65 The MBPA also recommends that the MPS requests for IAG assistance should go through the MPA “to ensure objectivity, transparency and the maintenance of proper accountability.”

6.66 This recommendation was also made by the NBPA in their written submission:

“The use of IAG should be strictly controlled and placed under the auspice of the MPA. We believe that the current strategy of the police service and in particular the MPS to use the IAG as a ‘get out of jail card’ for senior investigating officers in case things go wrong should cease. This is not in the spirit of the Lawrence Report recommendation.”

6.67 The NBPA also considers that any payment to IAG members should be a matter of public record and that no person who directly, or indirectly, receives remuneration for services rendered to the police service or the Home Office should be a member of an IAG.

Photo of police in Westminster policing demonstration 6.68 The concerns of the MBPA and the NBPA arise from the LAG involvement in Operation Helios. We have concerns about the LAG involvement in that case, although our concerns are not about the individuals involved, or their contributions, but about how they were used. We are unhappy about the fact that they were not given all the information they should have received at the relevant time and that they were not informed of either the decision to settle the Employment Tribunal claim or the terms of that settlement.

6.69 We are, however, concerned about the IAG’s accountability. This was explained to us by Beverley Thompson, a member of the IAG (and the LAG), when she gave evidence to us:

“I think our understanding and the working definition that we have taken around independence is that we are not a statutory body, we have no decision-making function; nor are we elected by individuals within the community to represent them.

“So we are independent of the process, but have a view from that external process, having been informed about the workings of the organisation …

“And for us, our independence and who we are accountable to, I guess is to us, as a group, and to the communities that we all come back from … So in a sense, our independence is very much to our group membership.”

John Azah, another IAG member, elaborated on this: “Part of the criteria for what we do is that we are not representatives of any communities. I as a black person, African, born in Ghana in West Africa, have a perspective into the black community, but I am not elected… I offer my opinion based on my own life experiences, and perhaps some of the experience that I have gained from doing work as a race equality officer.”

Ms Thompson was confident that the IAG’s independence had not been compromised at any point: “I think one of the things that we have always been very careful and anxious about is our ability to remain critical, because in order to develop the relationship with the organisation, there has been a process where we have needed to trust both the organisation to provide us with the information that we will need, in order to give the advice upon, and for the organisation to feel comfortable to trust us to give us some very highly sensitive and confidential information.”

6.70 We are satisfied that, in the words of the IAG’s submission to us “The IAG has never shirked away from challenging the organisation or from temporarily suspending activities with the MPS when required. The role of the IAG is to challenge the thinking of the organisation and how it conducts its business.”

6.71 Nevertheless, given the importance of the role, we believe that it is time that the IAG were put on a more transparent footing. This would emphasise the vital public service which IAG members perform and ensure that the IAG has the confidence of all stakeholders.

6.72 We believe that the MPA should be responsible for the appointment of IAG members to emphasise the IAG’s independence from the MPS. This would be analogous to the appointment of independent members of discipline panels by police authorities. However, we do not consider that it is necessary for requests for IAG assistance to go through the MPA to ensure objectivity, transparency and proper accountability.

We therefore recommend that the ‘Nolan Principles’ for public appointments should apply to the appointment of members of the Independent Advisory Group and that:

their appointment should be by the Metropolitan Police Authority;
they should be appointed in a transparent way following open competition by public advertisement;
the terms of their appointment, including tenure of office and any remuneration, should be made public; and
candidates should be assessed for their suitability against a formal specification which should also be made public by the Metropolitan Police Authority.

We also recommend that the Independent Advisory Group is properly resourced and that this should include a budget for expenditure on items such as independent professional advice (this includes legal advice), where the Independent Advisory Group believes this is necessary.

6.73 Finally, we would like to deal further with the LAG involvement in Operation Helios. We have already said that we are concerned that LAG members were not given full information and particularly that, having assisted the MPS in the Operation over some months, they were not consulted in relation either to the decision to settle Superintendent Dizaei’s Employment Tribunal claim or in relation to the terms of any settlement.

6.74 The evidence that we have received suggests that the trust and confidence which is essential between a police service and an IAG may have been severely damaged. Consideration needs to be given as to how it can best be repaired.

We recommend that the Independent Advisory Group and the MPS agree a protocol in relation to disclosure of documentation and the rationale for decisions to Independent Advisory Group members. This must be based on the presumption that Independent Advisory Group members see everything that is available to the investigating officers. Where possible, this should be before decisions are taken.

Skip Navigation \| Accessible

Accessibility About the Inquiry Contacts Search
Home News Schedule Transcripts Evidence Report Links
Report > 6: Governance, Accountability and Scrutiny
QuickSearch	Previous Next	Views Print Accessible Actions Send
	Archive note Important note: This is an archive of the website that was formerly at www.morrisinquiry.gov.uk. It is being hosted on the MPA website for archival purposes only and may contain out-of-date information. Page summary This resource is from the final Report of the Morris Inquiry. This section contains chapter 6, "Governance, Accountability and Scrutiny". This chapter deals with the role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in employment matters and complaints & discipline, the implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report, and the role of the Independent Advisory Group. Sections available here: 6: Governance, Accountability and Scrutiny Chapter Summary The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in people matters The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in complaints and discipline The implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report Figure 7: The Recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report The role of the Independent Advisory Group Alternative versions This document is also available in the following formats: Word [0.97MB]; PDF [1.45MB] Content 6: Governance, Accountability and Scrutiny “You can only have accountability from a position of knowledge. You can only obtain that knowledge by scrutiny. If there is no scrutiny, there can be no accountability.” Peter Herbert, Member of the MPA Chapter Summary This chapter deals with: The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in employment matters The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in complaints and discipline The implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report The role of the Independent Advisory Group The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in people matters 6.1 Paragraph 5 of our terms of reference asks us: “To consider and make recommendations on the role of the Police Authority and its Members in relation to the consideration of high profile or sensitive cases, and the oversight of the performance of the MPS in relation to the matters covered by this Inquiry.” 6.2 We deal with professional standards cases later in this chapter. Here we deal briefly with the MPA’s role in relation to human resource issues, in particular grievances and Employment Tribunal cases. 6.3 Police authorities have a duty to secure ‘efficient and effective’ policing in their area. “Ensuring that the force has in place an effective HR strategy, and that HR planning and management is fully integrated into the overall business process, is fundamental to this task. Each police authority must be able effectively to scrutinise its force’s activity across the HR function and assure itself that the force is maximising the potential of its most valuable assets – its police officers, support staff and members of the special constabulary – for the delivery of more effective policing.” (PEOPLE MATTERs, A framework for police authority oversight of police human resource plans (APA).) 6.4 Police authorities are responsible for agreeing the annual costed HR plan prepared by the police service and for agreeing the annual priorities for investment in training with the Chief Constable (the Commissioner). 6.5 The APA publication, PEOPLE MATTERs, provides a framework for police authority oversight of HR planning, policies and practices. It is in the course of being updated but is an extremely valuable source of support and guidance to police authorities in discharging their responsibilities in relation to people management. 6.6 The MPA oversees human resource matters in the MPS through its Human Resources Committee. The Committee’s terms of reference give it the role of monitoring activity on all HR issues. This also includes grievances and Employment Tribunal cases. 6.7 The APA has also published guidance on effective oversight and scrutiny of grievances and Employment Tribunal cases, PEOPLE MATTERs, Tackling discrimination: police authority oversight and scrutiny of grievance procedures and employment tribunals. This states: “Grievance and ET cases provide a significant insight into the health of any organisation. Police authorities need to clearly hold forces to account for how they deal with such cases through regular strategic analysis and scrutiny.” 6.8 This scrutiny will involve regular consideration of numbers of cases and trends over time, across the organisation and in comparison with other organisations and services. It should also involve consideration of whether there is a need to review or change a relevant policy. Case files can also be dip-sampled. The APA considers that this work is best dealt with by a committee rather than the full authority. 6.9 The MPA has told us that it does not have comprehensive oversight systems in place in relation to Employment Tribunal cases and grievances. However, it proposes to introduce systems based on the APA guidance. We have received a draft protocol between the MPA and the MPS which would cover oversight of Employment Tribunal cases as well as other matters. We consider that this protocol, together with systems based on the APA guidance, should enable the MPA to hold the MPS to account in this important area. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority puts in place comprehensive oversight systems and processes to scrutinise grievances and Employment Tribunal cases as soon as possible, taking account of the Association of Police Authorities’ guidance in this area. The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in complaints and discipline 6.10 Public confidence requires robust scrutiny of police complaints and conduct matters. This is a key part of the role of police authorities. They must ensure that they have systems and structures in place to apply the necessary rigour to oversee the way the police service handles cases. 6.11 As a starting point, it is helpful to examine the statutory framework governing police authority oversight of complaints. This is set out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform Act 2002. 6.12 Section 6(1) of the 1996 Act places a duty on police authorities to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police service in its area. The service is under the direction and control of the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) by virtue of section 10(1). 6.13 Section 77 of the 1996 Act imposed a duty on every police authority, in maintaining an efficient and effective police service, to keep itself informed as to the workings of the procedures for handling complaints about the conduct of police officers. Section 15 of the 2002 Act maintains this duty and now widens it. 6.14 Section 22(3) of the 1996 Act requires the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) to submit a report to the police authority on such matters as the authority may determine relating to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service. This is subject to an appeal to the Home Secretary on the grounds that the report would contain information which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed, or is not needed for the discharge of the functions of the police authority. 6.15 There is no express statutory provision which imposes a duty on the police authority to hold its Chief Constable (the Commissioner) to account, although “everybody understands that is the convention.” (Evidence of David Riddle, Deputy Clerk, MPA.) 6.16 The MPA has suggested that an express provision to this effect would be helpful. We have not received evidence from any other source which would justify disturbing the current relationship. 6.17 The Chief Constable (the Commissioner) is responsible for the recording, handling and investigating of complaints about the conduct of police officers of the rank up to and including Chief Superintendent. 6.18 The police authority is responsible for overseeing the procedures for handling complaints to ensure that they comply fully with the statutory provisions, and for considering issues raised by complaints as they impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the service. 6.19 Police authorities also have responsibility for the recording, handling and investigating of complaints against ACPO officers, other than complaints relating to the direction and control of a service. 6.20 Police authorities are not responsible for investigating complaints concerning the conduct of officers below ACPO rank. The APA’s view is that, in carrying out their oversight role, police authorities should not involve themselves in the detail of individual cases, other than to look at process issues and any implications for wider policy. 6.21 In their publication, Complaints against the Police – Monitoring and Oversight Arrangements, A Good Practice Guide for Police Authorities, the APA recommends that police authorities should have in place “a structured process for ongoing scrutiny and oversight of complaints which contains all of the following elements: process and procedural audit against Home Office guidance; dip sampling of completed complaints files; analysis of statistics and trends; strategic analysis; discussion with stakeholders and partners.” The Guide considers each of these elements in detail and offers guidance to assist police authorities. 6.22 The MPA discharges its responsibilities for complaints through its Professional Standards and Complaints Committee. This Committee: periodically reviews the policies and procedures adopted by the MPS for complaints handling; liaises with HMIC in order to obtain an independent assessment of service procedures and performance; maintains contact with the IPCC to obtain feedback and guidance; receives regular reports from the Commissioner containing complaints performance information; undertakes dip-sampling of complaint case files; and maintains oversight of the implementation of the MPS’ Professional Standards Strategy. 6.23 We have received evidence from both Lord Harris, former Chair of the MPA, and Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee, on how the MPA discharges its oversight role and what they perceive to be restrictions under the current statutory regime. 6.24 Mr Auladin informed us that the MPA had recently increased staffing support to Members on professional standards issues and that the new resource would be used to develop systems and processes for oversight and monitoring, particularly in relation to dip-sampling cases, OCU level analysis, analysis of data on categories of complaint, improving discussions with stakeholders and more detailed monitoring of timeliness of investigations and their outcomes. 6.25 The MPS Directorate of Professional Standards handles approximately 5,000 cases a year. The MPA told us that, given this figure and the resources at its disposal, the proportion of files the Authority is able to sample is small. Some police authorities are able to scrutinise every complaint file for their service; that level of scrutiny is beyond the resources of the MPA and scrutiny at Member level is in the region of 10 cases a month. 6.26 However, Mr Auladin went on to underline the Authority’s view that the current monitoring regime was deficient in that the police authority is unable to influence the way matters are dealt with by the Service “in particular in terms of oversight of individual cases.” The proposal in the Review of Operation Lancet that the Clerk to the Police Authority should be included in case conferences did not, in his view go far enough and he considered that “a more systematic and formal system for proper Member oversight is required ... “The MPA considers that the current framework should be strengthened by, as a minimum, legislation or a Home Office Code of Practice to provide for a police authority To receive, as of right, regular reports on current ‘sensitive cases’ including complaints, discipline cases, civil actions against police, grievances and employment tribunals… To identify specific cases upon which it requires a full report from the Commissioner, and for these to include live as well as closed cases. To give advice or views on the conduct or progress of a specific case to which the Commissioner should be required to have regard; to nominate one or more Members to give such advice or views on a continuing basis throughout the course of an individual case. To set standards in respect of matters such as use of mediation, informal resolution of complaints, and restorative conferencing to which the Commissioner should be required to have regard.” (Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee.) 6.27 Lord Harris proposed in his submission that the function of the investigation of complaints within a service should be at “arms length” from the service management and directly accountable to the police authority. “Redefining the relationship of the investigating unit to the Authority could boost community confidence in the complaints process, complementing the role of the MPA.” 6.28 The MPA itself acknowledged that this proposal received little support from those giving evidence to the Inquiry. The Commissioner saw it as potentially being “political interference”, although the MPA, like all police authorities, is not intended to be a political body. The MPA clarified that they were not proposing that police authorities should have any direct responsibility for discipline decisions or functions and saw the proposal as building on the “existing convention in police forces that the Deputy Chief Constable is the discipline authority and responsible for the operation of the complaints function.” 6.29 Thus, in respect of the MPS, the MPA’s proposal is that the Deputy Commissioner should have responsibility and accountability for the direction and control of the service relating to the investigation of complaints and conduct matters and should report to, and be accountable, to the Authority for the performance of those responsibilities. 6.30 This would leave the Commissioner free in the role of final adjudicator on individual cases without a conflict of responsibilities. “The separation of functions, and the introduction of the authority as an independent player, would serve to increase public and internal confidence in the system.” (Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee.) 6.31 We invited the Home Office to comment on the MPA’s proposal. The department’s view is that the current statutory framework enables police authorities to carry out their oversight responsibilities and that authorities play a valuable role in asking challenging questions of the service. In their submission to us, the Home Office noted the MPA’s view that there was a case for “fundamental structural reform to put the investigation of professional standards matters at arms length from the management of the force … making it directly accountable to the MPA”. They also noted that the MPA did not appear to be seeking day to day control or management but rather to act as a “critical friend”. 6.32 The Home Office is “not yet convinced that there is a compelling case for a reform of the statutory duty of police authorities in relation to professional standards.” It also considers that making such a change would risk “blurring the clear distinctions between [Chief Constables and Police Authorities] that were established in the Police Act 1996.” On this last point they differ from the MPA. The Authority’s view is that empowering police authorities will clarify responsibilities without compromising the Commissioner’s responsibility for direction and control. 6.33 Peter Herbert, a Member (and former Deputy Chair) of the MPA, considered that the existing powers should be adequate: “… we should be able to get the level of co-operation from the MPS to make scrutiny and accountability work.” Although he implied that the system had not always worked smoothly: “I am aware, certainly, that where the MPS is resistant to that level of intrusion and accountability, either selective information, as I said earlier, is given, or no information is given at all.” 6.34 ACPO too were in favour of maintaining the status quo and disagreed with Lord Harris’ suggestion of a new reporting line for professional standards: “The present system of misconduct hearings relies on a review and an appeal process. A review by the chief constable and ultimate appeal to a third party panel convened by the authority. An independent appeal process would have to be re-engineered if the authority were to be involved in the direct management and handling of complaints investigations. It is submitted in short that the change would be an imbalance of the relationship between a force and an authority and cumbersome to boot.” (Submission from Christopher Fox, President of ACPO.) 6.35 Indeed, both ACPO and the Home Office believe that effective oversight is possible within the current statutory framework. This is also the view of the APA. The Association believes that, if a police authority is exercising its responsibilities robustly, it is capable of monitoring effectively. 6.36 However, the APA was “attracted to the MPA’s proposal that the investigation of professional standards should be put at arms length from the force with direct reporting to the police authority.” The Association considers that this would be consistent with the police authority’s scrutiny and oversight role and would reinforce the role of the police authority as the link between the policing service provided and the local community. “It would certainly complement the thrust of the new complaints arrangements which were designed to increase public confidence by making the system more independent.” However, the APA stressed that it had not consulted its members about the proposals and would need to do so before expressing a definitive view. 6.37 Having considered the evidence that we have received, we do not believe that there is a compelling case for recommending changes to the legislation governing the role of police authorities in relation to complaints. We are persuaded that the current statutory provisions provide a framework for effective scrutiny. 6.38 We are, of course, mindful of the fact that the MPA is a relatively new police authority charged with oversight of a police service that operated without a police authority for over 170 years. It is, therefore, likely that it might take some time to find the right level of equilibrium in the relationship and also for the MPS to appreciate the benefits of increased scrutiny. 6.39 This latter point is important, since effective oversight depends, to a certain extent, on a constructive attitude on the part of those whose work is overseen. It is possible that some of the MPA’s frustration with the current system is a reflection of the attitude of the MPS to the Authority’s interest in its work. 6.40 We have already commented on the need for a police authority to apply appropriate rigour to its oversight role. We consider that the MPA could be more assertive in exercising its powers. There are examples of police authorities who are much more robust in holding professional standards departments to account. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority enters into greater dialogue with other police authorities to establish best practice in discharging the oversight role. This could also include visits and the exchange of information. We also recommend that the Commissioner takes steps to ensure that the Directorate of Professional Standards appreciates the importance of scrutiny to public confidence. 6.41 In the next chapter we outline a model of case management which we believe will ensure greater scrutiny of complaints and discipline matters. If this is adopted, we are confident that it will assist the MPA in discharging its oversight role effectively. 6.42 Oversight is not political interference but part of proper accountability. This needs to be accepted by DPS, and the interest of MPA Members in the directorate’s work welcomed and positively encouraged. We have received evidence of police services who have issued an open invitation to members of their police authority’s professional standards committee to inspect any professional standards file. 6.43 We have seen a draft protocol which, when finalised, will apply to, inter alia, complaints, conduct cases and Employment Tribunal claims. This should assist in clarifying the arrangements for the provision of information on cases which are significant in terms of their financial or other consequences. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority keeps under review the protocol with the MPS on the provision of information to the Authority on complaints and conduct cases, in order to ensure that it meets its responsibility for scrutiny. We also recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority reviews the resources it is able to devote to supporting its role in overseeing complaints and conduct cases, with a view to increasing activity further, particularly in relation to dip-sampling of files. 6.44 However, we are firmly of the view that oversight needs to be a formal function conducted through formal structures, rather than through the involvement of individual Members of the Authority in specific cases, and we would encourage a partnership to that end. The implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report 6.45 Another matter that is relevant to paragraph 5 of our terms of reference, which deals with the oversight role of the MPA, is the implementation of the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report. 6.46 Indeed, note 8 to our terms of reference asks us to consider: “What progress has been made by the MPS on the implementation of recommendations from the Gurpal Virdi Inquiry.” 6.47 The Virdi Inquiry, Chaired by David Muir, a Member of the MPA, was set up to look at the case involving Detective Sergeant Virdi (as he now is). The facts of that case are, we believe, well known and we deal with them later in this report since the case itself is one of the ‘high profile’ cases we were asked to consider. 6.48 The Virdi Inquiry published its report in January 2001. It contained 18 recommendations, of which 11 were directed at the MPS. We have been asked to comment on the progress in implementing those recommendations. We found this a very difficult task. 6.49 On the one hand, the Commissioner has periodically provided the MPA with reports setting out the progress made by the MPS in implementing the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry and, in his written submission to us, the Deputy Commissioner told us that “The MPS has therefore complied with all the recommendations of the Gurpal Virdi report.” 6.50 On the other hand, however, we have received evidence from organisations, such as the Discrimination Law Association, the MET-TUS and from individuals, including Mr Virdi himself, which suggests that this might not be the case. 6.51 In addition, in his oral evidence to us, the Deputy Commissioner conceded that “… while we have fulfilled in a bureaucratic way the findings of the Virdi Report, I have said already that I am not happy with the fact that the spirit of them has been fully understood and put in all the other contexts.” He went on to say: “… one of the difficulties with the Virdi report is where did it land in the organisation and what was done about it … some things were done very specifically, the Fairness at Work piece, the stuff around the press, but in broad terms I think Virdi sank into that: well, we will tick the boxes, that is all done, and we are doing so much elsewhere, let us leave it at that.” 6.52 Figure 7 outlines the evidence we received in relation to each of the relevant recommendations and the Inquiry’s observations. 6.53 Given the confusion, even within the MPS, over exactly what progress has been made in implementing these recommendations, we find it impossible to do anything more than set out the evidence we have received. 6.54 The MPA has received regular reports from the Commissioner on implementation and we are somewhat surprised that assessing progress should have been part of the task we have been given. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority should convene and chair a case conference involving the Commissioner and all relevant stakeholders (including, in particular, those individuals and organisations who have given evidence to this Inquiry on this point) to establish what progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report and to determine what, if any, further action should be taken. Figure 7: The Recommendations of the Virdi Inquiry Report Recommendation 1 Regulations, particularly in regard to discipline, should be interpreted with common sense and reasonableness in an attempt to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy and unjustified cost both financially and in personal terms. Evidence from the MPS While the Deputy Commissioner described this recommendation as “a bit of motherhood and pie”, he conceded that “I do not think that it is possible to know [whether this recommendation is indeed being fulfilled].” Inquiry’s Observations We find it difficult to establish how compliance with this recommendation could be measured. Recommendation 2 The grievance machinery should be reviewed (as the MPS has already undertaken to do) to: ensure that the procedure includes the informal stage of normal managerial action; provide training to managers and supervisors in the use of the process and their obligations to address issues at an early stage; support the decisions of managers and supervisors where appropriate; re-launch the process and give senior officer assurance that staff who use the procedure will not be punished or victimised. Evidence from the MPS The MPS introduced the new Fairness at Work procedure to replace the grievance procedure on 5 May 2003. Mr McAnuff’s submission to the Inquiry explained that this was done in response to a staff survey in 2000, consultation with staff associations and as a result of the recommendations from the Virdi Inquiry Report, and that in fact the MPS used an external consultant who assisted the Virdi Inquiry. As the Deputy Commissioner stated in his oral evidence: “it was already in process, but it has been given a significant boost by the Virdi Inquiry.” Inquiry’s Observations We have received evidence on the Fairness at Work procedure and have already outlined our recommendations for its replacement. Recommendation 3 That consideration be given to a review of administration of Employment Tribunals within the MPS to encourage: setting up a monitoring and good practice unit capable of early intervention and for alerting chief officers to highly sensitive cases; removal of some of the responsibility for case management to suitably trained Personnel Managers who will work in close liaison with Borough Commanders; direct contact between Borough Commanders, Personnel Managers and MPS solicitors to encourage local management responsibility and the possibility for earlier resolution of cases. Evidence from the MPS In his submission, the Deputy Commissioner explained that “a review of the administration of ETs within the MPS was completed on 19 October 2003.” In oral evidence, the Deputy Commissioner explained that the MPS had not set up a dedicated unit as such, but has in place “a mechanism” whereby the Employment Tribunal Unit, the Diversity Directorate and Directorate of Legal Services meet on a regular basis to review significant Employment Tribunal cases. Evidence from MET-TUS In their submission, the MET-TUS stated: “There has been no fundamental review of the way Employment Tribunals are conducted.” Inquiry’s Observations We have recommended that the Employment Tribunal Unit should be moved to the HR directorate. We believe that more work needs to be done on contact with borough commanders. Recommendation 4 Notwithstanding the constraints of the existing Regulations, the MPS should address the perceived blame culture, recognising that an early apology may be the only desired outcome and should support staff who admit to honest mistakes. Evidence from the MPS In his oral evidence, the Deputy Commissioner acknowledged the existence of a blame culture: “Well, it is a serious dilemma here, I have to say. It is the absolute centrepiece of the Commissioner's leadership programme … Any blame culture that exists runs through the organisation. “I have no doubt that there has been, in the last four to five years, such an emphasis on performance, such an emphasis on getting the Met's figures right, that there has been very little room – it is this bit about, where are the soft skills in all of this? … And there is clearly a sense of a blame culture. That is what, I think, this inquiry will help, but it is my fourth pillar; you have actually got to make the organisation mature. “But I am positive we will move on, and I am quite clear that, as always, you are going to kind of drag behind the truth. “I am sure that when your survey is completed it can then be compared in some way with the staff survey that we did just before the Commissioner took up office and with the response to some of the other smaller staff surveys that we have done, and I think you will see an upward curve in a feeling that the people are supported and looked after. But there is a long way to go.” Evidence from MET-TUS In their submission, the MET-TUS stated that: “We have seen no change in the way managers behave when things go wrong.” Inquiry’s Observations We have received evidence that there is still an established blame culture within the MPS. Recommendation 5 That appropriate actions arising from these recommendations should be included in the requisite action plan to comply with requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and that the MPS should produce a strategy to reassure the community of its commitment to comply with the legislation. Evidence from the MPS In his oral evidence, the Deputy Commissioner said that the MPS had implemented this recommendation in full: “… we issued our Race Equality Scheme in 2002 with the full backing of the CRE, and the CRE in fact use it as a template for other forces. So my hope is that this is one area where we have got this absolutely right. There is always the danger, in saying that, that we found something that is wrong, but in general, the penetration of the Race Relations Amendment Act, the Race Equality Scheme, the impact assessment is very strong, and this is one part of it … I am quite comfortable that this is a major recommendation that we have complied with.” Evidence from MET-TUS In their submission, the MET-TUS stated that: “The Virdi Inquiry recommendations have not been incorporated into the RRAA Action Plan.” Inquiry’s Observations The Inquiry was unable to assess this. Recommendation 6 The MPS should seek to address the perceived difficulties associated with the Directorate of Legal Services, namely: the use of early intervention strategies to limit the number of cases going to employment tribunal; to ensure that the structure of decision-making, where legal advice is a critical consideration but not the final arbiter, is transparent to the MPA. Evidence from the MPS In relation to the use of early intervention strategies, the Deputy Commissioner told us his view: “My very strong sense, talking to people, is that it is about first line supervisors listening and understanding the lesson that what this person is complaining about in this instance may not be the main issue; there may be something further back that they have got to deal with, and it is taking time.” With regard to the transparency to the MPA of the MPS’ decision-making, we are aware that a draft model protocol is being drawn up but we were informed by the Deputy Commissioner that other efforts have been made to include the MPA more: “The transparency to the MPA, there are some difficulties here, and I have got to be clear on this. There were one or two members of the MPA who have got a very specific viewpoint on this, and I am not sure it is as widely shared as it might be ... As I say, it is just a question of getting the MPA to be more involved in David Hamilton’s department. We have made many offers; some have been taken up, some have not been taken up. This is a perception that is quite deep-rooted about a number of cases, but it seems to be only deep-rooted with two or three members of the MPA rather than the whole of the MPA, but it is something we have to deal with and we have got to get right.” David Hamilton, the MPS Director of Legal Services, drew our attention to a document MPS Decision-making in Malfeasance Litigation submitted to the MPA in 2002, which deals with the role of his directorate in decision-making in malfeasance litigation. Evidence from MET-TUS In their written submission, the MET-TUS stated that: “No action has been taken to implement this recommendation.” Inquiry’s Observations We have already commented on the use of mediation and the role of the Directorate of Legal Services. Recommendation 7 The MPS should maintain the ongoing progress and good practice identified in the last HMIC Inspection of the Professional Standards Department, ensuring that all staff regardless of their background have confidence in the grievance procedures. Inquiry’s Observations The grievance procedure dealt with in the HMIC report has now been replaced by Fairness at Work on which we have commented extensively. Recommendation 8 A press strategy should be adopted that: explains how to deal effectively with race-specific and high-profile cases, using the learning from critical incident training; includes the principles contained in the National Union of Journalists Guidelines on Race Reporting; does not compromise the principles of natural justice. Evidence from the MPS In his submission to the Inquiry, Dick Fedoricio, the MPS Director of Public Affairs, explained that: “Following the recommendations made by the Virdi Inquiry Report in December 2001, the DPA amended the instructions issued to press officers concerning racial matters and the broader area of diversity including sexual orientation, religion, gender and transgender issues. “These instructions were drafted in consultation with the CRE and the MPS IAG and incorporate the same guidelines laid down by the National Union of Journalists for reporting on race. “As a result the MPS will only confirm an employee’s race if we are asked by the media and if it is strictly relevant. Such an instance would be if an internal investigation had an obvious racial component, for example, having been triggered by allegations of racist language being used. In the context of professional standards and employment matters the DPA does not offer the race of an officer in news releases or statements. “Following recent publicised allegations that visible ethnic minority officers are being disproportionately targeted by internal investigations it has become commonplace for the DPA to be asked for the race of any officer subject to internal investigation or suspension. While such information would never be volunteered to the media it will be given as a response to a specific question. To do otherwise would be to frustrate legitimate scrutiny of the disproportionality issue, a matter clearly in the public interest.” Evidence from MBPA Their submission stated that: “The lessons of Virdi either have not been learned, or are simply ignored, when it comes to dealing with black and minority ethnic officers and staff in high profile cases.” Inquiry’s Observations This recommendation appears to have been implemented. Recommendation 9 Senior officers should regularly monitor and review how effectively middle and junior managers implement the organisation’s policies and commitments to equality. Evidence from the MPS The Deputy Commissioner’s submission states that the Commissioner reported to the MPA on 10 June 2003 that: “Recommendation 9 was ‘fully adopted and ongoing’.” Evidence from MET-TUS The MET-TUS told us that “We are not aware of this being done in any formal, structured way.” Inquiry’s Observations This is a sound recommendation but monitoring cannot occur without management information and we are not aware of a structure or system which would yield that information. Recommendation 10 On conclusion of the re-investigation into PS Virdi’s case, (to be supervised by the PCA) any officers deemed to have acted inappropriately should face disciplinary action. Evidence from the MPS The submission of the Deputy Commissioner states that: “ ‘a re-investigation of the PS Virdi case’, has been completed, under the supervision of the Police Complaints Authority, by the South Wales police force and is now complete. Their investigation identifies no further action which can now be taken by the MPS.” Inquiry’s Observations Since no action was identified by the case review, none could be taken. Recommendation 11 The MPS should monitor the composition of Representatives of the Police Federation’s Joint Branch Board, ensuring that concrete measures are taken to address under-representation, especially from ethnic minority groups. Evidence from the MPS The Deputy Commissioner informed us of his view of this recommendation: “I took the view at the time, with David Muir, that this recommendation was just wrong in principle. The MPS does not have that right. We do know that the federated branch boards have a considerable difficulty in this ... I do not think it was a proper recommendation, because it should have been that the Federation did it and did something about it, but the Federation would have said, ‘Who are you to tell us this?’ so I am not sure it helps. In an ideal world, we would all be able to sort this out, but I do not know how it is sorted out through a democratic process ... I am afraid it would be better for the Federation to answer ...” Inquiry’s Observations The MPS can monitor representation on the branch board but is not able to take any action in relation to under-representation. This is a matter for the Police Federation and the Inquiry supports the Federation in any action it may take to address this issue. The role of the Independent Advisory Group 6.55 The Independent Advisory Group (IAG) also discharges a scrutiny role over the MPS. The IAG was originally set up to advise the MPS’ Racial and Violent Crime Task Force on any aspect of policing that impacts on minority ethnic communities. Its area of influence has increased and it is now able to impact on the policing debate in all areas of the MPS. 6.56 This strategic IAG has been joined by a Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender Advisory Group, a Youth Advisory Group and a Disability Issues Advisory Group. There are also separate Advisory Groups for Operation Trident (gun crime) and a sub-group of the strategic IAG advises the Child Protection OCU. 6.57 In addition, 27 of the 32 Boroughs Commands now have IAG structures and those without IAGs are being encouraged to develop them. 6.58 As Commander Allen of the Diversity directorate said in his submission to us: “Independent advice has become a key mechanism by which we improve decision-making and operational outcomes. There has been direct IAG involvement in over 370 cases, including some of the most high profile, e.g. the siege at Hackney in 2003. In addition the groups provide a constant source of advice and challenge around policy and practice across the organisation.” 6.59 Commander Allen provided us with a document, Independent Advisory Group – Protocols May 2001. This defines ‘Advisors’ as: “Those people who are: Able to critically appraise police policies and practices Able to make dispassionate, measured, considered and ethical assessment of what they experience Able to bring relevant expertise, experience and integrity Able to reason and willing to articulate their views Able to represent the views and commanding the respect of the communities policed Committed to the improvement of community - police relations Able to exercise judgement/discretion re: conflict of interest.” 6.60 Our terms of reference ask us to inquire into the policies, procedures and practices of the MPS in relation to complaints and allegations against individuals. Since members of the IAG have been used to give advice on investigations of visible ethnic minority officers, their work falls within our remit. 6.61 We were extremely impressed with the representatives of the IAG who gave evidence to us. We were also impressed with the evidence of the members of the Lay Advisors Group (LAG), which assisted the MPS in relation to Operation Helios, the investigation into Superintendent Ali Dizaei. We found members of both groups to have great integrity, mental acuity and strength of character; in short, all the qualities we regard as essential in IAG and LAG members. 6.62 We must therefore make it clear that anything we say which is critical of the IAG system and how it operates must not be read as a criticism of the individuals involved, but of the system itself. 6.63 We have heard some criticism of the IAG and particularly of IAG involvement in investigations of black officers as a ‘rubber stamp’ or a mechanism to ‘race-proof’ an inquiry. These criticisms relate to individual IAG members being ‘cherry-picked’ and formed into small ‘quasi-IAGs’ for specific cases: “… These ‘appointments’ were often shrouded behind a cloak of secrecy that we would argue seriously undermines their terms of reference and raises further questions over the allocation of resources and the use of cash incentives.” (Submission from the MBPA.) 6.64 The MBPA has recommended that: “The IAG should come under the jurisdiction of the MPA, in order to maintain their independence and to prevent further suggestions of manipulation. That no member of the IAG should be in the paid employment of the MPS or the Home Office, or be a member of a company that receives remuneration from the provision of consultancy or other services to the MPS. New criteria should be developed in relation to the recruitment, tenure and structure of the IAG.” 6.65 The MBPA also recommends that the MPS requests for IAG assistance should go through the MPA “to ensure objectivity, transparency and the maintenance of proper accountability.” 6.66 This recommendation was also made by the NBPA in their written submission: “The use of IAG should be strictly controlled and placed under the auspice of the MPA. We believe that the current strategy of the police service and in particular the MPS to use the IAG as a ‘get out of jail card’ for senior investigating officers in case things go wrong should cease. This is not in the spirit of the Lawrence Report recommendation.” 6.67 The NBPA also considers that any payment to IAG members should be a matter of public record and that no person who directly, or indirectly, receives remuneration for services rendered to the police service or the Home Office should be a member of an IAG. 6.68 The concerns of the MBPA and the NBPA arise from the LAG involvement in Operation Helios. We have concerns about the LAG involvement in that case, although our concerns are not about the individuals involved, or their contributions, but about how they were used. We are unhappy about the fact that they were not given all the information they should have received at the relevant time and that they were not informed of either the decision to settle the Employment Tribunal claim or the terms of that settlement. 6.69 We are, however, concerned about the IAG’s accountability. This was explained to us by Beverley Thompson, a member of the IAG (and the LAG), when she gave evidence to us: “I think our understanding and the working definition that we have taken around independence is that we are not a statutory body, we have no decision-making function; nor are we elected by individuals within the community to represent them. “So we are independent of the process, but have a view from that external process, having been informed about the workings of the organisation … “And for us, our independence and who we are accountable to, I guess is to us, as a group, and to the communities that we all come back from … So in a sense, our independence is very much to our group membership.” John Azah, another IAG member, elaborated on this: “Part of the criteria for what we do is that we are not representatives of any communities. I as a black person, African, born in Ghana in West Africa, have a perspective into the black community, but I am not elected… I offer my opinion based on my own life experiences, and perhaps some of the experience that I have gained from doing work as a race equality officer.” Ms Thompson was confident that the IAG’s independence had not been compromised at any point: “I think one of the things that we have always been very careful and anxious about is our ability to remain critical, because in order to develop the relationship with the organisation, there has been a process where we have needed to trust both the organisation to provide us with the information that we will need, in order to give the advice upon, and for the organisation to feel comfortable to trust us to give us some very highly sensitive and confidential information.” 6.70 We are satisfied that, in the words of the IAG’s submission to us “The IAG has never shirked away from challenging the organisation or from temporarily suspending activities with the MPS when required. The role of the IAG is to challenge the thinking of the organisation and how it conducts its business.” 6.71 Nevertheless, given the importance of the role, we believe that it is time that the IAG were put on a more transparent footing. This would emphasise the vital public service which IAG members perform and ensure that the IAG has the confidence of all stakeholders. 6.72 We believe that the MPA should be responsible for the appointment of IAG members to emphasise the IAG’s independence from the MPS. This would be analogous to the appointment of independent members of discipline panels by police authorities. However, we do not consider that it is necessary for requests for IAG assistance to go through the MPA to ensure objectivity, transparency and proper accountability. We therefore recommend that the ‘Nolan Principles’ for public appointments should apply to the appointment of members of the Independent Advisory Group and that: their appointment should be by the Metropolitan Police Authority; they should be appointed in a transparent way following open competition by public advertisement; the terms of their appointment, including tenure of office and any remuneration, should be made public; and candidates should be assessed for their suitability against a formal specification which should also be made public by the Metropolitan Police Authority. We also recommend that the Independent Advisory Group is properly resourced and that this should include a budget for expenditure on items such as independent professional advice (this includes legal advice), where the Independent Advisory Group believes this is necessary. 6.73 Finally, we would like to deal further with the LAG involvement in Operation Helios. We have already said that we are concerned that LAG members were not given full information and particularly that, having assisted the MPS in the Operation over some months, they were not consulted in relation either to the decision to settle Superintendent Dizaei’s Employment Tribunal claim or in relation to the terms of any settlement. 6.74 The evidence that we have received suggests that the trust and confidence which is essential between a police service and an IAG may have been severely damaged. Consideration needs to be given as to how it can best be repaired. We recommend that the Independent Advisory Group and the MPS agree a protocol in relation to disclosure of documentation and the rationale for decisions to Independent Advisory Group members. This must be based on the presumption that Independent Advisory Group members see everything that is available to the investigating officers. Where possible, this should be before decisions are taken.
	Previous Next
Report > 6: Governance, Accountability and Scrutiny
© Copyright 2004, The Morris Inquiry. Standards compliant HTML. Designed and maintained by Netfundi